South Africa's Civil Aviation Authority released their final report concluding the probable cause was:
During landing the nose landing gear of the aircraft collapsed backwards after it had collided with a wild animal on the runway.
Contributory Factors
- The aerodrome fence had been constructed without a proper foundation, which allowed animals to dig holes and trenches underneath the fence in order to gain access to the aerodrome property, thereby easily migrating from one side of the fence to the other.
- The fact that a section of the perimeter fence that used to be electrified was disabled due to theft of the solar panel powering the fence, was considered to be a significant contributory factor in the migration of animals along the fence.
- An aardvark and other types of animals were spotted on the aerodrome by ARFF personnel during their runway and taxiway inspections over the period of 12 to 16 July 2010. However, no corrective measures were taken by the aerodrome licence holder to address this shortcoming (i.e., setting traps to catch these animals or bring in professional wildlife capturing teams to catch and relocate these animals).
- The open areas between the runways and taxiways were found to consist mainly of savanna-type grassland. The grass was found to be approximately 0.5 m in height, which acted as a good camouflage for several species of animals, making it difficult to observe and track these animals, especially at night.
- The fact that aerodrome maintenance personnel members were not on duty over weekends to ensure that the integrity of the perimeter fence had not been jeopardised and if so, to take corrective actions by closing all possible holes/trenches dug underneath the perimeter fence, was considered to be a significant contributory factor to this accident.
The captain (26, ATPL, 4,575 hours total, 1,525 hours) was pilot flying, the first officer (34, ATPL, 6,531 hours total, 1,270 hours on type) was pilot monitoring.
The aircraft was on approach to Kimberley's runway 20 in night time conditions, the crew requested the tower controller to turn up the runway lighting that were too dim.
The main gear had just touched down when the captain saw an aardvark in front of the aircraft, less than one second later the nose gear, still airborne at that point and 621 meters past the runway threshold, collided with the aardvark that came to rest 38 meters from the point of impact, the landing gear horn immediately activated. The captain attempted to keep the nose of the aircraft up as long as practical, during this time the first officer transmitted an emergency call reporting they had struck an animal on the runway. The tower pressed the crash button as result of the emergency call. With decreasing speed the captain lowered the nose onto the runway 479 meters past the point of impact, the right nose wheel's tyre burst 879 meters past impact, both nose gear doors made contact with the runway surface 893 meters past point of impact, the aircraft started to veer right, the nose gear strut started to contact the runway surface 1079 meters past impact, the airplane was steered back onto the center line using asymmetric braking. Sparks were flying mainly off the right side of the aircraft, haze with a distinctive acrid smell originating from the burst tyres, scrape of gear doors and nose gear strut on the runway surface entered the cabin.
After the airplane came to a standstill 1838 meters down the runway the first officer assessed the situation with regards to a possible fire, after it was clear there was no fire the first officer helped the passenger disembarking the aircraft via the main access door onto the runway.
The captain completed working the shut down in ground emergency checklist and subsequently assisted with the evacuation.
Arriving emergency services also assisted with the evacuation of the aircraft.
The airplane sustained substantial damage to the nose wheel assembly and the lower nose fuselage structure.
An inspection of the aerodrome revealed that animal hazard including rabbits, jackal, steenbok and aardvarks had been detected and reported between July 12th and 16th with the majority of sightings during dusk and night.
The airport's perimeter fence was found with several holes dug underneath the fence, a number of which had been temporary repaired by putting concrete blocks into the holes, those holes however were dug open again leaving little to no effect in stopping wildlife from migrating through the perimeter fence.
At the west side of the aerodrome bordering a nature reserve an electrical fence had been installed, the solar panel powering the electrical fence however had been reported stolen on Jun 22nd 2010, the panel had not been replaced.
Grass inside the airport perimeter was found 0.5 meters in height, hiding even numerous termite mounds. In the past there had been a program to counter termites by filling the mounds with poison and breaking up the mounds, this programme had ceased however some time ago. Due to the high grass the mounds were hardly visible, the grass also provided cover for wildlife. Termites also provided an incentive for aardvarks to migrate through the perimeter fence to get access to their favourite food supply.
The SACAA analysed: "In the case of Kimberley aerodrome the environment provided an ideal habitat for certain birds and wild animals, with the three basic needs to survive being met on the aerodrome property. The property contained hundreds of termite mounds, which provided the staple diet of the aardvark/anteater, and was therefore an ideal environment for these animals as well as several others."
The SACAA analysed further that after main gear touch down the pilot flying (captain) saw the animal for a split second in the beam of the landing light, but was committed to land and had no possibility to avoid the accident. The pilot however managed to control the situation.
The ATC had no clear vision of the runway and was unable to see the animal before clearing the aircraft to land. However, due to the quick movements by the animals the animals can enter the runway at any time emphasizing the need to properly manage the wildlife on the aerodrome to prevent occurrences like this one.
11 safety recommendations to SACAA's aerodrome safety department and the airport operator, all dealing with wildlife management within the aerodrome perimeter, were released as result of the investigation.
During landing the nose landing gear of the aircraft collapsed backwards after it had collided with a wild animal on the runway.
Contributory Factors
- The aerodrome fence had been constructed without a proper foundation, which allowed animals to dig holes and trenches underneath the fence in order to gain access to the aerodrome property, thereby easily migrating from one side of the fence to the other.
- The fact that a section of the perimeter fence that used to be electrified was disabled due to theft of the solar panel powering the fence, was considered to be a significant contributory factor in the migration of animals along the fence.
- An aardvark and other types of animals were spotted on the aerodrome by ARFF personnel during their runway and taxiway inspections over the period of 12 to 16 July 2010. However, no corrective measures were taken by the aerodrome licence holder to address this shortcoming (i.e., setting traps to catch these animals or bring in professional wildlife capturing teams to catch and relocate these animals).
- The open areas between the runways and taxiways were found to consist mainly of savanna-type grassland. The grass was found to be approximately 0.5 m in height, which acted as a good camouflage for several species of animals, making it difficult to observe and track these animals, especially at night.
- The fact that aerodrome maintenance personnel members were not on duty over weekends to ensure that the integrity of the perimeter fence had not been jeopardised and if so, to take corrective actions by closing all possible holes/trenches dug underneath the perimeter fence, was considered to be a significant contributory factor to this accident.
The captain (26, ATPL, 4,575 hours total, 1,525 hours) was pilot flying, the first officer (34, ATPL, 6,531 hours total, 1,270 hours on type) was pilot monitoring.
The aircraft was on approach to Kimberley's runway 20 in night time conditions, the crew requested the tower controller to turn up the runway lighting that were too dim.
The main gear had just touched down when the captain saw an aardvark in front of the aircraft, less than one second later the nose gear, still airborne at that point and 621 meters past the runway threshold, collided with the aardvark that came to rest 38 meters from the point of impact, the landing gear horn immediately activated. The captain attempted to keep the nose of the aircraft up as long as practical, during this time the first officer transmitted an emergency call reporting they had struck an animal on the runway. The tower pressed the crash button as result of the emergency call. With decreasing speed the captain lowered the nose onto the runway 479 meters past the point of impact, the right nose wheel's tyre burst 879 meters past impact, both nose gear doors made contact with the runway surface 893 meters past point of impact, the aircraft started to veer right, the nose gear strut started to contact the runway surface 1079 meters past impact, the airplane was steered back onto the center line using asymmetric braking. Sparks were flying mainly off the right side of the aircraft, haze with a distinctive acrid smell originating from the burst tyres, scrape of gear doors and nose gear strut on the runway surface entered the cabin.
After the airplane came to a standstill 1838 meters down the runway the first officer assessed the situation with regards to a possible fire, after it was clear there was no fire the first officer helped the passenger disembarking the aircraft via the main access door onto the runway.
The captain completed working the shut down in ground emergency checklist and subsequently assisted with the evacuation.
Arriving emergency services also assisted with the evacuation of the aircraft.
The airplane sustained substantial damage to the nose wheel assembly and the lower nose fuselage structure.
An inspection of the aerodrome revealed that animal hazard including rabbits, jackal, steenbok and aardvarks had been detected and reported between July 12th and 16th with the majority of sightings during dusk and night.
The airport's perimeter fence was found with several holes dug underneath the fence, a number of which had been temporary repaired by putting concrete blocks into the holes, those holes however were dug open again leaving little to no effect in stopping wildlife from migrating through the perimeter fence.
At the west side of the aerodrome bordering a nature reserve an electrical fence had been installed, the solar panel powering the electrical fence however had been reported stolen on Jun 22nd 2010, the panel had not been replaced.
Grass inside the airport perimeter was found 0.5 meters in height, hiding even numerous termite mounds. In the past there had been a program to counter termites by filling the mounds with poison and breaking up the mounds, this programme had ceased however some time ago. Due to the high grass the mounds were hardly visible, the grass also provided cover for wildlife. Termites also provided an incentive for aardvarks to migrate through the perimeter fence to get access to their favourite food supply.
The SACAA analysed: "In the case of Kimberley aerodrome the environment provided an ideal habitat for certain birds and wild animals, with the three basic needs to survive being met on the aerodrome property. The property contained hundreds of termite mounds, which provided the staple diet of the aardvark/anteater, and was therefore an ideal environment for these animals as well as several others."
The SACAA analysed further that after main gear touch down the pilot flying (captain) saw the animal for a split second in the beam of the landing light, but was committed to land and had no possibility to avoid the accident. The pilot however managed to control the situation.
The ATC had no clear vision of the runway and was unable to see the animal before clearing the aircraft to land. However, due to the quick movements by the animals the animals can enter the runway at any time emphasizing the need to properly manage the wildlife on the aerodrome to prevent occurrences like this one.
11 safety recommendations to SACAA's aerodrome safety department and the airport operator, all dealing with wildlife management within the aerodrome perimeter, were released as result of the investigation.