Qualche dettaglio in più qui
https://www.corriere.it/cronache/19...sa-ed632164-d31f-11e9-b7e8-6cf2f2f7881d.shtml
https://www.corriere.it/cronache/19...sa-ed632164-d31f-11e9-b7e8-6cf2f2f7881d.shtml
737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba
- Autore Discussione carter72
- Data d'inizio
Scusa la domanda stupida: è stato questo a influire sulla durata o la velocità mas di 444 chilometri orari?
Problemi anche sull’A320 sul centro di gravità. E Lufthansa deve bloccare l’ultima fila degli A320 Neo. Il problema principale è stato l’aggiunta di una fila in più e lo spostamento delle aft toilette nel Galley posteriore.
As we all know, nowadays airlines do everything they can to squeeze as many seats as possible onto planes, especially when we’re talking about short haul configured aircraft of European airlines.
They’ve been able to make these planes more “efficient” by reducing legroom, making the seats thinner, and eliminating as much galley and bathroom space as possible.
Well, an airline is now facing a situation where they’re being forced to block a row of seats on a very efficient plane for a surprising reason.
Lufthansa’s A320neo
The A320neo is the most fuel efficient version of the A320, with the “neo” designation standing for “new engine option.” Lufthansa has quite a few of these planes in their fleet. Initially they had “only” 180 seats of these planes, but they’ve been able to squeeze 186 seats onto these planes. Woot, woot, well done, Lufthansa!
A320neo Center Of Gravity Issues
While the airline might be proud of how many seats they’ve squeezed onto the plane, Simple Flying is reporting that Lufthansa is now blocking the last row of seats on A320neos due to center of gravity concerns. Could a 150,000 pound plane really be thrown off by passengers sitting in the last row? Yes and no.
We all know about the issues that the 737 MAX has had, and while not quite as serious, some issues have also been identified with the A320neo.
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has discovered a problem with the center of gravity of the A320neo. Essentially there’s a very narrow set of circumstances under which the A320neo’s elevator and aileron computer may not correctly compensate for the situation the plane is facing.
It seems that the most common situation here is when a plane is landing, and if it has to perform a go around. In these situations the elevator and aileron computer should compensate for the center of gravity being slightly off. But it has been discovered that with a center of gravity towards the rear of the aircraft, the computer may not respond correctly.
Now, it’s worth knowing that this has never been encountered during operations, but rather was discovered during analysis and laboratory testing.
Still, the EASA has issued an airworthiness directive limiting the aft CG, which is below the previous limit.
Why Is This Specifically Impacting Lufthansa’s A320neos?
Interestingly this issue only impacts Lufthansa A320neo aircraft with the new Space Flex cabins. These planes feature an extra row of seats, and the way they’re able to squeeze in those extra seats is by more efficiently using every part of the aircraft.
For example, the bathrooms are at the very back of the plane behind the galley, using space that previously wasn’t used. Clearly this moves the center of gravity of the plane back a bit.
Bottom Line
Sometimes when you’re flying a turboprop or small regional jet they’ll ask you to move around for weight & balance, though you wouldn’t expect a row of seats would have to be blocked on an A320.
It would appear that Lufthansa will keep this seat blocking in place for the foreseeable future, and not actually reconfigure any planes. It’s expected that a software fix will be available sometime next year that fixes this.
Interesting stuff, eh?
https://onemileatatime.com/lufthans..._M1oPAwCB7KsNj4URpS0vnTBK1d1pI2yZiqCMlWbkqNJc
As we all know, nowadays airlines do everything they can to squeeze as many seats as possible onto planes, especially when we’re talking about short haul configured aircraft of European airlines.
They’ve been able to make these planes more “efficient” by reducing legroom, making the seats thinner, and eliminating as much galley and bathroom space as possible.
Well, an airline is now facing a situation where they’re being forced to block a row of seats on a very efficient plane for a surprising reason.
Lufthansa’s A320neo
The A320neo is the most fuel efficient version of the A320, with the “neo” designation standing for “new engine option.” Lufthansa has quite a few of these planes in their fleet. Initially they had “only” 180 seats of these planes, but they’ve been able to squeeze 186 seats onto these planes. Woot, woot, well done, Lufthansa!
A320neo Center Of Gravity Issues
While the airline might be proud of how many seats they’ve squeezed onto the plane, Simple Flying is reporting that Lufthansa is now blocking the last row of seats on A320neos due to center of gravity concerns. Could a 150,000 pound plane really be thrown off by passengers sitting in the last row? Yes and no.
We all know about the issues that the 737 MAX has had, and while not quite as serious, some issues have also been identified with the A320neo.
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has discovered a problem with the center of gravity of the A320neo. Essentially there’s a very narrow set of circumstances under which the A320neo’s elevator and aileron computer may not correctly compensate for the situation the plane is facing.
It seems that the most common situation here is when a plane is landing, and if it has to perform a go around. In these situations the elevator and aileron computer should compensate for the center of gravity being slightly off. But it has been discovered that with a center of gravity towards the rear of the aircraft, the computer may not respond correctly.
Now, it’s worth knowing that this has never been encountered during operations, but rather was discovered during analysis and laboratory testing.
Still, the EASA has issued an airworthiness directive limiting the aft CG, which is below the previous limit.
Why Is This Specifically Impacting Lufthansa’s A320neos?
Interestingly this issue only impacts Lufthansa A320neo aircraft with the new Space Flex cabins. These planes feature an extra row of seats, and the way they’re able to squeeze in those extra seats is by more efficiently using every part of the aircraft.
For example, the bathrooms are at the very back of the plane behind the galley, using space that previously wasn’t used. Clearly this moves the center of gravity of the plane back a bit.
Bottom Line
Sometimes when you’re flying a turboprop or small regional jet they’ll ask you to move around for weight & balance, though you wouldn’t expect a row of seats would have to be blocked on an A320.
It would appear that Lufthansa will keep this seat blocking in place for the foreseeable future, and not actually reconfigure any planes. It’s expected that a software fix will be available sometime next year that fixes this.
Interesting stuff, eh?
https://onemileatatime.com/lufthans..._M1oPAwCB7KsNj4URpS0vnTBK1d1pI2yZiqCMlWbkqNJc
FAA chief to meet with Boeing officials, test 737 MAX simulator
David Shepardson
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - New Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) chief Stephen Dickson plans to fly to Seattle this week to fly “newly configured” Boeing 737 MAX software in a simulator and will visit with Boeing (BA.N) officials, the agency said Monday.
Boeing plans to revise the 737 MAX software to take input from both angle-of-attack sensors in the MCAS anti-stall system linked to two deadly crashes that led to a global grounding of the plane in March. But it is not clear when it will conduct a key certification test flight, a step needed before the FAA can return the plane to service. The FAA confirmed that Dickson, who took over as administrator in mid-August, has no firm timeline for the grounded 737 MAX to resume flights or when Boeing will turn over final documentation. The FAA said Dickson also plans to visit with the FAA aircraft certification team in Seattle. Separately, a spokeswoman for Representative Peter DeFazio, who chairs the House Transportation Committee, confirmed that Boeing had declined his invitation to testify at an upcoming House hearing. “Boeing is working diligently and transparently with committees in both the House (of Representatives) and the Senate to ensure that proper information is being shared and we will continue to do so,” the company said in an e-mailed statement. Boeing’s board is expected to consider changes proposed by a board committee later this week, people briefed on the matter said. Reuters reported in August that the committee review would find the company needs to reorganize its engineering reporting lines company-wide and ensure higher ranking officials, including its CEO, get faster feedback about potential safety concerns from lower levels of the company. The changes are intended to boost the transparency of engineering decisions and accelerate efforts to share safety information as widely and swiftly as possible across Boeing’s global businesses and factories, Reuters reported.
Boeing has said it plans to conduct a certification test flight in the “September time frame” but Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg did not give a specific date when asked last week. Federal prosecutors aided by the FBI, the Department of Transportation’s inspector general and several blue-ribbon panels are investigating the 737 MAX as well as how the FAA certifies new aircraft. Major U.S. airlines have canceled flights into December as a result of the MAX grounding, including American Airlines Group Inc (AAL.O) and United Airlines (UAL.O), while Southwest Airlines Co (LUV.N) has canceled flights into early January.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-faa/faa-chief-to-meet-with-boeing-officials-test-737-max-simulator-idUSKBN1W12TM
David Shepardson
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - New Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) chief Stephen Dickson plans to fly to Seattle this week to fly “newly configured” Boeing 737 MAX software in a simulator and will visit with Boeing (BA.N) officials, the agency said Monday.
Boeing plans to revise the 737 MAX software to take input from both angle-of-attack sensors in the MCAS anti-stall system linked to two deadly crashes that led to a global grounding of the plane in March. But it is not clear when it will conduct a key certification test flight, a step needed before the FAA can return the plane to service. The FAA confirmed that Dickson, who took over as administrator in mid-August, has no firm timeline for the grounded 737 MAX to resume flights or when Boeing will turn over final documentation. The FAA said Dickson also plans to visit with the FAA aircraft certification team in Seattle. Separately, a spokeswoman for Representative Peter DeFazio, who chairs the House Transportation Committee, confirmed that Boeing had declined his invitation to testify at an upcoming House hearing. “Boeing is working diligently and transparently with committees in both the House (of Representatives) and the Senate to ensure that proper information is being shared and we will continue to do so,” the company said in an e-mailed statement. Boeing’s board is expected to consider changes proposed by a board committee later this week, people briefed on the matter said. Reuters reported in August that the committee review would find the company needs to reorganize its engineering reporting lines company-wide and ensure higher ranking officials, including its CEO, get faster feedback about potential safety concerns from lower levels of the company. The changes are intended to boost the transparency of engineering decisions and accelerate efforts to share safety information as widely and swiftly as possible across Boeing’s global businesses and factories, Reuters reported.
Boeing has said it plans to conduct a certification test flight in the “September time frame” but Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg did not give a specific date when asked last week. Federal prosecutors aided by the FBI, the Department of Transportation’s inspector general and several blue-ribbon panels are investigating the 737 MAX as well as how the FAA certifies new aircraft. Major U.S. airlines have canceled flights into December as a result of the MAX grounding, including American Airlines Group Inc (AAL.O) and United Airlines (UAL.O), while Southwest Airlines Co (LUV.N) has canceled flights into early January.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-faa/faa-chief-to-meet-with-boeing-officials-test-737-max-simulator-idUSKBN1W12TM
FAA chief says he won’t certify the Boeing 737 Max until he flies the plane himself
Federal Aviation Administrator Steve Dickson says he won’t allow the Boeing 737 Max jets to return to the skies for service until he personally flies the plane himself.
“I’m the final signoff authority in the U.S., and I’m not going to sign off on the aircraft until I would fly it myself,” Dickson told NBC News during an interview in Las Vegas.
NBC Correspondent Tom Costello pressed Dickson, a former pilot who is licensed to fly the 737, if he will actually pilot the plane on a short flight before officially approving the Max for commercial operation. “I will fly the Max,” said Dickson.
Dickson’s comments come on the eve of his visit to Boeing facilities outside Seattle. While there, Dickson will meet with Boeing executives and be briefed on software updates to the 737 Max flight control system. He will also climb into a simulator and test out the changes Boeing engineers have made to the Max.
Earlier this week, in his first interview since taking over the FAA, Dickson told CNBC, “I can guarantee you that the airplane will not be flying again until I’m satisfied that it’s the safest thing out there.”
Dickson’s decision to fly the Max before giving it final approval for commercial service is a new development. The official process calls for Boeing to file for recertification after a test flight that includes one pilot from Boeing and one pilot from the FAA.
During that recertification flight, the crew will put the plane through a checklist of maneuvers to see how the plane handles those situations. After the flight, flight engineers from Boeing and the FAA will review the results. If those results meet the targets Boeing and the FAA agreed to in advance, the company will then file for recertification.
Because Dickson is not a test pilot, he will not be in the cockpit during the Max recertification flight. When Dickson would fly the plane has not yet been determined.
“We will work to meet the administrator’s requests and we continue to support global regulators as we work to safely return the aircraft to service,” said Chaz Bickers, a spokesman for Boeing.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/18/faa...737-max-until-he-flies-the-plane-himself.html
- FAA Administrator Steve Dickson’s decision to fly the Max before giving it final approval for commercial service is a new development
- Dickson’s comments come on the eve of his visit to Boeing facilities outside Seattle.
- The FAA administrator will meet with Boeing executives and be briefed on software updates to the 737 Max flight control system.
Federal Aviation Administrator Steve Dickson says he won’t allow the Boeing 737 Max jets to return to the skies for service until he personally flies the plane himself.
“I’m the final signoff authority in the U.S., and I’m not going to sign off on the aircraft until I would fly it myself,” Dickson told NBC News during an interview in Las Vegas.
NBC Correspondent Tom Costello pressed Dickson, a former pilot who is licensed to fly the 737, if he will actually pilot the plane on a short flight before officially approving the Max for commercial operation. “I will fly the Max,” said Dickson.
Dickson’s comments come on the eve of his visit to Boeing facilities outside Seattle. While there, Dickson will meet with Boeing executives and be briefed on software updates to the 737 Max flight control system. He will also climb into a simulator and test out the changes Boeing engineers have made to the Max.
Earlier this week, in his first interview since taking over the FAA, Dickson told CNBC, “I can guarantee you that the airplane will not be flying again until I’m satisfied that it’s the safest thing out there.”
Dickson’s decision to fly the Max before giving it final approval for commercial service is a new development. The official process calls for Boeing to file for recertification after a test flight that includes one pilot from Boeing and one pilot from the FAA.
During that recertification flight, the crew will put the plane through a checklist of maneuvers to see how the plane handles those situations. After the flight, flight engineers from Boeing and the FAA will review the results. If those results meet the targets Boeing and the FAA agreed to in advance, the company will then file for recertification.
Because Dickson is not a test pilot, he will not be in the cockpit during the Max recertification flight. When Dickson would fly the plane has not yet been determined.
“We will work to meet the administrator’s requests and we continue to support global regulators as we work to safely return the aircraft to service,” said Chaz Bickers, a spokesman for Boeing.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/18/faa...737-max-until-he-flies-the-plane-himself.html
Boeing rejected 737 MAX safety upgrades before fatal crashes, whistleblower says
Seven weeks after the second fatal crash of a 737 MAX in March, a Boeing engineer submitted a scathing internal ethics complaint alleging that management — determined to keep down costs for airline customers — had blocked significant safety improvements during the jet’s development.
The ethics charge, filed by 33-year-old engineer Curtis Ewbank, whose job involved studying past crashes and using that information to make new planes safer, describes how around 2014 his group presented to managers and senior executives a proposal to add various safety upgrades to the MAX.
The complaint, a copy of which was reviewed by The Seattle Times, suggests that one of the proposed systems could have potentially prevented the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia that killed 346 people. Three of Ewbank’s former colleagues interviewed for this story concurred.
The details revealed in the ethics complaint raise new questions about the culture at Boeing and whether the long-held imperative that safety must be the overarching priority was compromised on the MAX by business considerations and management’s focus on schedule and cost.
Managers twice rejected adding the new system on the basis of “cost and potential (pilot) training impact,” the complaint states. It was then raised a third time in a meeting with 737 MAX chief project engineer, Michael Teal, who cited the same objections as he killed the proposal.
It was not directly related to the flight-control system — the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) — that contributed to both crashes. But it would have detected the false angle of attack signal that initiated events in both accidents, and so potentially could have stopped MCAS from activating and repeatedly pushing down the nose of each jet.
But installing it in the MAX would likely have meant 737 pilots needed extra training in flight simulators. Running thousands of pilots through simulator sessions would have delayed the jet’s entry into service and added substantial costs for Boeing’s airline customers, damaging the MAX’s competitive edge against the rival Airbus A320neo.
Ewbank’s complaint goes further than the decision not to install this one new system. He describes management as “more concerned with cost and schedule than safety and quality.” And he alleges that in one instance Boeing hid inflight safety incident data from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
As first reported in The Seattle Times, Boeing did an inadequate system safety assessment that missed flaws in the design of MCAS that were central to the two MAX disasters. And Boeing engineers were under pressure to limit safety testing to certify the MAX. These fresh allegations from inside Boeing indicate that the problems with jetmaker’s safety culture may go deeper than MCAS.
Prosegue sul sito
https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...-max-safety-upgrades-were-rejected-over-cost/
Seven weeks after the second fatal crash of a 737 MAX in March, a Boeing engineer submitted a scathing internal ethics complaint alleging that management — determined to keep down costs for airline customers — had blocked significant safety improvements during the jet’s development.
The ethics charge, filed by 33-year-old engineer Curtis Ewbank, whose job involved studying past crashes and using that information to make new planes safer, describes how around 2014 his group presented to managers and senior executives a proposal to add various safety upgrades to the MAX.
The complaint, a copy of which was reviewed by The Seattle Times, suggests that one of the proposed systems could have potentially prevented the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia that killed 346 people. Three of Ewbank’s former colleagues interviewed for this story concurred.
The details revealed in the ethics complaint raise new questions about the culture at Boeing and whether the long-held imperative that safety must be the overarching priority was compromised on the MAX by business considerations and management’s focus on schedule and cost.
Managers twice rejected adding the new system on the basis of “cost and potential (pilot) training impact,” the complaint states. It was then raised a third time in a meeting with 737 MAX chief project engineer, Michael Teal, who cited the same objections as he killed the proposal.
It was not directly related to the flight-control system — the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) — that contributed to both crashes. But it would have detected the false angle of attack signal that initiated events in both accidents, and so potentially could have stopped MCAS from activating and repeatedly pushing down the nose of each jet.
But installing it in the MAX would likely have meant 737 pilots needed extra training in flight simulators. Running thousands of pilots through simulator sessions would have delayed the jet’s entry into service and added substantial costs for Boeing’s airline customers, damaging the MAX’s competitive edge against the rival Airbus A320neo.
Ewbank’s complaint goes further than the decision not to install this one new system. He describes management as “more concerned with cost and schedule than safety and quality.” And he alleges that in one instance Boeing hid inflight safety incident data from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
As first reported in The Seattle Times, Boeing did an inadequate system safety assessment that missed flaws in the design of MCAS that were central to the two MAX disasters. And Boeing engineers were under pressure to limit safety testing to certify the MAX. These fresh allegations from inside Boeing indicate that the problems with jetmaker’s safety culture may go deeper than MCAS.
Prosegue sul sito
https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...-max-safety-upgrades-were-rejected-over-cost/
Boeing pushed FAA to relax 737 MAX certification requirements for crew alerts
https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...x-certification-requirements-for-crew-alerts/
Sono sempre più sconcertanti i retroscena che continuano ad uscire sull'ambiente interno di Boeing e sul rapporto di subalternità della FAA. Qui si hanno esplicitamente le prove che Boeing dice alla FAA che il profitto è prioritario sulla sicurezza e la FAA acconsente. Mi auguro, senza esserne certo, che la EASA si prepari alla più scrupolosa verifica di sicurezza mai effettuata nella storia prima di riabilitare il 737 MAX. Mi auguro anche, con ancora più dubbi, che il 'sistema' statunitense ritrovi almeno una parte della rettitudine perduta e che i vertici di Boeing e FAA vengano condannati in modo esemplare a seguito della inchiesta federale che si è aperta.
https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...x-certification-requirements-for-crew-alerts/
Sono sempre più sconcertanti i retroscena che continuano ad uscire sull'ambiente interno di Boeing e sul rapporto di subalternità della FAA. Qui si hanno esplicitamente le prove che Boeing dice alla FAA che il profitto è prioritario sulla sicurezza e la FAA acconsente. Mi auguro, senza esserne certo, che la EASA si prepari alla più scrupolosa verifica di sicurezza mai effettuata nella storia prima di riabilitare il 737 MAX. Mi auguro anche, con ancora più dubbi, che il 'sistema' statunitense ritrovi almeno una parte della rettitudine perduta e che i vertici di Boeing e FAA vengano condannati in modo esemplare a seguito della inchiesta federale che si è aperta.
Boeing pushed FAA to relax 737 MAX certification requirements for crew alerts
I titoli dei giornali tendono a riassumere sinteticamente, ed il Seattle Times ovviamente si adegua.
Ho trovato il testo ben scritto e ben documentato; tuttavia non è certo possibile dedurre, neanche lontanamente, quale sia , presso FAA, la procedura di certificazione delle varianti dei velivoli.
La valutazione sui costi/benefici può sembrare una pratica cinica, ma è l’unico modo per poter dedurre se una modifica è veramente utile . Si è tutti d’accordo sul fatto che un aereo potrebbe essere costruito con la medesima robustezza di un carro armato, ma ciò renderebbe il costo del biglietto così elevato da costringere il passeggero medio ad utilizzare l’auto o altri mezzi meno sicuri dell’aereo, con i conseguenti valori di costi (= n. di morti x costo di ogni morte) ben superiori ai benefici potenzialmente introdotti dalla modifica.
Le medesime valutazioni vengono sempre fatte dagli enti certificatori (EASA, FAA, etc) in occasione di una nuova variante di un prodotto (motore o aereo) , e sono certo che EASA ha applicato la stessa metodologia nel passare da un modello ad una sua evoluzione più recente.
E’ comprensibile che se ad ogni nuova versione fosse necessario ricertificare l’aereo in accordo ai nuovi requisiti, ebbene, i costi sarebbero così elevati (per la comunità, e non solo per il costruttore) da scoraggiare ed impedire ogni seppur piccola miglioria.
La ricertificazione di un MAX per inserire un EICAS simile a quello del 767 avrebbe probabilmente impedito, anche a me, di poter utilizzare in futuro, come passeggero tale nuovo aereo, a causa dei probabili costi del biglietto esageratamente elevati.
Per quanto sono a conoscenza fino ad ora , trovo discutibile il progetto del sistema MCAS, ma sono consapevole di conoscere solo una piccola frazione di quanto emergerà dalla inchiesta -sicuramente seria- della NTSB, per cui aspetto a farmi un’idea completa.
Di sicuro , non mi stupisce il concetto di delega dei poteri di approvazione dalla autorità al costruttore. Anche in questo caso , se un ente certificatore dovesse rivedere tutto quanto in autonomia, avremmo bisogno di decuplicare gli ispettori e triplicare i tempi : anche in questo caso i costi per la comunità sarebbero proibitivi.
Non mi sfugge poi il fatto che in Italia/Europa/Mondo la procedura di delega all’interno delle compagnie aeree è ormai in uso da decenni e ben regolamentata; basta pensare alle modalità con cui si raggiunge la qualifica di Comandante, oppure al recurrent al simulatore ; tutte attività praticate all’interno della compagnia aerea , la cui sorveglianza da parte dell’autorità si limita alla approvazione della procedura. Le compagnie aeree sono dotate di TRI ed anche di TRE, che non sono altro che dipendenti che ‘istruiscono’ ed ‘approvano’ altri dipendenti, con tutte le possibili e probabili anomalie che ne potrebbero scaturire -ognuno di noi ha le sue horror stories su questo argomento ! E chissà se questa pratica di istruzione/approvazione interna non possa essere stata una concausa negli incidenti del MAX !
I titoli dei giornali tendono a riassumere sinteticamente, ed il Seattle Times ovviamente si adegua.
Ho trovato il testo ben scritto e ben documentato; tuttavia non è certo possibile dedurre, neanche lontanamente, quale sia , presso FAA, la procedura di certificazione delle varianti dei velivoli.
La valutazione sui costi/benefici può sembrare una pratica cinica, ma è l’unico modo per poter dedurre se una modifica è veramente utile . Si è tutti d’accordo sul fatto che un aereo potrebbe essere costruito con la medesima robustezza di un carro armato, ma ciò renderebbe il costo del biglietto così elevato da costringere il passeggero medio ad utilizzare l’auto o altri mezzi meno sicuri dell’aereo, con i conseguenti valori di costi (= n. di morti x costo di ogni morte) ben superiori ai benefici potenzialmente introdotti dalla modifica.
Le medesime valutazioni vengono sempre fatte dagli enti certificatori (EASA, FAA, etc) in occasione di una nuova variante di un prodotto (motore o aereo) , e sono certo che EASA ha applicato la stessa metodologia nel passare da un modello ad una sua evoluzione più recente.
E’ comprensibile che se ad ogni nuova versione fosse necessario ricertificare l’aereo in accordo ai nuovi requisiti, ebbene, i costi sarebbero così elevati (per la comunità, e non solo per il costruttore) da scoraggiare ed impedire ogni seppur piccola miglioria.
La ricertificazione di un MAX per inserire un EICAS simile a quello del 767 avrebbe probabilmente impedito, anche a me, di poter utilizzare in futuro, come passeggero tale nuovo aereo, a causa dei probabili costi del biglietto esageratamente elevati.
Per quanto sono a conoscenza fino ad ora , trovo discutibile il progetto del sistema MCAS, ma sono consapevole di conoscere solo una piccola frazione di quanto emergerà dalla inchiesta -sicuramente seria- della NTSB, per cui aspetto a farmi un’idea completa.
Di sicuro , non mi stupisce il concetto di delega dei poteri di approvazione dalla autorità al costruttore. Anche in questo caso , se un ente certificatore dovesse rivedere tutto quanto in autonomia, avremmo bisogno di decuplicare gli ispettori e triplicare i tempi : anche in questo caso i costi per la comunità sarebbero proibitivi.
Non mi sfugge poi il fatto che in Italia/Europa/Mondo la procedura di delega all’interno delle compagnie aeree è ormai in uso da decenni e ben regolamentata; basta pensare alle modalità con cui si raggiunge la qualifica di Comandante, oppure al recurrent al simulatore ; tutte attività praticate all’interno della compagnia aerea , la cui sorveglianza da parte dell’autorità si limita alla approvazione della procedura. Le compagnie aeree sono dotate di TRI ed anche di TRE, che non sono altro che dipendenti che ‘istruiscono’ ed ‘approvano’ altri dipendenti, con tutte le possibili e probabili anomalie che ne potrebbero scaturire -ognuno di noi ha le sue horror stories su questo argomento ! E chissà se questa pratica di istruzione/approvazione interna non possa essere stata una concausa negli incidenti del MAX !
Ma vi siete fatti un idea se questo aereo, una volta che tornera' a volare, restera' comunque azzoppato per sempre?
Oppure tra qualche anno la vicenda sara' rientrata e potremo averne nugoli che oscurano il cielo, come sarebbe stato senza questo problemino?
Oppure tra qualche anno la vicenda sara' rientrata e potremo averne nugoli che oscurano il cielo, come sarebbe stato senza questo problemino?
La pubblicità negtiva rimarrà a lungo, il nome MAX è bruciato dai due incidenti e dallo scandalo, fossi in Boeing cambierei nome... Ricordiamoci il Comet distrutto dalla pubblicità negativa delle esplosioni in volo.
The Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA) on 7 October announced it filed a lawsuit against Boeing seeking damages for the 10,000 pilots represented by the association who have lost compensation since the grounding of Boeing 737 Max in March 2019.
The lawsuit filed in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, where Southwest Airlines is based, alleges that Boeing deliberately misled the airline and its pilots that 737 Max aircraft were airworthy and not significantly different from the previous generation 737NG aircraft. The full complaint is available online.
"Our pilots should not be expected to take a significant and ever-expanding financial loss as a result of Boeing's negligence," SWAPA says. "We look forward to a solution that helps Boeing restore the confidence of both the flying public and the pilots who operate its aircraft."
Boeing is negotiating with airlines about how to compensate them for the aircraft grounding.
"Boeing has the greatest respect for the men and women who fly for Southwest Airlines," the airframer says in a statement. "We are aware that their pilot union, SWAPA, has filed a lawsuit against Boeing related to the 737 MAX suspension of operations. We believe this lawsuit is meritless and will vigorously defend against it."
Southwest Airlines had the largest 737 Max fleet in service out of any airline when regulators worldwide grounded the aircraft in March, with a total of 34 aircraft from that type, Cirium's Fleets Analyzer shows. It also has 234 Max 8 series aircraft on order from Boeing, along with 28 Max 7 aircraft. The Dallas-based airline has removed Max aircraft from its flight schedules through 6 January,
Investigations have suggested a central factor in the fatal crashes was the manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) flight control software created for Max aircraft by Boeing to make the aircraft fly and respond similarly to 737NG aircraft despite different engines added to Max series aircraft.
Boeing is coordinating with the US Federal Aviation Administration on flight tests of modified Max aircraft. The airframer expects Max aircraft will be deemed safe to return to service during the fourth quarter of 2019.
The lawsuit alleges that Boeing rushed certification under the same aircraft type certificate as NG aircraft. Boeing’s false representations about safety made directly to SWAPA, the lawsuit adds, caused the association to agree to include the 737 Max as a term in its collective bargaining agreement with Southwest "despite its initial reluctance".
"Boeing made a calculated decision to rush a re-engined aircraft to market to secure its single-aisle market share and prioritize its bottom line," according to the lawsuit. "In doing so, Boeing abandoned sound design and engineering practices, withheld safety critical information from regulators and deliberately mislead its customers, pilots and the public about the true scope of design changes to the 737 Max."
Russian aircraft lessor Avia Capital Services made similar allegations in its lawsuit against Boeing, which it filed in August in Cook County, Illinois, which is the jurisdiction of Boeing's Chicago headquarters. The lessor is seeking at least $115 million, alleging that the airframer deceptively sold 737 Max aircraft on the premise that the aircraft were properly certificated, and that pilots would not need months of additional training.
Boeing and the FAA are facing scrutiny about not informing pilots about the risks of the automated flight control software on Max aircraft or requiring additional training before clearing them to operate the Max. The US National Transportation Safety Board published a report in September urging the FAA to develop broad standards to make cockpit alerts clearer and to help pilots better prioritise cockpit warnings. NTSB chairman Robert Sumwalt in the report stated pilots of the two doomed Max aircraft flights "did not react in the ways Boeing and the FAA assumed they would" to the automated MCAS software.
Fonte: Flightglobal
The lawsuit filed in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, where Southwest Airlines is based, alleges that Boeing deliberately misled the airline and its pilots that 737 Max aircraft were airworthy and not significantly different from the previous generation 737NG aircraft. The full complaint is available online.
"Our pilots should not be expected to take a significant and ever-expanding financial loss as a result of Boeing's negligence," SWAPA says. "We look forward to a solution that helps Boeing restore the confidence of both the flying public and the pilots who operate its aircraft."
Boeing is negotiating with airlines about how to compensate them for the aircraft grounding.
"Boeing has the greatest respect for the men and women who fly for Southwest Airlines," the airframer says in a statement. "We are aware that their pilot union, SWAPA, has filed a lawsuit against Boeing related to the 737 MAX suspension of operations. We believe this lawsuit is meritless and will vigorously defend against it."
Southwest Airlines had the largest 737 Max fleet in service out of any airline when regulators worldwide grounded the aircraft in March, with a total of 34 aircraft from that type, Cirium's Fleets Analyzer shows. It also has 234 Max 8 series aircraft on order from Boeing, along with 28 Max 7 aircraft. The Dallas-based airline has removed Max aircraft from its flight schedules through 6 January,
Investigations have suggested a central factor in the fatal crashes was the manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) flight control software created for Max aircraft by Boeing to make the aircraft fly and respond similarly to 737NG aircraft despite different engines added to Max series aircraft.
Boeing is coordinating with the US Federal Aviation Administration on flight tests of modified Max aircraft. The airframer expects Max aircraft will be deemed safe to return to service during the fourth quarter of 2019.
The lawsuit alleges that Boeing rushed certification under the same aircraft type certificate as NG aircraft. Boeing’s false representations about safety made directly to SWAPA, the lawsuit adds, caused the association to agree to include the 737 Max as a term in its collective bargaining agreement with Southwest "despite its initial reluctance".
"Boeing made a calculated decision to rush a re-engined aircraft to market to secure its single-aisle market share and prioritize its bottom line," according to the lawsuit. "In doing so, Boeing abandoned sound design and engineering practices, withheld safety critical information from regulators and deliberately mislead its customers, pilots and the public about the true scope of design changes to the 737 Max."
Russian aircraft lessor Avia Capital Services made similar allegations in its lawsuit against Boeing, which it filed in August in Cook County, Illinois, which is the jurisdiction of Boeing's Chicago headquarters. The lessor is seeking at least $115 million, alleging that the airframer deceptively sold 737 Max aircraft on the premise that the aircraft were properly certificated, and that pilots would not need months of additional training.
Boeing and the FAA are facing scrutiny about not informing pilots about the risks of the automated flight control software on Max aircraft or requiring additional training before clearing them to operate the Max. The US National Transportation Safety Board published a report in September urging the FAA to develop broad standards to make cockpit alerts clearer and to help pilots better prioritise cockpit warnings. NTSB chairman Robert Sumwalt in the report stated pilots of the two doomed Max aircraft flights "did not react in the ways Boeing and the FAA assumed they would" to the automated MCAS software.
Fonte: Flightglobal
Friction Between U.S., European Regulators Could Delay 737 MAX Return to Service
European air-safety regulator has indicated it wants more testing on proposed revisions to flight-control computers
By Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel
Oct. 8, 2019 5:30 am ET
Boeing Co. ’s delay-prone effort to return 737 MAX jets to service has hit a new snag, according to people familiar with the details, due to heightened European safety concerns about portions of proposed fixes to flight-control systems.
Disagreements over various software details, centered on how the MAX’s dual flight-control computers are now intended to start working together, haven’t been reported before. The issue could prolong final vetting of the anticipated changes and may prompt European regulators to withhold their full support when the Federal Aviation Administration ultimately allows the planes back in the air, these people said.
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency recently told senior U.S. regulators it wasn’t satisfied that FAA and Boeing officials had adequately demonstrated the safety of reconfigured MAX flight-control computers, according to people briefed on the discussions. The aim is to add redundancy by having both computers work simultaneously to eliminate hazards stemming from possible chip malfunctions identified months ago; over decades, and on previous versions of the 737, only one computer at a time has fed data to automated systems, alternating between flights. The concerns were passed on by EASA chief Patrick Ky to Ali Bahrami, the FAA’s top safety official, one of the people said.
EASA said it hadn’t reached a verdict on Boeing’s fixes or whether the agency will act in tandem with the FAA.
Without a swift resolution, according to those briefed on the details, EASA’s objections could set an industrywide precedent for foreign authorities publicly second-guessing determinations by the FAA, affecting aircraft initially approved as safe by the U.S.
Boeing and the FAA are finishing testing the dual-computer system, and the final results haven’t been presented to EASA or other regulators. EASA has signaled, though, that it wants additional risk scenarios examined beyond those in the current testing plan, this person said.
The situation remains fluid, and EASA’s position could change. The agency previously indicated it planned to perform some of its own simulator testing and risk analysis in coordination with FAA activities. But now, according to people briefed on the latest friction, European regulators appear poised to diverge from the overall U.S. game plan unless a compromise is hammered out in coming weeks. Boeing engineers are frustrated EASA hasn’t specified what additional measures might allay its objections, according to people close to the discussions.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/friction-between-u-s-european-regulators-could-delay-737-max-return-to-service-11570527001
European air-safety regulator has indicated it wants more testing on proposed revisions to flight-control computers
By Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel
Oct. 8, 2019 5:30 am ET
Boeing Co. ’s delay-prone effort to return 737 MAX jets to service has hit a new snag, according to people familiar with the details, due to heightened European safety concerns about portions of proposed fixes to flight-control systems.
Disagreements over various software details, centered on how the MAX’s dual flight-control computers are now intended to start working together, haven’t been reported before. The issue could prolong final vetting of the anticipated changes and may prompt European regulators to withhold their full support when the Federal Aviation Administration ultimately allows the planes back in the air, these people said.
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency recently told senior U.S. regulators it wasn’t satisfied that FAA and Boeing officials had adequately demonstrated the safety of reconfigured MAX flight-control computers, according to people briefed on the discussions. The aim is to add redundancy by having both computers work simultaneously to eliminate hazards stemming from possible chip malfunctions identified months ago; over decades, and on previous versions of the 737, only one computer at a time has fed data to automated systems, alternating between flights. The concerns were passed on by EASA chief Patrick Ky to Ali Bahrami, the FAA’s top safety official, one of the people said.
EASA said it hadn’t reached a verdict on Boeing’s fixes or whether the agency will act in tandem with the FAA.
Without a swift resolution, according to those briefed on the details, EASA’s objections could set an industrywide precedent for foreign authorities publicly second-guessing determinations by the FAA, affecting aircraft initially approved as safe by the U.S.
Boeing and the FAA are finishing testing the dual-computer system, and the final results haven’t been presented to EASA or other regulators. EASA has signaled, though, that it wants additional risk scenarios examined beyond those in the current testing plan, this person said.
The situation remains fluid, and EASA’s position could change. The agency previously indicated it planned to perform some of its own simulator testing and risk analysis in coordination with FAA activities. But now, according to people briefed on the latest friction, European regulators appear poised to diverge from the overall U.S. game plan unless a compromise is hammered out in coming weeks. Boeing engineers are frustrated EASA hasn’t specified what additional measures might allay its objections, according to people close to the discussions.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/friction-between-u-s-european-regulators-could-delay-737-max-return-to-service-11570527001
Da un punto di vista mediatico, dagli 3 mesi (posto che sia risolto) e nessuno si ricorderà più nulla.
La memoria collettiva è cortissima, la propensione a dimenticare massima.
Ne sono passati già più di tre. Se media e social non martellano sull'argomento già domani non ci farebbero caso sopratutto se elimini la scritta "max", anche perché l'utente medio non sa quasi mai su che aereo vola.
Ma se il rientro in servizio viene attenzionato dai cacciatori di "like"... potrebbe essere più complicato.
Voglio riformulare la domanda... coloro che distinguono un Max da un altro aereo... ci risaliranno sopra senza esitazione e senza nessuna remora?