TAM. San Paolo.voice recorder prima dello schianto

[mxp]

Ho trovato questo in rete , non so se e' stato messo nel forum in precedenza.
Tam 3504 del 17 /7/07 si e'schiantato perche' arrivato lungo , se non sbaglio l'aeroporto e' stato chiuso definitivamente , non so per quanto tempo, la domanda e' : si poteva evitare ????? molti sono stati i comandanti che si sono lamentati per quella pista che quando era bgnata era difficile fermarsi.
LEGEND


CAM Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
HOT Flight crew audio panel voice or sound source (1)
PA Airplane Public Address system voice or sound source
FWC Automated callout from the Flight Warming Computer
RDO Radio transmissions from TAM flight 3054
APP Radio transmission from Approach Control
TWR Radio transmission from the Congonhas Control Tower
CH2 sound heard on CVR channel 2



Start Of Transcript



18:18:24.5 (all times are local time)
[start of recording]
18:18:24.5
PA-1 [captain makes speech to passengers]
18:18:53.4
CAM - ? [sound of whistling]
18:20:25.0
CAM [sound of flight attendant door open request]
18:20:28.1
CAM - 1 is ok?
18:20:29.7
CAM - 3 [flight attendant says that everything in the cabin is OK, and then asked where will they be landing]
18:20:33.3
CAM -1 I have just informed.
18:20:34.7
CAM - 3 I didn’t hear - sorry -her talking.
18:20:37.7
CAM -1 but she heard, Congonhas.
18:20:39.3
CAM - 3 is it Congonhas? its great so. she might have heard. thank you.
18:43:04.3
HOT -1 remember, we only have one reverse.
18:43:06.9
HOT-2 yes… only the left.
18:43:24.0
HOT-1 glideslope… LOC blue. LOC star. [LOC star means a an asterisk is displayed on the FMA, which means the loc capture]
18:43:26.6
HOT-2 checked.
18:43:27.1
HOT-1 autopilot one plus two.
18:43:29.4
HOT-1 flaps one.
18:43:30.7
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:43:36.7
HOT-1 clear status.
18:43:41.8
HOT-2 clear status.
18:43:43.8
HOT-2 clear.
18:43:48.2
RDO-2 going to intercept the localizer, TAM three zero five four.
18:43:52.2
APP TAM three zero five four, reduce speed for the approach… and call the tower on frequency one two seven point one five, good afternoon.
18:44:00.0
RDO-2 one two seven one five, over.
18:44:01.7
HOT-1 good afternoon.
18:44:06.4
HOT-1 flaps two.
18:44:08.01
CAM-2 speed checked.
18:44:20.0
HOT-2 flaps at two.
18:44:22.3
RDO-2 Sao Paulo tower, this is TAM three zero five four.
18:44:26.01
TWR TAM three zero five four, reduce minimum speed for approach, the wind is north with zero six. I will report when clear three five left.
18:44:33.4
RDO-2 good evening, reducing to the minimum possible [speed].
18:44:36.3
HOT-1 landing gear down.
18:44:37.7
HOT-2 landing gear down.
18:44:53.9
HOT-1 flaps three.
18:44:55.1
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:44:57.4
HOT-2 flaps three.
18:45:03.9
HOT-1 flap full.
18:45:05.7
CAM-2 speed checked, flaps full.
18:45:10.6
HOT-1 standby final checklist
18:45:12.0
HOT-2 standing by.
18:45:12.9
CAM-1 glide star, set missed approach altitude.
18:45:15.0
CAM-2 ALT**.
18:45:21.0
CAM-2 six thousand feet.
18:45:44.0
CAM [sound of windshield wipers operating]
18:45:52.1
CH2 [sound of outer marker beacon heard on channel 2]
18:46:03.2
HOT-1 final checklist.
18:46:04.6
HOT-2 final checklist, passing DIADEMA [name of the outer marker beacon]
18:46:10.4
PA-2 cabin crew, clear to land. [prepare for landing]
18:46: 14.0
CAM- 2 cabin crew
18:46:15.2
CAM – 1 advised.
18:46:16.00
CAM – 2 auto thrust.
18:46:18. 8
CAM 1 – speed.
18:46:20.0
CAM 2 - **-
18:46:21.1
CAM 1 – landing no blue.
18:46:22.6
CAM 1 – ECAM MEMO (Eletronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor – check memo status)
18:46:23.8
HOT-1 landing, no blue
18:46:24.9
HOT-2 landing no blue.
18:46:26.1
HOT-1 okay?
18:46: 26.7
HOT-2 okay..what?
18:46:28.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:46:30.8
HOT-? *-
18:46:30.8
HOT-2 final checklist complete.
18:46:33.8
CAM-1 runway in sight, landing.
18:46:41.7
CAM-1 ask him [the tower] about the rain condition, the runway condition, and if the runway is slippery.
18:46: 57.0
RDO-2 TAM on final approach, two miles away. could you confirm conditions?
18:47:01.7
TWR it's wet, and it is slippery. I will report three five left clear, three zero five four.
18:47:06.1
RDO-2 already on final.
18:47:07.5
TWR the aircraft is starting the departure.
18:47:10.7
HOT-1 wet and slippery!
18:47:22.0
HOT-2 The aircraft is starting the takeoff run.
18:47: 34.3
TWR TAM three zero five four, three five left, clear to land, the runway is wet, and is slippery and the wind is three three zero at eight. knots.
18:47:40.6
HOT-2 three three zero at eight, is the wind.
18:47:42.9
HOT-1 checked.
18:47:43.9
TWR three zero five four?
18:47:45.3
RDO-2 three zero five four, roger.
18:47:46.4
FWC four hundred.
18:47:49.8
HOT-1 is the landing clear?
18:47:50.7
HOT-2 clear to land.
18:47:52.3
HOT-1 land green, manual flight.
18:47:53.7
CAM [sound of autopilot disconnect tone]
18:47:54.1
HOT-2 checked.
18:47:54.8
HOT-1 inhibit the glide [GPWS aural warning] for me please.
18:47:55.7
CAM [sound of triple click indicating reversion from CAT II or III to CAT I approach mode (manual flight approach)]
18:47:56.9
HOT-2 what?
18:47:58.8
FWC three hundred.
18:47:59.3
HOT-1 inhibit the glide for me.
18:48:00.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:48:03.0
HOT-2 inhibit.
18:48:05.8
HOT-2 middle.
18:48:11.6
FWC two hundred.
18:48:14.9
HOT-2 one dot now. okay.
18:48: 16.8
HOT-1 okay.
18:48:21.0
FWC twenty.
18:48:21.6
FWC retard.
18:48:23.0
FWC retard.
18:48:24.5
CAM [sound of trust lever movement]
18:48:24.9
CAM [sound of increase engine noise]
18:48:25:5
GPWS retard.
18:48:26:3
CAM [sound similar to touchdown]
18:48:26:7
HOT-2 reverse number one only.
18:48:29:5
HOT-2 spoliers nothing.
18:48:30:8
HOT-1 aaiii [sigh]
18:48:33:3
HOT-1 look this.
18:48:34:4
HOT-2 decelerate, decelerate.
18:48:35:9
HOT-1 it can’t, it can’t.
18:48:40:0
HOT-1 oh my god….. oh my god.
18:48:42:7
HOT-1 go, go, go, turn turn turn turn.
18:48:44:6
HOT-2 turn turn to…no, turn turn.
18:48:45:5
CAM [sound of crushing noises].
18:48:49:7
CAM-? (oh no) [male voice]
18:48:50:0
CAM [pause in crushing noises]
18:48:50:6
CAM-? [sound of scream, female voice]
18:48:50:8
CAM-? [sound of crushing noise]
[end of recording]
18:48:51:4
Marked as: Mature

 

[Italo83]

Sì, si poteva decisamente evitare e l'aeroporto ha colpa fino a un certo punto, anche se ovviamente se ci fosse stato spazio alla fine della pista poteva finire diversamente:

da flightglobal.com

TAM A320 crew did not retard right-hand thrust lever
By David Kaminski-Morrow

Information on the TAM Airbus A320 accident shortly to be made available to operators will show that the crew retarded only the thrust lever for the left-hand engine during touchdown, leaving the other in its forward position.

Industry sources say the information, to be set out in a communique, shows that the crew made a normal approach to Sao Paulo Congonhas Airport on 17 July with auto-thrust selected – the aircraft operating under a ‘managed thrust’ regime – and the thrust levers in the ‘climb’ position.

For reasons yet to be explained, the pilot, in the final moments before touchdown, retarded only the thrust lever for the left-hand engine – first into the ‘idle’ position, then into ‘reverse’. This action disconnected the auto-thrust, as per its design. The failure to move the right-hand engine’s thrust lever to the reverse position runs contrary to the standard operating procedure which calls for both levers to be set to ‘idle’ and then 'reverse' – even with a thruster reverser inoperative.

It is unclear why the right-hand engine thrust lever was left in position. Newly-released cockpit-voice transcripts have notably highlighted the crew’s awareness that only the left-hand engine had an operable thrust-reverser; the right-hand reverser had been deactivated. This, however, should not have made a difference to the thrust retardation procedure.

As the aircraft began to slow after touchdown the thrust being produced by the right-hand engine remained at the level it was at when the auto-thrust had disconnected. With the thrust lever forward the spoilers would not have deployed, and the auto-brake would have similarly been inhibited.

In the cockpit transcript the co-pilot appears to state that the A320’s spoilers did not activate on touchdown and, as the situation develops, the pilots are heard to say that they cannot slow the aircraft. Flight-data recorder information indicates that the pilots repeatedly pressed on the brakes in a bid to stop the jet but did not retard the right-hand thrust lever.