Etihad e compagnie aeree nella sua sfera d'influenza


La cura EY per AB sembra non funzionare: a Febbraio i pax sono calati del 6.3%, mentre Airlineroute riporta la chiusura nientemeno della STR-AUH. Ulteriore dimostrazione della modesta attrattiva dello scalo emiratino come hub verso Asia/Africa/Oceania.

http://ir.airberlin.com/en/ir/finan...tains-stable-capacity-utilization-in-February
http://airlineroute.net/2016/03/21/ab-strauh-jun16/

Credo sia doveroso ricordare che la STR-AUH rientrasse nei codeshare AB/EY revocati dalle autorità tedesche.

Forbes 13.01.2016 ha detto:
Two of those existing codeshare entitlements – Abu Dhabi-Berlin and Abu Dhabi-Stuttgart, both operated by Air Berlin – have now been revoked, purportedly because they are not explicitly named in the bilateral treaty.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/martinr...many-axes-air-berlin-codeshares/#7d0abaff2bd6

Una rotta feeder, senza possibilità di codeshare, non ha molto senso, impegnando, per di più, una macchina a lungo raggio di cui AB non abbonda. Evitando di difendere l'indifendibile, mi pare di ricordare che anche QR abbia recentemente sospeso la rotta e che gli unici voli LR di STR siano ATL ed EWR.
 
I maggiori azionisti di Virgin Australia (Etihad oltre ad ANZ, SQ e Virgin Group) hanno approvato un prestito di $425M AUD ($321M USD) per la compagnia aerea Australiana.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-21/virgin-australia-raises-loan-from-major-shareholders/7262686

Virgin Australia raises $425m loan from major shareholders
Virgin Australia has secured a 12-month, $425 million loan facility with its four major airline shareholders, while it considers future funding options.
The airline says it is undertaking a review into its capital structure to provide cheaper and more flexible access to funds, and improve its cash flow generation and profitability.
While the review is underway, Virgin Australia's major shareholders - Air New Zealand, Etihad Airways, Singapore Airlines and Virgin Group - have agreed to provide access to $425 million in loans.
These airlines will contribute to the loan facility in proportion to the size of their shareholding.
Currently, Air New Zealand owns just under 26 per cent of Virgin Australia, Etihad 24 per cent, Singapore Airlines almost 23 per cent and Virgin Group 10 per cent.
The new loan will rank behind Virgin Australia's existing debt and the airline said it is on arm's length commercial terms with its shareholders.
Virgin Australia said it has had a very successful transition over the past five years from being a low-cost carrier to a diversified airline group.
The company's chief executive John Borghetti said now is an appropriate time to review its mix of debt and equity funding, as well as considering new operational initiatives.
"Having achieved a significant transformation in the last five years, the Virgin Australia Group is now well placed to deliver ongoing growth and choice to Australian travellers," he said in a statement to the ASX.
"One of the key pillars of our 'Virgin Vision' strategy is to optimise the group's balance sheet, and the group has had an ongoing program in place to achieve this goal."
 
Credo sia doveroso ricordare che la STR-AUH rientrasse nei codeshare AB/EY revocati dalle autorità tedesche.
Una rotta feeder, senza possibilità di codeshare, non ha molto senso, impegnando, per di più, una macchina a lungo raggio di cui AB non abbonda. Evitando di difendere l'indifendibile, mi pare di ricordare che anche QR abbia recentemente sospeso la rotta e che gli unici voli LR di STR siano ATL ed EWR.
Si e no. Nel senso che il CS faceva comunque comodo, ma credo non esistessero comunque limitazioni all'utilizzo integrato dei network di AB e EY. A partire dalla vendita dei biglietti sul sito del partner. D'altra parte in EY hanno provato a forzare la mano ai tedeschi cercando di aggirare il limite delle 4 destinazioni concesse dal bilaterale (a scelta di ciascuna compagnia), aggiungendone una 5a effettuata da AB con CS EY. Infatti lo stesso sito di AB non fa menzione della querelle relativa ai CS presentando la chiusura della rotta come un semplice aggiustamento del network. Cosa che probabilmente è vera. E la mia impressione è che il network moderato sul quale può contare EY nel proprio hub, renda possibile un federaggio proficuo solo dai grandi scali, come sembra dimostrare anche la difficoltà del volo per VCE.

http://ir.airberlin.com/en/press/pr...in-withdraws-from-Stuttgart---Abu-Dhabi-route
Anche QR ha fallito a STR per la cronaca
Si, ma QR non ha rilevato quote di una compagnia tedesca con l'obiettivo di federare AUH.
D'altra parte Stoccarda è talmente ben collegata ad un colosso come FRA (+o- un treno ogni mezzora e 75' di viaggio) da lasciare poco spazio al LR su STR.
 
Circa 90 piloti hanno rassegnato dimissioni negli ultimi mesi. Sembra che la sostituzione di hogan sia voluta dalla proprietà (leggi emiro) perché concentrato più su controllate che su risultati EY che non starebbe al passo con la crescita di ek e qr
 
Ultima modifica:
Dovrebbero venire posticipate anche alcune consegne aeromobili anche se questa voce non è confermata
 
Ultima modifica:
Certo, è sicuramente stato Hogan a voler collezionare compagnie fallite per mettere un po' di color sabbia sugli aerei, come no....;)
 
Una rotta feeder, senza possibilità di codeshare, non ha molto senso, impegnando, per di più, una macchina a lungo raggio di cui AB non abbonda....

STR-AUH era operata con A320 di AB, molto preoccupante che da una città ricca come Stoccarda non riescano a riempire neanche un NB considerando che non ci sono altre golfare a STR
 
Hogan a Melbourne ha espresso anche parole per AZ:

Equity Investment Model ‘protects And Promotes Competition’, Says Etihad Airways Chief

CAPA > Direct News Sources
31-Mar-2016 Etihad Airways’ equity investment model has created a new force in global air travel, which protects and promotes competition, said the airline’s President and Chief Executive Officer James Hogan, in a speech in Melbourne today.

Speaking at the City Business Luncheon at Melbourne City FC, Mr Hogan outlined the challenges facing airlines trying to bring new competition to global markets. He said:
“In a world of mega-connectors and mega-alliances, it is impossible to go it alone when trying to compete on the global stage. The regulatory challenges, the daunting cost of entry and the might of the legacy carriers create incredibly high barriers.
“At Etihad Airways, we have had to build everything from scratch, investing in all the infrastructure of a global airline. So in addition to the obvious multi-billion dollar investments in aircraft and engines, that means investment in people, investment in technology, investment in real estate and investment in our brand.
“For Etihad Airways, it also meant investment in partners.
“A network carrier needs global reach if it is to compete effectively and the market is too mature, too dominated by legacy interests, for any new carrier to get that reach on its own.
“We’ve used partnership since day one, in the form of a growing codeshare network, but the equity investments took that approach to a new level.”
Etihad Airways, which has 49 codeshare relationships with carriers across the world, has taken minority equity investments in airlines in strategic markets, including Virgin Australia, Alitalia, Jet Airways, airberlin, Air Serbia and Air Seychelles.
“As with any partnership, these investments only work because both partners see benefits. Etihad Airways has seen a massive impact in extending our network reach and in feeding guests onto our routes. But that feed goes both ways. Virgin Australia, for example, has traditionally received more guests from our network than they feed to us. So we both win – and so does the traveller, who has a real competitive option.
“These relationships go far, far deeper. The ‘skin in the game’ of equity means we seek smarter ways to extend the relationship. That means close network integration, it means joint marketing and distribution, and it means business and cost synergies through Centres of Excellence.
“In each case, these investments have allowed the carriers access to effective capitalisation and financial restructuring. In such a capital intensive industry, that means we can truly be seen as a catalyst for positive change.”
Mr Hogan used Alitalia as an example of this strategy in action, explaining that Etihad Airways’ investment had created a new path to sustainable profitability for the Italian carrier.
“Alitalia was on the verge of collapse in 2014. Our collaboration with all major stakeholders meant we could all invest in a new Alitalia, an airline which would take all the best elements of ‘brand Italy’ and meld them into a commercially-focused airline.
“We are on a three-year journey with Alitalia and it is hitting every milestone. This is a business that is unrecognisable from its predecessor – and one which is offering new competitive choices to travellers to and from Italy.”
He concluded by reiterating the important role that Etihad Airways and its partners have come to play in offering new competitive choices to travellers.
“Our equity investment model has helped to protect and promote competition in global air travel. Some of these carriers would be very different today without our commitment; some would not exist.
“Together, we are creating and developing commercially focused businesses which can compete against the legacy airlines that dominate markets around the world.”
Mr Hogan was speaking to more than 500 guests at the City Business Luncheon, during a trip to help promote Etihad Airways’ growing commitment to Melbourne.
The airline will bring its award-winning Airbus A380 service to Melbourne from 1 June 2016, including The Residence by Etihad, and will also open its new premium lounge at Melbourne airport in May.

 
pare che dopo l'abbandono di PMI, il nuovo focus di airberlin sia il lungo raggio verso ovest:
sta per prendere due A330-200 da TAM, da posizionare su DUS e TXL, liberando forse un ulteriore A330 da MUC a DUS, in modo da proporre nella prossima winter:

TXL
JFK 7x weekly
MIA 4x weekly
ORD 5x weekly
PUJ 3x weekly

DUS
LAX 5x weekly
CUN 3x weekly
VRA 3x weekly

http://www.airberlingroup.com/en/pr...-long-haul-service-massively-ahead-of-winter-

hanno lanciato una nuova campagna pubblicitaria con il motto "the smart alternative"
e alcuni video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mCCINjF-SDw

i dati di maggio non sono comunque particolarmente entusiasmanti: minore capacità, minori passeggeri, load factors abbastanza stabili

http://www.airberlingroup.com/en/pr...ng-with-virtually-stable-capacity-utilization
 
Gulf 3 airline growth: Emirates steady, Qatar Airways accelerates & Etihad Airways slows
CAPA > Aviation Analysis > Gulf 3 airline growth: Emirates steady, Qatar Airways accelerates & Etihad Airways slows
8-Apr-2016
inShare


© CAPA

The Middle East's three big network airlines – Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways – are following different growth paths in 2016. Emirates is largely holding course, continuing recent 10% p/a ASK growth. Qatar Airways is accelerating growth and so far for 2016 will add as many ASKs as Emirates will – the first year it will do so.

After growing around 20% p/a for most of its short history, Etihad is decelerating with 10% growth although its net ASK additions will be similar to levels in 2012 and 2013. Etihad wants to bed down growth, replace partner aircraft it has been using, and improve equity partner financials amidst the Abu Dhabi government reducing spending, as observed elsewhere in the Middle East following the sharp decrease in oil price. Etihad's size in 2016 is about where Emirates was in mid-2007 while Qatar in 2016 is about the size Emirates was in 2010. Emirates has doubled in size between 2010 and 2016. Etihad has pursued partner growth. There are signs of pressure: ASK growth has outpaced RPK growth in 15 of the 17 months since Oct-2014, and load factors are falling to lows not seen in recent years.


Qatar Airways is the size Emirates was in 2010. Emirates has doubled in six years
In 2010, rhetoric against the big three Gulf airlines – Emirates, Etihad and Qatar – was mounting publicly in Europe in Australia, and beginning to see some US airlines investigate their Gulf counterparts. By the end of 2016, Emirates is expected to have doubled in size (ASKs) compared to 2010, based on schedules filed so far with OAG.

Qatar Airways in 2016 will be approximately the same size Emirates was in 2010. Etihad in 2016 will be about the size Emirates was in 2007.

Emirates, Etihad and Qatar annual ASKs: 2006-2016F

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG

Etihad is slowing growth while Qatar Airways is accelerating
The growth of the three Gulf airlines over the last decade may be confronting in chart form (below). In summary, Emirates has been descending from 20% p/a growth to around 10% for 2014-2016. Etihad, generally around 20%, is quickly slowing in 2016 amidst pressure to bed down its operation. So far Etihad is expected to grow about 9% in 2016, the second-slowest growth rate in its approximately decade-long history; in 2009 it was flat year-on-year. Etihad's next "slowest" year of growth was 2011's 15% expansion.

Qatar Airways reduced its growth rate around the turn of the decade (approximately 13% 2012-2014) but has accelerated since 2015, returning to pre-2011 growth levels despite now expanding from a significantly larger base. 2015 saw 19% growth and 2016 is projected to so far see 23% growth. This could tick upwards more as Qatar has announced new services but not yet filed schedules.

Emirates, Etihad and Qatar annual ASK growth: 2006-2016F

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG

Qatar Airways in 2016 will add as many ASKs as Emirates
Growth rates can be distorting since the base figure changes. Emirates' 10% growth in 2016 is 8ppt lower than 2012's 18%, but Emirates in 2016 will add almost as many ASKs in 2016 as it did in 2012. Qatar Airways is growing more than twice as fast (23%) in 2016 than Emirates. To bring this into focus, Qatar will add almost as many ASKs in 2016 as Emirates will. In terms of annual ASK additions, 2016 will be Qatar's largest year yet. Qatar's 2016 ASK growth is almost equivalent to the growth it put in over three years from 2012-2014.

2016 is the first year Qatar has come close to growing as much as Emirates – a result of Qatar accelerating growth while Emirates, even if it wanted to grow more, is constrained by capacity at its hub of Dubai International. Emirates' 2016 ASK production increase is similar to levels seen in 2013 and 2015, but down from a peak in 2012. The strong growth of Qatar alone compares to 2015 airport traffic in which Abu Dhabi and Doha collectively added as many passengers as Dubai International.

See related report: Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi airports win record traffic. Unhelpful taxes could challenge growth

Etihad is cutting its growth rate in 2016, with its ASK increase for the year half that seen in 2014 or 2015. But 2016's ASK increase is approximately the same growth in 2012 and 2013.

Emirates, Etihad and Qatar annual ASK increase: 2006-2016F

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG

Qatar Airways serves more destinations than Emirates. Etihad adding only one city in 2016
In 2011 Qatar overtook Emirates for number of destinations served
Qatar's growth is occurring through route thickening but also the launch of new destinations. In 2011 Qatar overtook Emirates for number of destinations served. The two dovetailed until 2015 when Qatar began an upwards trajectory faster than Emirates. The gap has widened in 2016 with Qatar serving over a dozen destinations more than Emirates.

This count excludes four destinations Qatar has announced it intends to serve in 2016 but has not filed in OAG. Qatar plans a further four new destinations for launch in 2017, mostly in Jan-2017 but also mid-2017.

Emirates, Etihad and Qatar passenger destinations: 2006-2016F

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG
Note: Excludes home base(s)

Some of Qatar's destinations are served with narrowbody aircraft, as tags, or with less than daily frequency. In contrast, Emirates generally eschews tags but is making some notable exceptions in 2016 such as with Zhengzhou and Yinchuan, as well as Clark and Cebu. Emirates also generally prefers a daily service. Unlike Qatar, Emirates does not operate narrowbody aircraft, restricting ability to expand into smaller points. In fact, the 777-300ER is effectively Emirates' smallest aircraft (it has a handful of 777-200LRs and A330s/A340s, the latter being phased out). Qatar operates smaller A330s and 787-8s.

Emirates' lack of a smaller workhorse is a matter it intends to address in 2016 with an order for the A350 or 787. If including flydubai – which has the same shareholding of Emirates but the two are independent entities – the combined Emirates-flydubai serves more destinations (197) than Qatar (155). (Turkish serves even more.)

Qatar's surpassing of Emirates in terms of destinations is evident from the below graph of net additional destinations served by each airline – Qatar was adding more points than Emirates and continues to. Also notable is Etihad's slowing of growth. After adding a net of seven destinations a year from 2009 through 2013, Etihad hovered around five in 2014 and 2015. For 2016, net growth will as of Apr-2016 be just one destination according to OAG data (Etihad is opening Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen and Morocco's Rabat, but no longer serving Armenia's Yerevan).

Opening new stations is costly in its own right and generally means a route will be unprofitable for a few years. By focusing on existing destinations and not opening new ones, Etihad can improve its financials.

Emirates, Etihad and Qatar net increase in destinations served: 2007-2016F

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG

Etihad looks to re-fleet and bed down its investment strategy. Not the time to takeover Virgin Australia
Etihad in 2016 has a remaining three A380s and five 787-9s to take delivery of plus one A330 freighter, according to projections from CAPA's fleet database. The eight passenger widebodies represent an approximately 11% increase over Etihad's existing passenger widebody fleet in terms of aircraft. Seat capacity increases are higher due to the large capacity of the A380.

Much of Etihad's growth in 2016 is actually the result of capacity put in during 2015 but has not yet seen a full-year realisation.

Etihad Airways projected delivery dates for aircraft purchased from OEMs and leased from lessors: 8-Apr-2016

Source: CAPA Fleet Database

It may seem Etihad will take delivery of more aircraft than it plans to grow with. One objective for 2016 is for Etihad to deploy more of its own branded aircraft. Etihad has been using aircraft from Air Seychelles (A330) and Jet Airways (A330, 777), and this has led to some experience mis-match Etihad is eager to amend. New aircraft deliveries will free up existing aircraft and allow for equipment changes.

Etihad's use of aircraft from its equity partners network is the result of Etihad needing capacity and its partners having a surplus of capacity. Jet Airways in particular did not have a clear long haul strategy, leaving its aircraft idle. Etihad is now in a position to replace Jet aircraft with its own. Jet's use for widebody aircraft that will be handed back to it has a mixed outlook.

For A330s, strong performance of the Indian market could see Jet up-gauge regional international flights (Dubai and Singapore) from 737 to A330. Because of constraints at Mumbai, Jet has started to operate A330s domestically. The six 777s to be returned starting from mid-2016 could cause deployment challenges for Jet as it is still short of a clear strategy for them. The aircraft could be sub-leased again, but if this does not happen Jet may struggle to find a viable role for this equipment, even at the current low fuel prices.

Cooling organic growth allows more management bandwidth to be spent on equity partners that have generally been under-performing financially, airberlin especially. Having gone on a long organic growth expansion and buying additional airlines, now is the time to bed down the strategy. Etihad's shareholder, the Abu Dhabi government, would be particularly eager to see improvements at Etihad at a time the government is under pressure from the fall in fuel prices, its staple source of revenue.

Dubai (hardly dependent on oil revenue) has resorted to increased air departure taxes. Etihad's EBIT margin for the Etihad-branded operation has been under 4% between 2012 and 2014, for when figures are available. Net margin has been 1%, but this all excludes the gains/losses from airlines Etihad invests in.

Etihad EBIT and net profit, and margins: 2012-2014

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and company

Etihad is unlikely to pursue Air New Zealand's stake in Virgin Australia
Against this background, Etihad is unlikely to pursue Air New Zealand's stake in Virgin Australia. Air New Zealand announced plans to divest its stake in Virgin Australia, in which Etihad also holds an interest, along with Singapore Airlines. With the two remaining partners keen to have influence over Virgin Australia, the Air NZ stake could go for a premium, further pressuring Etihad and Abu Dhabi financially.

Australia is a larger market for Singapore Airlines than Etihad, and SIA has ample cash reserves. As seen with SIA's purchase of Tigerair well above its market value, the group is not opposed to paying a premium to secure its strategic intent.

Finally, Air New Zealand would be more comfortable with SIA holding a larger (even majority) position in Virgin Australia than Air NZ would be with Etihad. Air NZ and SIA have broadly aligned interests – they have a JV – whereas Air NZ and Etihad are more distant even with a trans-tasman codeshare.

See related reports:

airberlin SWOT: even Etihad's millions can't help it to profit in year of peak airline sector margin
Alitalia's "new" strategy realigns it to feed Etihad, but needs to change loss-making mindset
India Aviation Outlook: Traffic up, losses down but operating environment remains challenging
Outlook: mixed airline growth comes as IATA cautions Middle East over-capacity
The Middle East outperforms IATA's global average on ASK growth. This region encompasses far more airlines than the big three network airlines, but they have come to define it.

IATA Middle East ASK growth (blue line) and global ASK growth (yellow line): 2012-2016

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and IATA

IATA's most recent traffic briefing, for Feb-2016, cautioned of over-capacity. Feb-2016 was the sixth consecutive month of capacity outstripping demand. RPKs were ahead of ASKs for all but one month of the first nine months of 2014. In the following 17 months, from Oct-2014 to Feb-2016, RPKs were ahead of ASKs in all but two months (Jul-2015 and Aug-2015). Since Sep-2015 is the six consecutive months IATA references.

Year-on-year change of ASKs and RPKs for international Middle East: 2014-2016

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and IATA

In the 20 months between Jul-2014 and Feb-2016, load factors have decreased for 16 of those months, including the six consecutive months since Sep-2015.

IATA Middle East international load factor year-on-year change (PPT): 2012-2016

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and IATA

In late-2014 load factors started to fall to recent lows. Mid-2015 saw a brief period of record load factors for recent times, but since Sep-2015 load factors have fallen below recent highs and are well below IATA's average.

Detailed analysis is not possible since Emirates, Etihad and Qatar do not report monthly traffic. The aggregate total from IATA is also impacted by the numerous other airlines in the region. Strategic route launches with poor performance could be dragging down strong performance elsewhere on the network. When viewing network performance as a total, a few rotten apples can spoil the lot.

IATA Middle East international load factor: 2012-2016

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and IATA

Etihad is slowing growth against internal factors, not competitive outlook, but the accelerated growth from Qatar Airways could pressure the growing over-capacity. Adding to pressure is that's Qatar's expansion could provoke competition responses, exacerbating growth.


http://centreforaviation.com/analys...ways-accelerates--etihad-airways-slows-275457
 
Da quello che so in Etihad hanno problemi a reperire piloti, molti stanno lasciando la compagnia o lo faranno nei prossimi mesi tanto che c'è una mail interna nella quale si comunica che alcuni voli potranno essere operati con 2 comandanti anzichè c.te e primo ufficiale.
 
Da quello che so in Etihad hanno problemi a reperire piloti, molti stanno lasciando la compagnia o lo faranno nei prossimi mesi tanto che c'è una mail interna nella quale si comunica che alcuni voli potranno essere operati con 2 comandanti anzichè c.te e primo ufficiale.

Possibile che fra poco aprano cadet?
 
Intanto AB continua a soffrire.

March 2016
Capacity 2,664,042 (-5.7%)
Number of passengers 2,141,898 (-6.7%)
ASK in millions 4,111 (-5.7%)
RPK in millions 3,513 (-6.8%)
Capacity utilization rate in % 85.4 (-1.0 pp)

accumulated 2016
Capacity 7,040,210 (-5.9%)
Number of passengers 5,416,618 (-6.8%)
ASK in millions 10,978 (-7.2%)
RPK in millions 9,151 (-7.0%)
Capacity utilization rate in % 83.4 (+0.1 pp)

http://ir.airberlin.com/en/ir/finan...ng-with-virtually-stable-capacity-utilization