Incidente A330 Air France Rio-Parigi 01/06/2009
- Autore Discussione Edo75
- Data d'inizio
Ritornando alle possibili cause di tipo tecnico, quale fenomeno esterno o interno all' aereo, potrebbe giustificare un improvviso blocco delle comunicazioni ma consentire comunque di volare per altri 40'?
Un grosso cedimento strutturale immagino non li avrebbe lasciati in aria tanto tempo e uno minore non avrebbe dovuto impedirgli di comunicare, specie considerando un lasso di tempo così lungo.
Un problema di pressurizzazione immagino non sia in grado in 3 secondi di far passare l' equipaggio dallo stato di normalità a quello di incoscienza.
Andando per esclusione, mi verrebbe da pensare ad un evento che ha interessato soprattutto la cabina di pilotaggio e/o i piloti. Un evento abbastanza serio da riuscire ad interrompere parte delle comunicazioni oppure a neutralizzare i piloti, ma non così dirompente da far precipitare subito l' aereo.
Chiedo agli esperti del forum: quali possibili eventi possono portare alle (supposte) conseguenze di cui sopra?
Un grosso cedimento strutturale immagino non li avrebbe lasciati in aria tanto tempo e uno minore non avrebbe dovuto impedirgli di comunicare, specie considerando un lasso di tempo così lungo.
Un problema di pressurizzazione immagino non sia in grado in 3 secondi di far passare l' equipaggio dallo stato di normalità a quello di incoscienza.
Andando per esclusione, mi verrebbe da pensare ad un evento che ha interessato soprattutto la cabina di pilotaggio e/o i piloti. Un evento abbastanza serio da riuscire ad interrompere parte delle comunicazioni oppure a neutralizzare i piloti, ma non così dirompente da far precipitare subito l' aereo.
Chiedo agli esperti del forum: quali possibili eventi possono portare alle (supposte) conseguenze di cui sopra?
Stessa cosa che ho pensato io azzardo qualche ipotesi:
1 Un pezzo di ghiaccio ha sfondato il parabrezza
2 A causa di un cedimento uno o tutti e due i windshield sono saltati
3 impatto con qualcosa (ma credo sia improbabile)
4 Magari incendio in cabina (sbaglio o non sono stati trovati pezzi della cabina) rimasto circoscritto a quella zona li. Mi rivolgo agli esperti, esiste un fire detector in cabina?
Le ipotesi 1, 2, 3, 4 avrebbero scatenato messaggi ACARS ben prima. Sarebbe bello se riuscissimo a rimanere con i piedi per terra ;-)
Ok, tuttavia se dobbiamo lasciare intatto il cockpit per non scatenare gli ACARS, rimane solo un evento dall' interno che ha compromesso i piloti...
Quindi i Wind shield sono collegai all'acars in qualche modo? Sorry non lo sapevo
Quello che a me viene in mente è, memore dell'incidente American Airlines sopra il Queens, una rottura catastrofica della deriva.
Ovvero in turbolenza e volando con comandi manuali, delle spedalate troppo violente e la deriva cede... conseguenza inevitabile la perdita di controllo del velivolo e la caduta in mare...
Ovvero in turbolenza e volando con comandi manuali, delle spedalate troppo violente e la deriva cede... conseguenza inevitabile la perdita di controllo del velivolo e la caduta in mare...
E' compatibile questo tipo di cedimento con la possibilità di continuare a volare per 40'?
I windshield, che io sappia, no. La loss of cabin pressure conseguente, sicuramente si.
http://www.flightglobal.com/article...47-opens-rift-between-brazil-and-senegal.html
DATE:04/07/09
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news
Loss of contact with AF447 opens rift between Brazil and Senegal
By David Kaminski-Morrow
Initial details of the handover of Air France flight AF447 from Brazil to Senegal have opened a rift between the two states, as investigators attempt to establish how long the Airbus A330 was out of contact before a formal emergency alert was declared.
Preliminary findings into the loss of the AF447 indicate that, after the jet failed to respond to radio calls shortly before leaving Brazilian airspace, several hours elapsed while controllers in 10 different flight information regions tried to determine the aircraft's position.
Circumstances of the loss - close to the Brazil-Senegal oceanic airspace boundary, where responsibility for the flight is handed over - have made the transfer issue a sensitive matter.
France's Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA) states that the flight "was not transferred" between Brazil's Atlantico and Senegal's Dakar oceanic centres. This has been backed by West African air navigation service ASECNA.
But the Brazilian air force says it wants to "eliminate doubts" about the procedures followed. It has publicly issued an audio segment of the moment the Atlantico controller co-ordinated transfer of AF447 to Dakar, when the A330 was estimating reaching the Brazil-Senegal airspace boundary - the waypoint designated TASIL - at 02:20UTC.
AUDIO: Atlantico co-ordinates AF447 transfer with Dakar
Only changes in excess of 3min to this estimated time would have required further co-ordination with Dakar. But the estimate was never revised because the Atlantico controller could not raise AF447 after the last radio contact at 01:35UTC.
As a result, argues the air force, Dakar "theoretically" assumed control of the aircraft at 02:20UTC.
© Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses
But in a statement ASECNA claims the "onus" was on the Atlantico controller to call his counterpart at Dakar centre to confirm the aircraft's arrival at the airspace boundary. "This formality was not performed," it says, and the aircraft did not contact Dakar to "signal its presence".
ASECNA rejects as "totally unfounded" the Brazilian suggestion that aircraft can be assumed to have entered Dakar airspace if the Dakar centre does not warn otherwise.
But BEA's interim report into the crash highlights a September 2008 agreement between the Atlantico and Dakar centres which was in force at the time of the crash.
This states that air crews must contact the receiving sector controller 5min before the airspace boundary, but also that controllers in the receiving sector must inform the exiting sector if they cannot establish contact with an aircraft within 3min of the estimated time of arrival.
BEA warns against drawing early conclusions over the search and rescue situation, stating that its chronology of subsequent air traffic control communications is "still fragmentary".
But the interim report states that Dakar controllers worked with a 'virtual' track of AF447 in the absence of radio contact and a confirmed trajectory. There was no log-on to the Dakar automatic dependent surveillance tracking system.
Some 28 minutes after the estimated entry of AF447 into Dakar oceanic airspace, the Dakar controller informed the adjacent centre, Cape Verde Sal, that the aircraft had not yet made contact. More than an hour later, at 03:54UTC, with AF447 running 9min behind the projected time to enter Sal airspace, Sal called Dakar for an update, and was told that AF447 had not contacted Dakar to revise its estimates.
Sal informed Dakar at 04:07UTC that it was tracking a second Air France flight, AF459, which had been some 37min behind AF447. This second aircraft failed to raise AF447 on the radio.
At 04:21UTC Dakar called Atlantico centre to confirm the whether AF447 had exited Brazilian airspace at TASIL in line with the original estimate.
BEA's partial chronology does not yet include full information from the Atlantico and Sal centres. But the Brazilian air force states that, after Dakar queried AF447's position with Atlantico, the Recife-based Salvaero search and rescue division "initiated necessary actions to start air operations to locate the missing aircraft" at 05:20UTC.
By this time Air France was also trying to confirm the flight's position and, over a period of about three hours, the carrier and several other control centres - among them Canarias, Santa Maria, Casablanca, Lisboa, Madrid and Brest - exchanged information in a bid to establish the aircraft's whereabouts. At one stage, the BEA chronology shows, the flight was erroneously reported to have been in contact with Moroccan air traffic control.
Air France and Brest centre informed BEA of the situation shortly after 07:41UTC. Madrid centre issued an 'alert' emergency phase at 08:15UTC and Brest launched a 'distress' phase about 20min later.
Ecco il link alle comunicazioni tre Atlantico e Dakar:
http://www.aer.mil.br/portal/voo447/AUDIOS/020709/audio_020709.mp3
DATE:04/07/09
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news
Loss of contact with AF447 opens rift between Brazil and Senegal
By David Kaminski-Morrow
Initial details of the handover of Air France flight AF447 from Brazil to Senegal have opened a rift between the two states, as investigators attempt to establish how long the Airbus A330 was out of contact before a formal emergency alert was declared.
Preliminary findings into the loss of the AF447 indicate that, after the jet failed to respond to radio calls shortly before leaving Brazilian airspace, several hours elapsed while controllers in 10 different flight information regions tried to determine the aircraft's position.
Circumstances of the loss - close to the Brazil-Senegal oceanic airspace boundary, where responsibility for the flight is handed over - have made the transfer issue a sensitive matter.
France's Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA) states that the flight "was not transferred" between Brazil's Atlantico and Senegal's Dakar oceanic centres. This has been backed by West African air navigation service ASECNA.
But the Brazilian air force says it wants to "eliminate doubts" about the procedures followed. It has publicly issued an audio segment of the moment the Atlantico controller co-ordinated transfer of AF447 to Dakar, when the A330 was estimating reaching the Brazil-Senegal airspace boundary - the waypoint designated TASIL - at 02:20UTC.
AUDIO: Atlantico co-ordinates AF447 transfer with Dakar
Only changes in excess of 3min to this estimated time would have required further co-ordination with Dakar. But the estimate was never revised because the Atlantico controller could not raise AF447 after the last radio contact at 01:35UTC.
As a result, argues the air force, Dakar "theoretically" assumed control of the aircraft at 02:20UTC.
© Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses
But in a statement ASECNA claims the "onus" was on the Atlantico controller to call his counterpart at Dakar centre to confirm the aircraft's arrival at the airspace boundary. "This formality was not performed," it says, and the aircraft did not contact Dakar to "signal its presence".
ASECNA rejects as "totally unfounded" the Brazilian suggestion that aircraft can be assumed to have entered Dakar airspace if the Dakar centre does not warn otherwise.
But BEA's interim report into the crash highlights a September 2008 agreement between the Atlantico and Dakar centres which was in force at the time of the crash.
This states that air crews must contact the receiving sector controller 5min before the airspace boundary, but also that controllers in the receiving sector must inform the exiting sector if they cannot establish contact with an aircraft within 3min of the estimated time of arrival.
BEA warns against drawing early conclusions over the search and rescue situation, stating that its chronology of subsequent air traffic control communications is "still fragmentary".
But the interim report states that Dakar controllers worked with a 'virtual' track of AF447 in the absence of radio contact and a confirmed trajectory. There was no log-on to the Dakar automatic dependent surveillance tracking system.
Some 28 minutes after the estimated entry of AF447 into Dakar oceanic airspace, the Dakar controller informed the adjacent centre, Cape Verde Sal, that the aircraft had not yet made contact. More than an hour later, at 03:54UTC, with AF447 running 9min behind the projected time to enter Sal airspace, Sal called Dakar for an update, and was told that AF447 had not contacted Dakar to revise its estimates.
Sal informed Dakar at 04:07UTC that it was tracking a second Air France flight, AF459, which had been some 37min behind AF447. This second aircraft failed to raise AF447 on the radio.
At 04:21UTC Dakar called Atlantico centre to confirm the whether AF447 had exited Brazilian airspace at TASIL in line with the original estimate.
BEA's partial chronology does not yet include full information from the Atlantico and Sal centres. But the Brazilian air force states that, after Dakar queried AF447's position with Atlantico, the Recife-based Salvaero search and rescue division "initiated necessary actions to start air operations to locate the missing aircraft" at 05:20UTC.
By this time Air France was also trying to confirm the flight's position and, over a period of about three hours, the carrier and several other control centres - among them Canarias, Santa Maria, Casablanca, Lisboa, Madrid and Brest - exchanged information in a bid to establish the aircraft's whereabouts. At one stage, the BEA chronology shows, the flight was erroneously reported to have been in contact with Moroccan air traffic control.
Air France and Brest centre informed BEA of the situation shortly after 07:41UTC. Madrid centre issued an 'alert' emergency phase at 08:15UTC and Brest launched a 'distress' phase about 20min later.
Ecco il link alle comunicazioni tre Atlantico e Dakar:
http://www.aer.mil.br/portal/voo447/AUDIOS/020709/audio_020709.mp3
Ho pensato la stessa cosa, ma essendo che erano in quota mi sembra strano che non siano riusciti a comunicare nulla prima di toccare il mare!!!
Era da un po' che non entravo in questo 3d, ma vedo che certezze ancora non ce ne sono molte, o se ci sono non vengono pubblicizzate.
Diventa sempre piu' probabile che non sapremo mai cosa e' successo, o e' una mia sensazione?
Diventa sempre piu' probabile che non sapremo mai cosa e' successo, o e' una mia sensazione?
Temo che ci dovremo sorbire una stagione intera di Voyger sul disastro. :morto:
Se le regole del fly-by-wire cambiano da normal ad alternate (o addirittura direct, ma non credo sia questo il caso), alcune protezioni vengono meno (nel caso del direct credo vengano meno tutte). Comunque ancora è da vedere se le analogie col volo AA siano reali.
Non credo possano esserci analogie con AA (A300-600R) in quanto l'A300 non è FBW.
In ogni caso FBW o no, la corsa del timone è limitata in funzione della IAS, nel caso del 330 attraverso il Rudder Travel Limiter (2)
Analogie con le condizioni meteo?
In pratica, ricevendo quel messaggio ACARS, i tecnici a parigi, hanno la possibilità per mezzo del software AIRMAN, di collegare il codice di avaria al TSM (Trouble Shooting Manual), il quale ti dice con quel codice, quale componente è in avaria.
Possibile, forse...
Questo no, ma volendo seguire questa ipotesi supponiamo che in cabina ci sia stata una colluttazione molto violenta e uso di armi improprie "pesanti", tipo un estintore o simile che fracassa anche una parte del cockpit mentre i piloti vengono massacrati (ricordate le scene drammatiche di "United 93"...)
Il danno (o i danni) apportati qua e là in cabina, potrebbero magari aver poi innescato tutti i malfunzionamenti registrati dagli ACARS (in particolare, quello di problemi all'impianto elettrico...), mentre quelli relativi ai tubi di Pitot potrebbero essere dovuti al mega-temporale in cui l'aereo si stava infilando mentre gli assassini entravano in azione...
Saluti.
Questo no, ma volendo seguire questa ipotesi supponiamo che in cabina ci sia stata una colluttazione molto violenta e uso di armi improprie "pesanti", tipo un estintore o simile che fracassa anche una parte del cockpit mentre i piloti vengono massacrati (ricordate le scene drammatiche di "United 93"...)
Il danno (o i danni) apportati qua e là in cabina, potrebbero magari aver poi innescato tutti i malfunzionamenti registrati dagli ACARS (in particolare, quello di problemi all'impianto elettrico...), mentre quelli relativi ai tubi di Pitot potrebbero essere dovuti al mega-temporale in cui l'aereo si stava infilando mentre gli assassini entravano in azione...
Saluti.
E il motivo?
E la rivendicazione che non c'è?
E cosa avrebbero voluto dimostrare sti sedicenti che poi non fanno nulla per pubblicizzare il loro gesto?
Solo un pazzo solitario?
Naaaaaaaaa....