Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a ruotare in anticipo per evitarlo


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Incident: China Eastern A333 at Shanghai on Oct 11th 2016, runway incursion forces departure to rotate early and climb over A333


By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Oct 11th 2016 20:27Z, last updated Sunday, Oct 16th 2016 15:54Z


A China Eastern Airbus A330-300, registration B-6506 performing flight MU-5106 from Beijing to Shanghai Hongqiao (China), had landed on Hongqiao's runway 36R and was taxiing to the terminal needing to cross runway 36L. The aircraft, that had been previously cleared to cross runway 36L, was instructed to stop and hold short of runway 36L but did not react to the stop instruction.

A China Eastern Airbus A320-200, registration B-2337 performing flight MU-5643 from Shanghai Hongqiao to Tianjin (China), was accelerating for takeoff from Hongqiao's runway 36L when at about 110 KIAS the crew spotted the A330-300 crossing the runway edge and assessed that they would not be able to stop in time to avoid a collision, however, they would be able to outclimb the A330. The crew firewalled the engines, continued their takeoff run, rotated the aircraft at about 130 KIAS and managed to climb the A320 over the A330. The A320 continued to Tianjin for a safe landing about 100 minutes later.

China's Civil Aviation Authority CAAC reported that the A320 was in their takeoff run when the A330 crossing the runway appeared in front of them. The A320 captain assessed that it was safer to continue, the rest of the flight was without further incident. An investigation into the serious incident has been opened.

On Oct 12th 2016 the CAAC reported that preliminary investigation results suggest the serious incident was caused by a tower controller's misdirected instruction.

On Oct 15th 2016 the CAAC reported that the separation between the aircraft reduced to 19 meters vertical and 13 meters horizontal (wingtip to wingtip) while the A320 climbed over the vertical stabilizer of the A333. Screenshots off and the reconstruction video below.

According to the reconstruction video the A320 lined up runway 36L at taxiway H7. The A333 was taxiing on taxiway H3 and crossed the right runway edge when the A320 was just short of taxiway H4 about 1600 meters/5250 feet into the takeoff run and about 770 meters/2530 feet short of taxiway H3. The A320 became airborne abeam taxiway C2 about 2100 meters/6890 feet into the takeoff run and about 300 meters/1000 feet short of taxiway H3, and crossed taxiway H3 19 meters/62 feet above the vertical tail of the A332.

Chinese media are reporting (no official statement to the sequence of events released by the CAAC so far) that during the presentation of the video it was said, that the A330 had been cleared to cross runway 36L at H3 about 36 seconds prior to the A320 receiving takeoff clearance, by which time the controller had forgotten about the earlier crossing clearance, the A320 crew had not yet been on frequency and therefore had not heard the crossing clearance. After the A330 crossed the hold short line tower called the A330 three times to stop, however, the crew did not listen. The crew also did not check whether the runway was clear prior to cross the hold short line blindly trusting in the ATC instructions. In addition, the cockpit voice recorder of the A330 was not secured and was found overwritten. Takeoff performance computation shows, that even from V1=146 KIAS (with Vr=147 KIAS, V2=151 KIAS) the A320 could have stopped within 475 meters (thus permitting the aircraft to stop more than 200 meters short of H3 had takeoff been rejected abeam H4 at about 110 KIAS), however, the captain had no real time measurements of distances remaining available. The CAAC are going to decide about punishments on Oct 17th.

Metars:
ZSSS 110530Z 05005MPS CAVOK 25/09 Q1017 NOSIG
ZSSS 110500Z 03005MPS 360V070 CAVOK 25/10 Q1017 NOSIG
ZSSS 110430Z 06004G09MPS 320V100 CAVOK 25/11 Q1018 NOSIG
ZSSS 110400Z 06005MPS CAVOK 25/11 Q1018 NOSIG
ZSSS 110330Z 06004G11MPS 010V090 CAVOK 24/11 Q1018 NOSIG
ZSSS 110300Z 04005MPS 010V090 CAVOK 24/12 Q1019 NOSIG
ZSSS 110230Z 02006MPS CAVOK 23/13 Q1019 NOSIG
ZSSS 110200Z 04004MPS 010V080 CAVOK 23/13 Q1020 NOSIG
ZSSS 110130Z 04006MPS CAVOK 23/14 Q1020 NOSIG
ZSSS 110100Z 04005MPS 010V100 CAVOK 22/14 Q1020 NOSIG



http://avherald.com/h?article=49f37b96&opt=0
 
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Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

Porca l'oca!!
Mi immagino le facce dei pax lato sinistro del 330...
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

Questo operazione come si chiama tecnicamente? "Botta di culo", "Gesù/Buddha/Allah esiste" o "ca..o, ca..o, ca..o pfiuuuu"?

Mi permetto di scherzarci perché, ad un occhio di un non addetto ai lavori, sembra davvero una tragedia sfiorata per un pelo. Ed i 300-400 passeggeri dovrebbero accendere un cero alla Madonna o al loro Dio. E di corsa secondo me. :)
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

Questo operazione come si chiama tecnicamente? "Botta di culo", "Gesù/Buddha/Allah esiste" o "ca..o, ca..o, ca..o pfiuuuu"?

Mi permetto di scherzarci perché, ad un occhio di un non addetto ai lavori, sembra davvero una tragedia sfiorata per un pelo. Ed i 300-400 passeggeri dovrebbero accendere un cero alla Madonna o al loro Dio. E di corsa secondo me. :)

Credo anche agli occhi degli addetti
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

Questo operazione come si chiama tecnicamente? "Botta di culo", "Gesù/Buddha/Allah esiste" o "ca..o, ca..o, ca..o pfiuuuu"?

Mi permetto di scherzarci perché, ad un occhio di un non addetto ai lavori, sembra davvero una tragedia sfiorata per un pelo. Ed i 300-400 passeggeri dovrebbero accendere un cero alla Madonna o al loro Dio. E di corsa secondo me. :)
Sicuramente il fattore Q ha giocato bene la sua parte. Non esiste una manovra di "avoidance" codificata per queste situazioni. Credo che la valutazione dell'equipaggio del 320 in decollo (immagino il comandante al quale spetta la decisione di abortire o continuare la corsa di decollo) sia stata quella di valutare se lo spazio disponibile per il rejected take off fosse sufficiente ad evitare il 330 che stava attraversando (un 320 a carico medio, 180 pax e 6/7 ton di carburante, su pista asciutta si ferma in meno di 1000 metri) o sarebbe stato meglio utilizzare la spinta massima di take off/go around (ammesso, come riporta l'articolo, che il decollo fosse impostato per una spinta ridotta "flex thrust, assumed temperature", come spesso si fa su piste lunghe) ed involarsi anche alla Vmu (minimum unstick speed) per evitare l'impatto. Spesso sono reazioni istintive che scaturiscono da un rapidissimo ragionamento e dal fare il possibile per portare a casa le chiappe col minor danno possibile....meglio una grattuggiata alla coda che una "Tenerife 2.0"?
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

The CAAC reported late Oct 17th 2016, that preliminary investigation results, the investigation probably being completed in about 20 days, suggest the main cause of the serious incident was negligence by the tower controller, however, the work by the A330 crew was also flawed. The CAAC reported that the A330 was cleared to cross runway 36L, subsequently the A320 was cleared to line up runway 36L and wait followed by takeoff clearance. When the A320 had reached about 110 KIAS the crew spotted the A330 crossing the runway edge, the first officer applied brakes briefly, the commander took control of the aircraft, applied TOGA and accelerated the aircraft to 130 KIAS then rotated the aircraft at 7.03 degrees/second rate and climbed the A320 over the A330, minimal vertical distance between the aircraft was 19 meters, wingtip to wingtip distance was 13 meters. On board of both aircraft were 413 passengers and 26 crew. The tower controller was in violation of standard operating procedures with cross checking not in place (editorial note: incomprehensible what is meant, presumably the controller instructed just out of memory without noting instructions into the ATC system, also preventing the supervising controller to recognize the mistake) and forgot about the earlier crossing clearance when clearing the A320 for takeoff. The A330 crew did not cross check their instructions, did not check the status of the runway before crossing and did not maintain radio contact with tower.

At the same time the CAAC announced that the captain of the A320 is going to receive an award for his actions preventing what would have become China's worst aviation accident otherwise.
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

The CAAC reported late Oct 17th 2016, that preliminary investigation results, the investigation probably being completed in about 20 days, suggest the main cause of the serious incident was negligence by the tower controller, however, the work by the A330 crew was also flawed. The CAAC reported that the A330 was cleared to cross runway 36L, subsequently the A320 was cleared to line up runway 36L and wait followed by takeoff clearance. When the A320 had reached about 110 KIAS the crew spotted the A330 crossing the runway edge, the first officer applied brakes briefly, the commander took control of the aircraft, applied TOGA and accelerated the aircraft to 130 KIAS then rotated the aircraft at 7.03 degrees/second rate and climbed the A320 over the A330, minimal vertical distance between the aircraft was 19 meters, wingtip to wingtip distance was 13 meters. On board of both aircraft were 413 passengers and 26 crew. The tower controller was in violation of standard operating procedures with cross checking not in place (editorial note: incomprehensible what is meant, presumably the controller instructed just out of memory without noting instructions into the ATC system, also preventing the supervising controller to recognize the mistake) and forgot about the earlier crossing clearance when clearing the A320 for takeoff. The A330 crew did not cross check their instructions, did not check the status of the runway before crossing and did not maintain radio contact with tower.

At the same time the CAAC announced that the captain of the A320 is going to receive an award for his actions preventing what would have become China's worst aviation accident otherwise.

Inchiesta, ricostruzione video, e prime azioni in soli 6 giorni....complimenti !
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

"firewalled the engines"...magari stavano in Flex e sono passati in TOGA...non so se il 320 ha un sorta di "overrun" sui motori...ricordo l'MD11 mi sembra aveva proprio un blocco fisico a fine corsa delle manette che, se rimosso, te le faceva spingere oltre ancora...ma magari ricordo male o in mal modo...
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

"firewalled the engines"...magari stavano in Flex e sono passati in TOGA...non so se il 320 ha un sorta di "overrun" sui motori...ricordo l'MD11 mi sembra aveva proprio un blocco fisico a fine corsa delle manette che, se rimosso, te le faceva spingere oltre ancora...ma magari ricordo male o in mal modo...

No, sul 320 non c'è, la massima spinta ottenibile è con TOGA
L'MD11 aveva un "overboost" se non ricordo male
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

"firewalled the engines"...magari stavano in Flex e sono passati in TOGA...non so se il 320 ha un sorta di "overrun" sui motori...ricordo l'MD11 mi sembra aveva proprio un blocco fisico a fine corsa delle manette che, se rimosso, te le faceva spingere oltre ancora...ma magari ricordo male o in mal modo...

No, sul 320 non c'è, la massima spinta ottenibile è con TOGA
L'MD11 aveva un "overboost" se non ricordo male
Il 320 fam per entrambi i motori -CFM e IAE- non ha spinta extra oltre al TOGA; il 330 con i motori GE (quelli di AZ per intenderci) può avere i "thrust bumps" ovvero un optional che permette di avere un 7% massimo di N1 extra sul normale TOGA. Mai usato, sinceramente. Sono due bottoni posti vicino alle manette tipo il TOGA di Boeing.
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

Il 320 fam per entrambi i motori -CFM e IAE- non ha spinta extra oltre al TOGA; il 330 con i motori GE (quelli di AZ per intenderci) può avere i "thrust bumps" ovvero un optional che permette di avere un 7% massimo di N1 extra sul normale TOGA. Mai usato, sinceramente. Sono due bottoni posti vicino alle manette tipo il TOGA di Boeing.

Eccolo là.

ThrustBump.jpg
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

Il 320 fam per entrambi i motori -CFM e IAE- non ha spinta extra oltre al TOGA; il 330 con i motori GE (quelli di AZ per intenderci) può avere i "thrust bumps" ovvero un optional che permette di avere un 7% massimo di N1 extra sul normale TOGA. Mai usato, sinceramente. Sono due bottoni posti vicino alle manette tipo il TOGA di Boeing.

Si potrebbe testarlo su Città del Messco!:p
 
Re: Runway incursion a Shangai, 320 costretto a rotare in anticipo per evitarlo

Si potrebbe testarlo su Città del Messco!:p

Su aeroporti simili, tipo JNB, ti confesso che non ho mai avuto bisogno dell'extra anche a pieno carico. Se ti riferisci ad AZ per il ritorno a pieno carico, credo che il GE90 sia già abbondantemente "generoso" in quanto a spinta.
Il Trent700 (che motore ragazzi!!!) eroga 72 mila libbre di spinta, non ha thrust bumps, ma è talmente potente che da mxp 35L in salita diretto Aosta senza seguire la SID, potevi salire al max TOW con un buon Derated climb del 20%!
Il GE ha 70mila libbre ed il PW (quello di US airways ora AA) "solo" 68mila.

Chiudo l'OT permettendomi di osservare che la reazione del CM2 dell'incidente in questione, "the FO applied brakes briefely", per quanto istintiva, non rispecchia alcuna SOP in quanto è sempre il CM1 ad iniziare il RTO, anche su suggerimento di chiunque sia presente in cabina, FO, observer, trainer ecc.