Non so quanto sia attendibile, quindi cancellate se è fake
Fonte
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1G9puK8n3t/
So now we know what happened in India..... the 787's "points got wet"....
I am trying to find a second verification that this is fact. But the source has been accurate in the past. SO.... read but let time tell.
Flight: AI-171 | Aircraft: Boeing 787-8 | Date: June 25, 2025 | Route: Ahmedabad (VAAH) → London Heathrow (EGLL)
Crash Site: ~1.2 km from VAAH Runway 23, post-V1 and rotation
Fatalities: 247 (243 onboard + 4 ground)
Survivors: 0 onboard survivors (alternate to original), 3 injured on ground
⸻
🛠 AAIB Preliminary Report Highlights
1. Primary Cause – Electrical Power Transfer Interruption (PTI) During Rotation
• During transition from ground to airborne electrical configuration, the aircraft experienced a cascading dual-engine FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) failure.
• Root cause: Uncommanded bus transfer failure due to arcing in the main power relay box (PRB-A), traced to water ingress during pre-flight GPU disconnection in heavy rain.
• This led to loss of electronic engine control at rotation, resulting in both GEnx engines rolling back to ground idle within 4–5 seconds.
2. Flight Data Record Timeline
• +0:11 sec: Nose gear lifts off.
• +0:13 sec: Sudden engine rollback begins. Thrust reduces from 92% N1 to <27% within 3 seconds.
• +0:16 sec: Master caution + ENG FAIL L/R warnings. FO calls, “Both engines dropping!”
• +0:20 sec: Autopilot and flight control reverts to Direct Mode. Pitch up attitude peaks at 18°.
• +0:25 sec: Aircraft stalls at 186 ft AGL.
• +0:30 sec: Full aerodynamic stall; nose drops rapidly.
• +0:38 sec: Ground impact at 54° nose-down attitude, 174 knots.
⸻
⚙ Contributing Factors
• Environmental Conditions:
• Torrential rain during pushback.
• Moisture intrusion into PRB-A connector (P/N: HLN8471) — a known corrosion-risk component.
• Latent Maintenance Issue:
• Power transfer relay unit showed signs of thermal damage in a previous MEL deferral 2 weeks prior.
• No replacement had been conducted; aircraft was cleared under repetitive deferral.
• Design Oversight:
• Boeing 787 has no physical engine control backup (i.e., no direct mechanical linkage in FADEC loss scenario).
• Loss of power supply to both EEC channels resulted in engine “freeze” at ground idle instead of flameout.
• Flight Crew Response:
• Attempted engine relight sequence not completed before stall onset.
• Emergency power selector not activated — possibly due to confusion from multiple ECAM warnings.
⸻
✈ Immediate Safety Actions
• DGCA + EASA + FAA Emergency AD issued within 24 hours:
• Mandatory PRB-A moisture integrity inspection on all Boeing 787 aircraft.
• Temporary restriction on dispatch with MEL items related to power transfer systems.
• Boeing:
• Issued Service Bulletin SB-787-24-212 requiring replacement of PRB-A connectors with sealed versions.
• Exploring addition of dual-path power redundancy for FADEC systems.
⸻
Lessons Learned
• Over-reliance on electrical power distribution architecture without layered redundancy.
• Lack of crew procedural training for full engine rollback during takeoff in EEC dual failure scenarios.
• Need for improved environmental sealing in GPU/electrical handover units in monsoon zones.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com
i surge tank su qualsiasi aereo sono vuoti, sono solo 3 i serbatoi che portano il carburante in questo caso
