La nuova Germanwings


Ma inclusi i MUC/FRA - CDG?
Domanda che mi sono fatto anche io, cmq interessante (se confermata) la nota dal link originale:
"Or, selon une note interne de l'entreprise, l'escale parisienne affiche l'une des plus faibles productivité d'Europe, avec 8 100 passagers embarqués, contre 14 400 à Madrid ou encore 15 110 à Londres Heathrow. "
 
Domanda che mi sono fatto anche io, cmq interessante (se confermata) la nota dal link originale:
"Or, selon une note interne de l'entreprise, l'escale parisienne affiche l'une des plus faibles productivité d'Europe, avec 8 100 passagers embarqués, contre 14 400 à Madrid ou encore 15 110 à Londres Heathrow. "

Svelato l'arcano : solo i voli su Berlino (dal 6 marzo 2014) e Amburgo (dal 29 gennaio 2014) saranno trasferiti a Germanwings. Rimangono LH Mainline i voli verso gli hub della compagnia a FRA/MUC/DUS
 
L'obiettivo di Lufthansa sarebbe di ridurre i costi, ritenuti troppo alti per il personale di terra. Motivo per cui potrebbe scattare un piano di riduzione dei posti di lavoro su Parigi, tramite incentivi al licenziamento volontario di 199 dipendenti.

LH per gestire i suoi voli da Parigi alla Germania ha ben 200 persone basate a CDG?
Anzi se parlano di riduzione di posti vuol dire che il totale degli effettivi è ancora maggiore.
 
Just got it:

On 1 July 2013 the ‘new Germanwings’ will be launched. An airline with new offers and a modern product and service concept which, in future, will operate all current Lufthansa European flights, with the exception of those operating out of Frankfurt and Munich.


Oggi notavo che da DUS sono ancora operate tratte (ignoro se parzialmente o interamente) LH mainline, ed anche per l'orario invernale la DUS-NAP è operata direttamente da LH. La "riconversione" di DUS è stata posticipata?
 
Ve li immaginate dei 340 4U?! ?

Lufthansa (LH, Frankfurt Int'l) will use nine A340-300s previously earmarked for retirement for use on select long-haul routes from summer 2015. Germany's Spiegel magazine says Lufthansa intends to offer low-cost long-haul flights using the quadjets, which will be reconfigured with fewer business class seats.

Flights will be offered to destinations such as the Caribbean, India, Thailand and Taiwan - markets where the airline has lost market share to the likes of Emirates (EK, Dubai Int'l), Qatar Airways (QR, Doha Int'l) among others.

In a bid to keep costs down, negotiations with airport operators and staff regarding concessions are set to begin in due course.
 
Voli low cost e A343 direi che non possono stare nella stessa frase... é una contraddizione in termini...

Ho appena volato con AB con A330 configurato all Y forse vogliono fare qualcosa di simile, ma coi costi operativi dei 343 mi sembra impossibile.
 
Voli low cost e A343 direi che non possono stare nella stessa frase... é una contraddizione in termini...

Ho appena volato con AB con A330 configurato all Y forse vogliono fare qualcosa di simile, ma coi costi operativi dei 343 mi sembra impossibile.

Comunque non avrebbero costo leasing e/o capitale poichè trattasi di macchine destinate alla dismissione e interamente ammortizzate. Inoltre anche in termini di maintenance con un pò di macchine a terra per quelle operative ci sarebbe una base di pezzi di ricambio, inclusi i motori, praticamente a costo zero. Ovviamente tali saving non sono probabilmente sufficienti a compensare i maggiori costi in termine di consumi, ma si tratterebbe comunque di voli venduti da LH, quindi non un low cost da svendita.
 
Voli low cost e A343 direi che non possono stare nella stessa frase... é una contraddizione in termini...

Ho appena volato con AB con A330 configurato all Y forse vogliono fare qualcosa di simile, ma coi costi operativi dei 343 mi sembra impossibile.

Considera Cesare che, a fronte di consumi e costi di manutenzione superiori, i 343 dovrebbero essere di proprietà (e quelli eventualmente in leasing avranno canoni bassi, considerata l'età delle macchine), pertanto tagli una buona percentuale di costi fissi, togli dalla mainline un prodotto non più giovanissimo e che, con un altro target, può generare utili a costo quasi zero, cosa che non farebbe se fosse indirizzato alla demolizione.
 
Lufthansa (Frankfurt) has issued this information report on the first anniversary of the revamped Germanwings (2nd) (Cologne/Bonn):
For exactly one year now, the “new Germanwings” has enhanced the range of flights on offer for customers throughout Europe. On July 1, 2013, it launched an entirely new product and brand concept, and over the space of twelve months it has developed to become the third largest airline in Germany. Since July 2013, Germanwings has carried more than 16 million passengers. The number of routes on offer has also risen from 182 to 296 today. Germanwings now serves 130 destinations, most of which are in Europe.
Lufthansa amalgamated its domestic German and European flights that were not operated through its Frankfurt and Munich hubs in the “new Germanwings”. The handover of flight routes is now well advanced. In Cologne, Stuttgart and Hanover it has been completed, while in Hamburg and Berlin a few routes are still being transferred. Lufthansa began transferring routes to Germanwings in Düsseldorf in March 2014. Once the hand-over has been completed, Düsseldorf will be the largest Germanwings base.
Germanwings passengers rate the airline highly positively. In all the passenger surveys, they attest to the airline’s high-quality service, and the vast majority is extremely satisfied with the new offer. Customers thus reinforce Germanwings’ claim to be a low-cost-carrier offering flights at low prices and a high-quality service.
The expansion of Germanwings has also been successful from a commercial point of view: in comparison to last year, when the airline contributed €93 million to the Lufthansa Group’s earnings improvement year-on-year, the contribution is expected to increase again this year. For 2015, for the first time in many years, the Group expects to achieve a balanced result on its non-hub routes in Europe.
The airline, which is based at Cologne-Bonn Airport, has also significantly expanded its fleet. While just one year ago 38 jets bore the Germanwings livery, 71 aircraft can now be seen sporting the logo of the youngest airline in the Lufthansa Group. A further ten aircraft will join the fleet by the end of the year. The workforce has also increased from 1,600 to just over 2,000, the bulk of new staff recruitment being in flight operations. The number of flight personnel has thus risen from 1,174 to 1,614. Germanwings crews currently complete a total of 3,312 flights each week, compared with 1,891 a mere twelve months ago. Since its launch a year ago, Germanwings with its highly motivated team has already completed around 171,000 safe take-offs and landings. Carsten Spohr, Chairman of the Executive Board of Deutsche Lufthansa AG: “We have been on the offensive with the ‘new Germanwings’ in terms of point-to-point flights on European and German domestic routes that are not operated through our major hubs. We have combined our many years of experience in the low-cost segment and our high quality standards to develop a convincing concept that has been extremely well received by customers. With the ‘new Germanwings’, we have taken an important step and are now closer to achieving our goal of flying profitably beyond the major hubs within the short-haul traffic segment.”
Thomas Winkelmann, spokesman for the Germanwings Executive Board: “Germanwings is without a doubt one of the most creative airlines in Europe. Twelve months ago we entered new territory with Germanwings’ new product and brand promise. Since then, we have been combining the various requirements of different customer groups in one airline. Today we know that this bold decision was the right one: everyone feels at home on board of Germanwings. This is undoubtedly because we refuse to compromise on two points: safety and the friendly and expert way in which we deal with our customers.”
A unique feature of Germanwings is ‘à la carte flying’. When booking their tickets, passengers have a choice of three products in different price segments with different comfort add-ons: ‘BEST’ represents the high-end offer that primarily covers the needs of business passengers but that also appeals to certain leisure travelers. The ‘SMART’ fare product includes certain extra services, and ‘BASIC’ is a no-frills, low-cost fare.

flightglobal
 
profiles-96x30.png

[h=1]Germanwings has preserved Lufthansa's market share, but still has too many legacy issues for a LCC[/h]

NEWgermanwings-200x.jpg

Last month, Lufthansa confirmed plans to extend its low-cost operations under what it terms its 'Wings concept'. Short haul LCC subsidiary Germanwings will continue to expand, with a renewed emphasis on using group company Eurowings to provide it with capacity. Eurowings' pilots are under a separate (more flexible) contract from those of Lufthansa and Germanwings and its 23 Bombardier CRJ900s are to be replaced with an equivalent number of A320ceo aircraft.
Perhaps referring to this, and to Lufthansa's low cost long haul plans, Ryanair CEO Michael O'Leary* said thatLufthansa "has some bizarre plan about establishing a new low-fare airline.” He added: “Unfortunately they started with a high-fare airline called Germanwings and they’ll need to do a lot more than call it that and paint it yellow to make it a low-cost carrier.”
Lufthansa began transferring all its European point to point routes that do not serve its Frankfurt andMunich hubs to Germanwings in Jul-2013. Just over 15 months on, we review its capacity growth and the impact on the market share of Lufthansa/Germanwings in this segment.


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*as reported in Buying Business Travel (24-Sep-2014)
[h=2]An almost equal divide in Germany-Europe: Frankfurt/Munich vs other German airports…[/h]The focus of the Germanwings strategy is very much on non-hub European traffic. In terms of seat numbers, the total market for air travel between Germany and Europe (including Germany) is surprisingly evenly divided between traffic that begins or ends at the hubs Frankfurt or Munich and traffic from/to other German airports.
The segment that excludes Lufthansa's two main hubs has accounted for 52% of the total number of short and medium haul seats in Germany since 2011 (source: OAG Schedules Analyser).
Germany to all Europe: total market by seats 2005 to 2014
4U8.JPG

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation, OAG Schedules Analyser
[h=2]… but Lufthansa is much bigger in Frankfurt/Munich-Europe[/h]In spite of the roughly even divide between the short/medium haul market from Frankfurt and Munich and that from other German airports, Lufthansa (including Germanwings) has almost three times the number of seats serving continental destinations from its two hubs as it does from the rest of Germany.
Germany to all Europe: Lufthansa* seats split between Frankfurt & Munich and all other German airports 2005 to 2014
4U9.JPG

*including Germanwings
Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation, OAG Schedules Analyser

This means that Lufthansa's share of short and medium haul seats from Frankfurt and Munich (around two thirds) is much larger than its share from other German airports (a little more than one fifth), using data from OAG Schedules Analyser.
This is, of course, to be expected: Lufthansa is the dominant airline at its two main hubs and a large proportion of the continental traffic that it carries in Frankfurt and Munich is connecting to its long haul network.
Lufthansa* market share of seats from Frankfurt & Munich to all Europe and from all other German airports to all Europe 2005 to 2014
4U10.JPG

*including Germanwings
Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation, OAG Schedules Analyser

[h=2]Airberlin is the biggest non-Frankfurt/Munich airline in Germany-Europe[/h]The strategic focus of Germanwings is specifically on the short and medium haul market from Germany's non-hub airports. Data from OAG Schedules Analyser show that Airberlin is the biggest carrier in this segment, with 23% of seats in 2014.
Its return to growth in 2014 has allowed it to keep its share at its 2013 level, but it has fallen from 27% in 2010 as a result of capacity cuts. Airberlin grew its share from 2005 to 2010, mainly as a result of its acquisitions of LTU and dba.
Germany excluding Frankfurt and Munich to all Europe: airline share by seats 2005 to 2014
4U7.JPG

*LCCs excluding Germanwings and airberlin (which was classifued as LCC for part of this period)
Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation, OAG Schedules Analyser

[h=2]Lufthansa Group share fairly constant as Germanwings' gain matches Lufthansa's loss in non-hub Europe traffic[/h]The core Lufthansa brand held a fairly steady share of non-hub continental seats from 2005 to 2011 of between 11% and 13%. Its share actually increased to 14% in 2012, the year when made the decision grow Germanwings aggressively from 2013. Germanwings' share of this market grew from 7% in 2005 to 9% in 2007 and then held steady until 2012, before ramping up to 12% in 2013 and 18% in 2014.
The increased share of Germanwings over the past two years mirrors the fall in the share of the core Lufthansa brand to 11% in 2013 and 4% in 2014. The transfer of non-hub continental routes from Lufthansa to Germanwings is due to be completed by 2015, when the latter's share might be expected to be in the region of 22%.
Lufthansa's decision to switch this traffic from its core brand to Germanwings was taken when its share was holding steady and that of rivalairberlin was falling. Moreover, at the time, the share of LCCs other than Germanwings in the short and medium haul markets from German airports excluding Frankfurt and Munich was broadly stable, having taken a downward step in 2010.
The biggest rival LCC in Germany is Ryanair, whose share of seats in this segment (ie excluding FRA and MUC) has fallen from 14% in 2009 to 9% in 2014, followed by easyJet, whose share has grown from 4.5% to 6.5% over the same period.
[h=2]Switch to Germanwings was not motivated by market share reduction, but to stem losses[/h]The reason for Lufthansa's strategic decision, then, did not relate to any loss of market share in the non-hub short and medium haul segment. The combined share of Lufthansa and Germanwings has been broadly stable for a number of years. To some extent, its frequent flyer programme, brand loyalty and product quality were helping it in the battle with LCCs and airberlin. In addition, the significance of its hub activities meant that it was more focused on growing its share of that segment.
the decision to transfer capacity to Germanwings related to the financial losses that it had to sustain in order to maintain its market share
Rather, the decision to transfer capacity to Germanwings related to the financial losses that it had to sustain in order to maintain its market share. In 2012, its non-hub European network lost around EUR200 million and its losses were around EUR300 million at the lowest point in the cycle.
Even if the LCCs were not eroding Lufthansa's market share in the years before it made its strategic decision about Germanwings, their prices were (and still are) at a huge discount to those of the German national airline. This was having a damaging effect on Lufthansa's pricing as it had to discount its fares in order to maintain its market position. LCCs can be profitable at much lower fares, but Lufthansa's higher cost base meant that the weaker pricing eroded more than all of its profit margin.
[h=2]Lufthansa's fares in Europe have not recovered since the financial crisis[/h]Lufthansa does not separately disclose data on fares in each sub-segment of its network, but it does report passenger traffic revenue and passenger numbers for the Group's passenger business in each major region.
From this, we can calculate average traffic revenue per passenger for the Group on its European network. The largest part of this is accounted for by the core Lufthansa brand, but it also includes SWISS, Austrian and Germanwings itself. The resultant figures do not precisely represent fares on Lufthansa's non-hub European network, but the trend in them is informative.
From 2005 to 2008, before the global financial crisis, but in the years when LCC market share was growing, the Lufthansa Group's average traffic revenue per passenger in Europe held fairly steady. Market conditions were good and demand for Lufthansa's superior product was strong and fairly price insensitive. During this period, the LCCs' market share gains were at the expense of other competitors (rather than Lufthansa).
Lufthansa Group average revenue per passenger (left hand axis) and average trip length (right hand axis) on Europe network 2005 to 2013
4U11.JPG

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation, Lufthansa annual reports
The financial crisis, however, had a dramatic impact. From 2008 to 2010, the Lufthansa Group suffered a 17% fall in traffic revenue per passenger in Europe, from EUR140 to EUR116, in spite of a 2% increase in average trip length. By 2012, this had recovered only to EUR121, where it remained in 2013.
What appeared in 2009 to be a cyclical effect was clearly revealed to be a permanent, structural market shift to a more price sensitive environment. Lufthansa could no longer rely on its global network, service quality and branding to charge a big premium in the increasingly commodity-like short and medium haul market, particularly on point to point routes.
[h=2]Germanwings' 2011 rev/pax was 22% lower than Lufthansa Group on Europe network, but 30% higher than LCCs'[/h]By comparison, Germanwings' revenue per passenger held steady at EUR82 from 2008 to 2010 and recovered to EUR91 in 2011, the last year for which Lufthansa has reported separate data for its LCC.
This suggests much lower fares for Germanwings than for the Lufthansa Group as a whole in Europe (a discount of 22% in 2011).
Germanwings' cost per passenger was 52% above the 2012 average for these four LCCs
However, comparison with average revenue per passenger for the leading LCCs in 2012 reveals a 30% premium for Germanwings compared with the average of easyJet, Ryanair, Vueling and Wizz Air. Moreover, as it recorded an operating loss in 2011 and we can deduce that Germanwings' cost per passenger was 52% above the 2012 average for these four LCCs.
See related report: Germanwings rebrands: you say you want a revolution? To be led by cost and operations
[h=2]Germanwings' profits depend on premium pricing and cost reduction[/h]Since that loss in 2011, the last time Lufthansa reported figures for Germanwings, there has been some further recovery in market demand and Germanwings has been relaunched with a new fare structure and with a renewed focus on cost reduction.
Its profitability (and future survival) depends on its maintaining a premium over other LCCs' fares, driven by price bundling, its airport network and its association with Lufthansa. This is not easy in a price sensitive market, particularly given that the very act of transferring routes from Lufthansa to Germanwings emphasises pricing, rather than Lufthansa's premium brand qualities, as the main dimension of competition.
One of Germanwings' big challenges is that its pilots are under a Lufthansa group-wide labour contract
Moreover, it must also ensure a lower cost base and this is also not easy, although it has been working to achieve this. One of Germanwings' big challenges is that its pilots are under a Lufthansa group-wide labour contract, with union Vereinigung cockpit representing staff at Germanwings and Lufthansa. Not only does this place more hurdles in the path of cost reduction, but it can also expose Germanwings' schedule to strike action, as was seen this summer. The increased use of Eurowings to provide capacity should be helpful in this respect.
See related report: Germanwings: can a premium strategy sustain an LCC? Lufthansa would like to think so
[h=2]2015 breakeven target will not be enough[/h]If Germanwings can at least achieve breakeven, then some might argue that the transfer of loss-making Lufthansa routes to breakeven Germanwings operations will have been worthwhile. Lufthansa is targeting 2015 to achieve breakeven in its non-hub European network, but this will still not be enough.
As Lufthansa Group CEO Carsten Spohr said when still head of Lufthansa Passenger Airlines in 2013, “…a company the size of new Germanwings, with 90 aircraft, eventually needs to make sure it makes enough profit to pay for its own capital. That’s what we are in the industry for”.
[h=2]An opening for Ryanair, while Lufthansa tackles legacy issues[/h]Mr O'Leary's typically forthright comments about Germanwings were made as he announced plans for Ryanair to grow its business in Germany. As noted above, OAG data show that Ryanair's share in the country has fallen in recent years, but it is still the biggest foreign airline in the German short haul market. Moreover, the Irish LCC may have spotted a new opportunity created in part by Lufthansa's strategic shift, which emphasises low fares. No airline in Europe has lower average fares than Ryanair.
“As we expand more rapidly in Germany we will start to take more traffic away from Lufthansa as people are fed up with their high-fares, frequent strikes and the high-fare subsidiary," said Mr O'Leary (Buying Business Travel, 24-Sep-2014), “The problem for legacy carriers is the more they are dealing with legacy issues, such as unions who don’t see the way forward, the harder it will be to set up a subsidiary and call it a low-cost airline. This will only help us grow in Europe". He has a point.
See related report: No hamburgers or frankfurters, but Ryanair will be serving Germany more
If conflict is needed for change, I regret that, but the reasons that force us to change won’t go away
For his part, Lufthansa's Mr Spohr recognises the challenge in tackling such legacy issues. “When I look at our most important stakeholders - customers, employees and shareholders - I think in the past years our employees have been the best off.” Mr Spohr added: “I have to make a trade-off between our long-term perspectives and short-term burdens. If conflict is needed for change, I regret that, but the reasons that force us to change won’t go away.” (Bloomberg, 11-Sep-2014).
See related report: Lufthansa pilot strike highlights labour issues for Europe's legacy carriers. It's time to wake up
Lufthansa's dispute with its pilots does not yet look to have been resolved. While Mr Spohr is rightly attempting to face the conflict and effect much needed change, he may have left an opening for the ever-nimble Mr O'Leary to have another crack at Germany.
 
Eurowings Adds A320 for germanwings Service in S15

Based on recent schedule update, germanwings has outlined planned Airbus A320 aircraft operation, by Eurowings, in Summer 2015 season from 29MAR15. Planned Eurowings A320 operational routes for germanwings in Summer 2015 season as follow.

Dusseldorf – Barcelona
Dusseldorf – Bari
Dusseldorf – Berlin Tegel
Dusseldorf – Budapest
Dusseldorf – Catania
Dusseldorf – Dubrovnik
Dusseldorf – Irakleion
Dusseldorf – Lamezia Terme
Dusseldorf – London Heathrow
Dusseldorf – Madrid
Dusseldorf – Naples
Dusseldorf – Palma Mallorca
Dusseldorf – Rome
Dusseldorf – Split
Dusseldorf – Valencia
Dusseldorf – Venice
Dusseldorf – Warsaw
Dusseldorf – Zadar
Dusseldorf – Zurich
Hamburg – London Heathrow
Hamburg – Madrid
Hamburg – Naples
Hamburg – Olbia
Hamburg – Palma Mallorca
Hamburg – Stockholm
Hamburg – Stuttgart
Hamburg – Vienna
Hamburg – Zadar
Hamburg – Zurich
Stuttgart – Dubrovnik

airlineroute

In pratica Lufthansa ha ceduto le rotte non passanti per gli hub di FRA e MUC a Germanwings perchè aveva costi operativi piu' bassi. Adesso si accorgono che i costi non sono sufficientemente bassi per competere con le principali low cost e a loro volta subappaltano i voli ad Eurowings. Stanno raschiando il fondo del barile...
 
Eurowings aveva in flotta i CRJ900 che saranno sostituiti dagli A320 con un notevole aumento di capacità su diverse rotte.

Non sono molto d'accordo con questo modello. La Germania, al di fuori di rotte come FRA o MUC e leisure/servite 1D ha bisogno di parecchie frequenze tra cittá che spesso non riescono a riempire un A319 e tanto meno un A320. Mi viene l'esempio della MXP-HAM che ai tempi dell'hub era operata fino a 4D con CRJ9, ridotta poi a 3 ed ora, visto che é operata con aerei piú grandi a 2. Vero si risparmia molto sulle rotazioni ma ne viene meno la flessibilitá dell'operativo.
 
germanwings Planned New S15 Routes as of 19NOV14

germanwings in Summer 2015 season plans to introduce 16 new routes from a number of its bases, mainly Berlin Tegel, Dusseldorf, Hamburg and Stuttgart. Planned new routes as follow.

Berlin Tegel – Antalya eff 04APR15 1 weekly A320 (A319 in April 2015)
Berlin Tegel – Izmir eff 05MAY15 2 weekly A319
Berlin Tegel – Palermo eff 11APR15 1 weekly A320
Dortmund – Ankara eff 04APR15 1 weekly A319
Dusseldorf – Ankara eff 27JUN15 2 weekly A320
Dusseldorf – Antalya eff 28MAR15 1 weekly A319 (until 16MAY15)
Dusseldorf – Jersey eff 23MAY15 1 weekly A319 (until 05SEP15)
Dusseldorf – Reykjavik eff 01JUN15 2 weekly A320 (until 05SEP15)
Dusseldorf – Rhodes eff 04APR15 1 weekly A319 or Lufthansa A320
Hamburg – Antalya eff 04APR15 1 weekly A320 (A319 in April 2015)
Hamburg – Bari eff 09MAY15 1 weekly CRJ900
Hamburg – Izmir eff 09MAY15 2 weekly A319
Stuttgart – Amsterdam eff 29MAR15 6 weekly A319
Stuttgart – Nice eff 31MAR15 3 weekly A319/CRJ900
Stuttgart – Tunis eff 24JUL15 1 weekly A319 (until 26SEP15)
Stuttgart – Valencia eff 30MAR15 4 weekly A319 (Certain service operated by CRJ700)

airlineroute
 
Germanwings chiude Torino-Dusseldorf ultimo volo il 7 gennaio, dopo questa data i voli sono stati tolti dalla vendita. Era operata 6x week con CRJ900. Il volo quando era operato da LH era 2x daily, con passaggio a Germanwings dimezzando le frequenze probabilmente ha perso molta appetibilità per i pax business.

Inoltre da Marzo prossimo Eurowings che operava il volo per conto di Germanwings inizierà a ricevere gli A320 che sostituiranno progressivamente i CR9.

Con questa chiusura Germanwings abbandona Torino
 
Infatti, quello che dicevo 2 post fa: togliendo aerei piccoli vanno a farsi benedire rotte con potenziali discreti yield. Non che me ne vogliano ma 1xw su BRI e PMO non si puó sentire proprio.