Atterraggio di emergenza a Fiumicino per AZ063 da Madrid
- Autore Discussione Tiennetti
- Data d'inizio
Era sotto sequestro anche il Wizzair,è stato fermo sigillato e transennato in zona area tecnica in mezzo agli md80 al prato,poi una volta chiusa l'indagine è stato portato in Avio 2 ed ho visto i tecnici LH lavorarci
Esattamente. Il sequestro è prassi comune, cosi come è comune il dissequestro in tempi rapidi, soprattutto se l'incidente non ha avuto conseguenze gravi.
Grazie! Io ricordo di averlo visto quest'estate in un hangar insieme ad aerei AZ (321 e co). È stato riparato li da LH?
Inviato dal mio U8800Pro con Tapatalk 2
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...lane-crash-seen-from-inside-the-aircraft.html
Evito di commentare.
Evito di commentare.
Tipo che come ti viene, durante una fase delicata quale può essere un atterraggio senza carrello, di metterti a fare un video?
Ho letto sui giornali che l'aereo è stato caricato su un camion ecc ecc a me da questo video, dal minuto 1.00 al minuto 2.28, mi sembra che l'aereo sia stato trainato con un trattore e sia arrivato con il suo carrello dove doveva arrivare, senza nessun ausilio di camion...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtKRaP1yWxE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtKRaP1yWxE
Poche ore prima sempre a Fiumicino un'altro Airbus LH ha avuto problemi con il carrello....
http://avherald.com/h?article=4693470c&opt=0
http://avherald.com/h?article=4693470c&opt=0
Dammi il numero di telefono del giornalista, sai.... mi devo trasferire e vorrei portare la villetta con me. Chiedigli se un Ducato Maxi è sufficiente.
On Dec 4th 2013 the ANSV released safety recommendations to EASA stating that current required checks are not effective to detect a developing failure of the main gear door actuators. Instead a campaign to replace current actuators with an improved version, that no longer requires such tests, should be accelerated. In addition, the ANSV recommends to require maintenance inspect and clear the associated hydraulic system in case of faulty door actuator being found.
The ANSV argues, that debris had been found within the failed and not failed gear door actuators of all three aircraft, EI-EIB, Wizzair's HA-LWM and N816UA, see Accident: United Airlines A319 at Newark on Jan 10th 2010, right main gear did not deploy. While maintenance procedures and airworthiness directives required the replacement of the actuator, neither required the associated hydraulic system to be inspected.
The ANSV reported, that the crew worked the checklists after receiving indication, that the right main gear was not locked into its extended position, amongst te procedures were high G procedures (+1.75G according to flight data recorder) with gear lever down, alternate gear extension, however all measures did not manage to extend the gear leg. The crew subsequently prepared for an emergency partial gear up landing at Fiumicino Airport, just before touchdown both engines were shut down, the right hand engine scraped along the runway until the aircraft came to a stop.
The ANSV stated: "The investigators noticed the right MLG door actuator only partially extended and the right MLG not in the up-lock position, but stuck on the door (the door was not touching the terrain and no signs of ground contacts were present on it – picture 2). At removal of the jammed actuator, the door fully opened and the gear correctly extended and locked."
Heavy debris was found in the damping housing of the failed actuator, some dampening components were missing with the exception of the retaining ring which however was out its design position. Tests confirmed the actuator was really jammed. Only when 1000psi hydraulic pressure were applied the failed actuator could be extended to near its extended length.
The left hand main gear actuator was also found containing debris, however, it was functional with a slight anomaly on the dampening speed (faster than maximum speed allowed).
The flight data recorder confirmed that after selecting the gear down the crew waited for more than 2 minutes before attempting the free fall procedure as recommended by the operations hand book.
The ANSV stated: "Recurrence of the accident, that seems fully coherent with the previous two events, one occurred at Newark Liberty International airport (NJ, USA) on January 10th 2010 to the A319 aircraft registration marks N816UA (equipped with a MLG door actuator std-10), and the other one occurred at Fiumicino airport on last June 8th 2013 to the A320 aircraft registration marks HA-LWM (equipped with a MLG door actuator std-12, like the one installed on the subject event), poses serious concerns about the effectiveness of the mitigation actions currently in place while taking into account the large fleet potentially affected by the issue. The DFDR analysis demonstrated that the total opening time of the main landing gear doors in the last two accident flight took about 4.5 seconds. So even if for the Wizzair case it has been individuated a problem solved with the Emergency AD 2013-132-E about the aircraft for which the interlink communication ARINC 429 was installed, the warning message on the PFR should have been not found. Further analysis have been performed on the DFDR data coming from the database of the ANSV Laboratory (A320 family fleet data), and normally the total timing for the main landing gear doors opening has been found between 3.5s to 5s (accident flight included)."
The ANSV voiced concern with the timing of a solution: "The recent introduction of the P/N 114122-014 as indicated by the SB 32-1407 released in May 2013, and by the OIT 999.0074/13 issued on October 30th 2013, that it is intended to fix the problem through a new design of the internal damping mechanism, if effective, could still require too long a time to ensure the highest safety standard before completion of the retrofit of the fleet."
http://avherald.com/h?article=469338e0&opt=0
The ANSV argues, that debris had been found within the failed and not failed gear door actuators of all three aircraft, EI-EIB, Wizzair's HA-LWM and N816UA, see Accident: United Airlines A319 at Newark on Jan 10th 2010, right main gear did not deploy. While maintenance procedures and airworthiness directives required the replacement of the actuator, neither required the associated hydraulic system to be inspected.
The ANSV reported, that the crew worked the checklists after receiving indication, that the right main gear was not locked into its extended position, amongst te procedures were high G procedures (+1.75G according to flight data recorder) with gear lever down, alternate gear extension, however all measures did not manage to extend the gear leg. The crew subsequently prepared for an emergency partial gear up landing at Fiumicino Airport, just before touchdown both engines were shut down, the right hand engine scraped along the runway until the aircraft came to a stop.
The ANSV stated: "The investigators noticed the right MLG door actuator only partially extended and the right MLG not in the up-lock position, but stuck on the door (the door was not touching the terrain and no signs of ground contacts were present on it – picture 2). At removal of the jammed actuator, the door fully opened and the gear correctly extended and locked."
Heavy debris was found in the damping housing of the failed actuator, some dampening components were missing with the exception of the retaining ring which however was out its design position. Tests confirmed the actuator was really jammed. Only when 1000psi hydraulic pressure were applied the failed actuator could be extended to near its extended length.
The left hand main gear actuator was also found containing debris, however, it was functional with a slight anomaly on the dampening speed (faster than maximum speed allowed).
The flight data recorder confirmed that after selecting the gear down the crew waited for more than 2 minutes before attempting the free fall procedure as recommended by the operations hand book.
The ANSV stated: "Recurrence of the accident, that seems fully coherent with the previous two events, one occurred at Newark Liberty International airport (NJ, USA) on January 10th 2010 to the A319 aircraft registration marks N816UA (equipped with a MLG door actuator std-10), and the other one occurred at Fiumicino airport on last June 8th 2013 to the A320 aircraft registration marks HA-LWM (equipped with a MLG door actuator std-12, like the one installed on the subject event), poses serious concerns about the effectiveness of the mitigation actions currently in place while taking into account the large fleet potentially affected by the issue. The DFDR analysis demonstrated that the total opening time of the main landing gear doors in the last two accident flight took about 4.5 seconds. So even if for the Wizzair case it has been individuated a problem solved with the Emergency AD 2013-132-E about the aircraft for which the interlink communication ARINC 429 was installed, the warning message on the PFR should have been not found. Further analysis have been performed on the DFDR data coming from the database of the ANSV Laboratory (A320 family fleet data), and normally the total timing for the main landing gear doors opening has been found between 3.5s to 5s (accident flight included)."
The ANSV voiced concern with the timing of a solution: "The recent introduction of the P/N 114122-014 as indicated by the SB 32-1407 released in May 2013, and by the OIT 999.0074/13 issued on October 30th 2013, that it is intended to fix the problem through a new design of the internal damping mechanism, if effective, could still require too long a time to ensure the highest safety standard before completion of the retrofit of the fleet."
http://avherald.com/h?article=469338e0&opt=0
Credo che non sia più sotto sequestro da tempo,è in avio 1 aperto senza sigilli ma non vedo mai nessuno lavorarci