Incidente A330 Air France Rio-Parigi 01/06/2009


belumosi

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DATE:28/05/11
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news

Revised stall procedures centre on angle-of-attack not power
By David Kaminski-Morrow

Investigators have been left attempting to explain why the crew of Air France flight AF447 failed to recover the Airbus A330 from a high-altitude stall, a predicament which has been the subject of a recent revision of safety procedures.
The revision concentrates on placing greater emphasis on reducing excessive angle of attack - the critical characteristic of a stall - rather than the classical approach of training pilots to power their way out of a near-stall with minimum loss of altitude.
A formal document detailing the rationale for the revision points out: "There have been numerous situations where flight crews did not prioritise [nose-down pitch control] and instead prioritised power and maintaining altitude."
Operational experience has shown that fixating on altitude, rather than the crucial angle of attack, can result in an aircraft stalling.
French investigation agency Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses has disclosed that the crew of AF447 maintained nose-up input despite the onset of a stall, but has yet to determine the reason or reach any conclusions.
After receiving a stall warning AF447's crew set the A330's thrust to take-off/go-around power, in line with Air France's standard operating procedure at the time. The procedure also required the crew to reduce pitch attitude, roll the wings level and ensure the speedbrake was retracted.
The revised recovery procedure was agreed between the major airframers, including Airbus and Boeing, some 12 months after the loss of AF447, although a source familiar with the investigation stresses that the change was "not prompted" by the accident.
At the heart of the revision is an acceptance that classical high-power recovery is not appropriate for every stall condition.
Simply applying maximum thrust could be ineffective in reducing the angle of attack and averting a stall, particularly at cruise altitudes where the available thrust would be limited and the engines would require time to spool up.
There is also a risk that the crew might fail to recognise that the aircraft has crossed the threshold from a near-stall into an actual stall, and continue to apply a recovery technique which is no longer effective.
The new procedure is designed to cover all stall conditions. It recognises that recovering the angle of attack might instead require a reduction of thrust, to regain pitch-down authority, as well as a loss of altitude.
It removes the need to prioritise take-off/go-around thrust in favour of restoring lift to the wing by reducing angle of attack. The procedure also points out that thrust should be re-applied smoothly, particularly because aircraft with under-wing engines have a tendency to pitch up, increasing the angle of attack, when power is applied.

http://www.flightglobal.com/article...procedures-centre-on-angle-of-attack-not.html
 

Seaking

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Seguendo il thread su A.Net, pare che in AF i piloti stiano polemizzando con l'azienda per non aver dotato gli Airbus, tranne il 380 poiché e' obbligatorio, del sistema BUSS (Back up speed scale), che dovrebbe essere di estremo aiuto per uscire da situazioni come quella del 330 AF.

Maggiori info qui sotto.

Comandante, ci dai un tuo parere al riguardo?

http://aviationtroubleshooting.blogspot.com/2009/06/af447-unreliable-speed-by-joelle-barthe.html

5 Back UP Speed Scale (BUSS)

In order to dedrease the crew workload in case of unreliable speed, Airbus has developed the Back-UP Speed Scale (BUSS) that replaces the pitch and thrust table. The BUSS is optional on A320/A330/A340. It is basic on A380, being part of the ADR Monitoring functions.

This indication is based on angle of atack (AOA) sensor information, and is therefore not affected by erroneous pressure measumements.

The BUSS comes with a new ADIUR standar (among other new system standards), where the AOA information is provided through the IRs and nor through the ADRs. This enables selecting all ADRs off without loosing the STALL WARNING PROTECTION.
The AOA information provides a guidance area in place of the speed scale. When the crew selects all ADRs OFF, then:

- The Back-Up Speed Scale replaces the PFD speed scale on both PFDs,

- GPS Altitude replaces the Altitude Scale on both PFDs.

The Back-Up Speed Scale then enables to fly at a safe speed, i. e. above stall speeds, by adjusting thrust and pitch.

The BUSS will be displayed once all ADRs are switched OFF. Therefore, on aircraft that have the BUSS, when the flight crew cannot identify the faulty ADR(s) when performing the troubleshooting, or when all ADRs are affected, the flight crew will switch OFF ADRs, and will fly the green area of the BUSS.

However, if the safe conduct of the flight is affected, the memory items must still be applied before troubleshooting.
As the BUSS is associated to the ADR monitoring funcitions, some unreliable speed situations can be automatically detected (e. g. new ECAM warning "NAV ADR 1+2+3 FAULT"), and some ECAM procedures will lead to the BUSS activation by requesting to switch OFF all ADRs.
6 Conclusion

An unreliable speed situatio may be difficult to identify, due to the multiple scenarios that can lead to it. Therefore, training is a key element: indeed the flight crew's ability to rapid detected the abnormal situation, and to correctely handle it, is cricial.

In case of any doubt, the pilot should apply the pitch/thrust memory items, and then refer to the QRH to safely fly the aircraft, and to positively determine the faulty source(s) before eliminating it (them).

In addition, to further assit the pilot in detecting the failure and safely fly the aircraft, Airbus has developed the BUSS, which provides a safe flying range indication.

Finaly, to reduze the probally of experiencing unreliable speed situations, on-ground actions, such as comprehensive maintenance and through pre-flight exterior inspection, should be stressed.
 

Seaking

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Sul sito Corporate, AF spiega perché non ha adottato il BUSS sui 330-340.

http://corporate.airfrance.com/en/press/af447/the-buss-or-backup-speed-scale/


On its A330s and A340s, Air France considered installing the BUSS system offered by Airbus and carried out tests on its flight simulators These tests did not lead Air France to adopt this system.
This is because it has the incovenience of depriving the crew of anemometric data during the flight once the BUSS system is activated, whereas experience has shown that the loss of speed indication is generally for a short time only. Moreover, the system is difficult to use at high altitude.
This has been confirmed by Airbus which recommends in a FOT (Flight Operations Telex) dated 9 September 2009 not to use this system at an altitude higher than 250, i.e. 7,600 metres (25,000 feet).
 

jtstream

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il comandante latita...
Domani, sperando di avere un po' di tempo, ti posto la sequenza temporale del come sono cambiate le procedure, cominciando subito a dire che quell di cui si parla sopra non è giunta 1 anno dopo ma bensì dopo poche settimane dall'evento.
 

depste

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Domani, sperando di avere un po' di tempo, ti posto la sequenza temporale del come sono cambiate le procedure, cominciando subito a dire che quell di cui si parla sopra non è giunta 1 anno dopo ma bensì dopo poche settimane dall'evento.
Va bene le procedure.
Ma e' credibile che questi siano venuti giu come sassi, perdendo 11mila piedi al minuto, con un assetto a cabrare?
Possibile non abbiano provato, una volta, d istinto, a romper lo stallo buttando giu il muso?
E' questo che mi fa pensare
 

Fabiazzo

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Roma.
Un'altra cosa che mi pare strana è che, osservando la traiettoria finale del volo, nonostante avessero voluto deviare verso sinistra per evitare la turbolenza, siano praticamente tornati indietro ruotando verso destra.
Considerando che un aereo di quel genere pesa 150-200 tonnellate, ma che un uragano può sradicare case intere e portarle a spasso, è pensabile che la violenza inaspettata della tempesta abbia trattato l'aereo come una foglia al vento ?
 

belumosi

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DATE:30/05/11
SOURCE:Flight International

AF447 inquiry: distress-triggered data could minimise search
By David Kaminski-Morrow

French investigators are to advise development of technical methods to reduce the search zone for missing aircraft, after the expensive two-year hunt for Air France flight AF447.
Uncertainty over AF447's location forced recovery teams to mark out a search circle 80nm (150km) in diameter - a total coverage area of 5,000nm² (17,000km²) - although the final wreck site was close to the last confirmed position.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation's flight recorder panel aims to require aircraft certificated from 2018 to carry equipment to limit searches over water to a 4nm radius.
Investigation agency BEA set up a technical working group that has concluded that the onset of an emergency could feasibly trigger transmission of aircraft data. The study also determined that higher-frequency position updates could significantly limit the size of a search radius.
The group examined 44 accidents and 24 incidents, across a broad range of aircraft types, to determine potential situations that could prompt a transmission.
Air France also supplied data on another 621 normal flights - comprising 212 conducted by Airbus A320s, 217 by A330s and 192 by Boeing 777s - to serve as a database for filtering out false triggers.
Analysis showed that simple binary triggering from unusual attitudes, such as excessive bank or pitch, as well as specific cockpit alarms, would have been effective for all but one of the 68 accidents, and would have limited nuisance alarms to two out of the 621 normal flights.
By including a time-limit criteria to check whether the emergency had stopped, the analysis found the false alarm rate could be limited to just 1min of nuisance transmission in 282h of flight. Using "fuzzy" logic to fine-tune the criteria could improve the detection rate and reduce nuisance alerts.
Eighty percent of the 44 accidents studied would have warned of a developing emergency at least 15s before impact, and for 34% the interval would have been at least 1min.
The warning time specifically for aircraft in cruise - as AF447 had been - notably increases, with 91% of accidents having a 30s interval, or more, between detection and impact.
"This study proves that developing reliable emergency detection criteria is achievable," said the BEA.
"The robustness of detection could be further improved with more elaborate criteria and additional parameters available on modern aircraft databuses."
BEA's working group also assessed the likelihood that triggered transmissions would be picked up and relayed by the Inmarsat constellation of communication satellites, when location and aircraft orientation were taken into account.
Simulations replicating 42 of the accidents in 597 different points of the world demonstrated that, in 85% of cases, transmission of data "would be possible before impact", said the working group.
For 82% of the accident and location combinations the corresponding search zone for the wreckage would be contained within a 4nm (7.4km) radius. This figure increases to 88% for impact points at the less extreme latitudes from 70°N to 70°S.
"Satcom systems with more than two antennas have the potential to perform extremely well in all aircraft environments, regardless of aircraft attitude," said the working group.
Much of the uncertainty over AF447's location resulted from the Airbus A330's automatically transmitting its position at 10min intervals. The working group has concluded that, by raising this frequency to once per minute, 85% of accidents in the study would have had an impact site within 4nm of last reported position.
This 4nm location radius is a "realistic aim" for 2020, said the group, and the BEA is "planning to issue a safety recommendation on this basis in the framework of the AF447 accident".
As part of its assessment the BEA has also inquired as to whether emergency locator transmitters could be developed to signal ahead of impact rather than activate on shock or water contact.
While the Cospas-Sarsat satellite system for search and rescue has been "undoubtedly helpful", said the working group, its detection of beacon signals after a crash "remains problematic" - either because of malfunction, submersion, obstruction or damage.
BEA sought advice from Cospas-Sarsat's operators to see whether beacons could transmit "a limited set of parameters" before an accident, and was invited to attend a meeting in Washington in September 2010 to draft initial operational requirements for next-generation beacons.
There have been previous similar suggestions, said the BEA, but the benefit has been impaired by limitations of Cospas-Sarsat's Leosar low-Earth orbit satellites, whose detection capability is "incompatible" with the typically short interval between an aircraft encountering distress and a resulting accident.
But this limitation "will disappear" with Cospas-Sarsat's medium-orbit Meosar system, it added. Initial testing shows localisation within 5km (2.7km) could be achieved with a single transmission burst.
The BEA adds that the time between beacon activation and initial data burst, currently specified at 50s, could be reduced to 3s to ensure data transmission initiates before a crash.
Cospas-Sarsat plans to approve operational requirements this year and compatible beacons could be available by the end of 2015. Meosar operational capability is expected in 2018.

http://www.flightglobal.com/article...y-distress-triggered-data-could-minimise.html
 

birillo

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(ANSA) - PARIGI, 31 MAG - Settantacinque corpi sono stati ripescati tra il 23 e il 30 maggio nel relitto dell'Airbus A330 del volo Rio-Parigi, precipitato nell'atlantico il primo giugno del 2009, uccidendo le 228 persone a bordo. E' quanto riferisce la gendarmeria francese confermando alcune indiscrezioni di stampa. In totale, sono stati recuperati 127 corpi, 50 nei giorni successivi all'incidente, due il giorno in cui sono state ritrovate le scatole nere, e 75 in questi ultimi giorni. Ne mancano ancora 101.
 

Alitalia Fan

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(ANSA) - PARIGI, 31 MAG - Settantacinque corpi sono stati ripescati tra il 23 e il 30 maggio nel relitto dell'Airbus A330 del volo Rio-Parigi, precipitato nell'atlantico il primo giugno del 2009, uccidendo le 228 persone a bordo. E' quanto riferisce la gendarmeria francese confermando alcune indiscrezioni di stampa. In totale, sono stati recuperati 127 corpi, 50 nei giorni successivi all'incidente, due il giorno in cui sono state ritrovate le scatole nere, e 75 in questi ultimi giorni. Ne mancano ancora 101.
Non posso neanche immaginare lo stato dei corpi ripescati in questi giorni... Povera gente :(
 

belumosi

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SOURCE:Flight International

Comment:AF447's new puzzles

For two years a team of investigators scoured a pitch-black area of ocean floor, half the size of Belgium, hunting a reinforced cylinder barely as big as a coffee pot, in the hope that it still contained the frozen echo of a French national disaster.
Few accidents have etched a flight number so firmly in the mind as the disappearance of Air France flight 447. The resulting story of determination set against desperate odds, and the timing of the flight recorders' discovery in the month before the Paris air show, could have been lifted from the pages of a film script.
Given the public and judicial interest, and with so much at stake for the reputations of Air France and Airbus, the chances that the recorders' contents would stay under wraps were minimal.
The investigators' decision to release a detailed picture of the accident sequence ended the mystery for many who had followed AF447's extraordinary story since the A330 vanished in an Atlantic storm in June 2009. But even as the riddle of AF447's sudden disappearance is being solved, two new puzzles emerge.
One centres on the adequacy of understanding over the icing phenomenon. Just 18 months before the loss of AF447, the wrecking of another long-haul aircraft - a British Airways Boeing 777 - revealed that this nemesis of aviation was still capable of behaving unexpectedly and outwitting modern certification criteria.
The other focuses on harmony between pilot and machine and whether flying skills, even flying knowledge, are being weakened by the crutch of automation.
While disclosure of the circumstances that led to the A330's predicament has yielded few surprises - an anemometric upset of sorts had been suspected within a week of the disappearance - it has yet to answer the real question: why could AF447 not be saved? The preliminary flight recorder data provides harsh fact with sparse context. But there appears little doubt that over 20,000h of collective cockpit experience was somehow insufficient to rescue a flyable airliner from the most basic of aerodynamic hazards - the loss of lift caused by a stall, a situation which private pilots are taught to recognise within hours of stepping into a light aircraft.
Investigators turned up several instances of similar stall scenarios, two of which happened in the same week as AF447 - one on the same Rio-Paris route.
There but for the grace of God? Or there but for the grace of thorough training, hands-on experience, and true understanding of what keeps an aircraft flying?

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/06/07/357513/commentaf447s-new-puzzles.html
 

A350XWB

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DATE:07/06/11
SOURCE:Flight International

Comment:AF447's new puzzles

For two years a team of investigators scoured a pitch-black area of ocean floor, half the size of Belgium, hunting a reinforced cylinder barely as big as a coffee pot, in the hope that it still contained the frozen echo of a French national disaster.
Few accidents have etched a flight number so firmly in the mind as the disappearance of Air France flight 447. The resulting story of determination set against desperate odds, and the timing of the flight recorders' discovery in the month before the Paris air show, could have been lifted from the pages of a film script.
Given the public and judicial interest, and with so much at stake for the reputations of Air France and Airbus, the chances that the recorders' contents would stay under wraps were minimal.
The investigators' decision to release a detailed picture of the accident sequence ended the mystery for many who had followed AF447's extraordinary story since the A330 vanished in an Atlantic storm in June 2009. But even as the riddle of AF447's sudden disappearance is being solved, two new puzzles emerge.
One centres on the adequacy of understanding over the icing phenomenon. Just 18 months before the loss of AF447, the wrecking of another long-haul aircraft - a British Airways Boeing 777 - revealed that this nemesis of aviation was still capable of behaving unexpectedly and outwitting modern certification criteria.
The other focuses on harmony between pilot and machine and whether flying skills, even flying knowledge, are being weakened by the crutch of automation.
While disclosure of the circumstances that led to the A330's predicament has yielded few surprises - an anemometric upset of sorts had been suspected within a week of the disappearance - it has yet to answer the real question: why could AF447 not be saved? The preliminary flight recorder data provides harsh fact with sparse context. But there appears little doubt that over 20,000h of collective cockpit experience was somehow insufficient to rescue a flyable airliner from the most basic of aerodynamic hazards - the loss of lift caused by a stall, a situation which private pilots are taught to recognise within hours of stepping into a light aircraft.
Investigators turned up several instances of similar stall scenarios, two of which happened in the same week as AF447 - one on the same Rio-Paris route.
There but for the grace of God? Or there but for the grace of thorough training, hands-on experience, and true understanding of what keeps an aircraft flying?

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/06/07/357513/commentaf447s-new-puzzles.html

Interpretazione giusta. Il rapporto tra automazione e pilota in questo caso non ha funzionato; leggevo che la Abnormal Attitude Law non si è inserita a causa dell'assetto non così "Abnormal", lasciando i piloti in "Alternate", quindi senza la protezione dell'angolo d'attacco.
Certo, i controlli automatici aiutano in maniera impressionante, ma quando la cosa si fa dura, sembra che nemmeno i più esperti riescano a tirarci fuori qualcosa.
Provare ad immaginarsi di essere in un cockpit in pieno oceano, in piena notte, in piena tempesta, in piena emergenza secondo me può essere una buona idea per rendersi conto di come una piena "situation awareness" non fosse così immediata.
I piloti non si arrabbino con me per quanto ho detto. So che si vola tranquillamente nelle prime 3 condizioni, ma aggiungendo una quarta, forse non diventa così immediato...
 

airbusfamilydriver

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Interpretazione giusta. Il rapporto tra automazione e pilota in questo caso non ha funzionato; leggevo che la Abnormal Attitude Law non si è inserita a causa dell'assetto non così "Abnormal", lasciando i piloti in "Alternate", quindi senza la protezione dell'angolo d'attacco.
la protezione dell'angolo d'attacco non ci sarebbe stata nemmeno in abnormal attitude law.
 

A350XWB

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speedbird437

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www.volarevirtual.com
The operations on board the Ile de Sein came to an end on the afternoon of Friday 3 June. The vessel is on its way to Las Palmas (Canary Islands) for demobilisation on 9 June.

In the course of next week, it will arrive in the port of Bayonne (south-west France), from where the airplane parts will be transferred to a hangar belonging to the DGA Techniques aéronautiques in Toulouse and the human remains taken to a forensic mortuary.

fonte: BEA