Iberia A346 at Quito on Nov 9th 2007, overran runway
By Simon Hradecky, created Saturday, Nov 14th 2009 21:41Z, last updated Saturday, Nov 14th 2009 21:58Z
Final position of EC-JOH (Photo: DGACE)
An Iberia Airbus A340-600, registration EC-JOH performing flight IB-6463 from Madrid,SP (Spain) to Quito (Ecuador) with 345 passengers and 14 crew, overran runway 35 while landing in Quito in rain and reduced visibility at 17:05L (22:05Z). The airplane received substantial damage and was subsequently written off, the passengers were evacuated. Two passengers received minor injuries.
The Direccion General de Aviacion Civil del Ecuador (DGACE) have released their final report in Spanish concluding, that the probable cause of the accident was:
The crew's decision to begin and carry out the approach to the airport of Quito despite the known runway and weather conditions and aircraft weight, and not to abort the approach when the capture of the PAPI glidepath brought the airplane outside the parameters of a stabilized approach. This resulted in a hard landing damaging important parts of the aircraft making it impossible to stop the airplane on the runway.
Contributing factors were:
- the crew did not have regulations and specific procedures for the airport of Quito (the briefing by the operator did not match the real conditions)
- the crew, although experienced in Quito and similiar airports, had no experience in similiar weather conditions, which would have allowed them to develop a strategy for the approach determining: necessary runway length, minimum altitude to change from ILS glideslope to PAPI visual glidepath, detailed briefing of the approach permitting no deviation from the briefed procedure and weather conditions (tail wind, visibility and moderate rain)
The crew had received weather data via ATIS telling them winds coming from 170 degreees at 6 knots, visbility 3000 meters and more than 10000 meters north of the station, moderate rain, fog in the vicinity, clouds 1-2 octas in 150 meters (500 feet), 5-7 octas in 780 meters (2500 feet), 8 octas at 3000 meters (10000 feet), temperature 13 degrees Centigrade, dew point 11 degrees Centigrade, QNH 1024 hPa, estimated moderate thunderstorms with precipitation at around 22:00Z, braking action was reported average.
The airplane was cleared to perform approach procedure 4 (see approach chart below). 2 minutes prior to landing the crew reported established on the localizer and was handed off to the tower frequency. The tower reported braking action medium to poor following two pilot reports who had landed earlier. The crew therefore changed their autobrakes setting from 4 to HIGH.
30 seconds prior to touch down the crew reported the runway in sight, the tower advised winds 170 at 4, runway was wet, braking action was poor and cleared the airplane to land on runway 35.
22 seconds prior to touch down the commander, pilot flying, decided to leave the glideslope indication and establish on the visual glidepath defined by the PAPIs.
The airplane touched down 200 meters from the runway threshold experiencing a vertical accelertion of 3.09G. Upon touch down the spoilers deployed automatically, the tyres 3 and 8 blew, wiring harnesses of both main gear struts broke leaving the engines in approach idle. The flap lever was involuntarily moved from full to position 2. Autobrakes indicated defective (due to loss of wheel tachometer signals), the crew applied full manual braking about 3 seconds after touch down, 20 seconds later the crew disconnected the anti-skid system still applying full manual braking.
The airplane departed the runway end with a ground speed of about 90 knots, impacted the localizer antenna and stopped 232 meters past the runway end in the security zone. The passengers were evacuated using slides about 30 minutes after landing.
The airplane received substantial damage:
- the left main gear strut was broken at the base separating from its wing attachment. The wheel bogie beam was broken, hydraulics lines and electrical harnesses were ruptured, the lower articulation link was broken into three pieces.
- the right main gear strut was bent outwards by about 5-10 degrees and showed the hydraulics lines and electrical harnesses ruptured, the lower articulation link was broken into two parts.
- the body gear remained in its position fully extended and locked.
- apart from the damaged wiring harnesses there was no evidence of damages to the brakes
- all tyres except number 6 deflated
- the left main landing gear damper separated from the aircraft upon impact with the localizer antenna
- the engine pylons 1 and 2 (both left) were deformed by torsion to the right
- the left wing had a crack at the lower surface resulting in a fuel spill. Several rivets detached. The upper surface showed a fissure in the area of the left main landing gear support.
- about 30% of the access doors of the overhead lockers went out of their position. The lavatory door 53L separated from its pivots, the upper panels between seat row 44 and 45 separated. Several vents were loose.
The instrument landing system of the airport was destroyed.
The captain (51) had a total of 14024 hours flying experience, thereof 2375 on type. The flight was his seventh into Quito.
The first officer (40) had a total of 10095 hours flying experience, thereof 1742 on type. The flight was his sixth flight to Quito.
The second officer (38) had a total of 8924 hours total flying experience, thereof 2793 hours on type. The accident flight was his eighth to Quito.
The instrument approach chart warns, that following the ILS glidepath at 3.2 degrees leaves a landing distance of just 2610 meters instead of 3120 meters available using the visual glide path.
The flight data recorder showed, that the airplane was touching down at a calibrated airspeed of 153 knots, an actual ground speed of 188 knots at a vertical speed of more than 1100 feet per minute resulting in a vertical acceleration of 3.09G. The airplane had been doing a 960 feet per minute sinkrate down to about 9700 feet (500 feet AGL) at a calibrated airspeed of 153 knots and 188 knots above ground. Then a pitch down command occured resulting in about 1500 feet per minute sinkrate descending through 400 feet AGL down to 200 feet AGL. At 130 feet AGL the sinkrate had reduced to 992 feet per minute, but increased again.
The airplane came to a standstill 49 seconds after touchdown.
The DGACE analysed, that the airplane remained stabilised until about 7 seconds after the autopilots initially used for approach and ILS intercept were disconnected at an altitude of 9810 feet (600 feet AGL) and became unstabilized when the airplane descended through 9700 feet (500 feet AGL).
Computations of the landing performance showed, that given the airplane's weight, aircraft configuration, weather and runway conditions the landing distance required was 2984 meters leaving a reserve of 136 meters for the full runway length, but did not permit a touchdown following the ILS glideslope indication. Following the PAPI indications the airplane was permitted to land.
Examination of the lower articulation link showed corrosion resulting in weakened material hardness, that could no longer fulfill the JAR requirements, however remained within construction tolerances.
Simulator tests showed, that the airplane can not be stabilized at 500 feet AGL as required in visual conditions, if the transfer from ILS glideslope to PAPI visual path is initiated at 652 feet AGL (the minimums for the ILS Category I approach). The operator did not specify a minimum altitude above which the change from ILS glideslope to the visual PAPI glide path was permitted.
By Simon Hradecky, created Saturday, Nov 14th 2009 21:41Z, last updated Saturday, Nov 14th 2009 21:58Z
Final position of EC-JOH (Photo: DGACE)
An Iberia Airbus A340-600, registration EC-JOH performing flight IB-6463 from Madrid,SP (Spain) to Quito (Ecuador) with 345 passengers and 14 crew, overran runway 35 while landing in Quito in rain and reduced visibility at 17:05L (22:05Z). The airplane received substantial damage and was subsequently written off, the passengers were evacuated. Two passengers received minor injuries.
The Direccion General de Aviacion Civil del Ecuador (DGACE) have released their final report in Spanish concluding, that the probable cause of the accident was:
The crew's decision to begin and carry out the approach to the airport of Quito despite the known runway and weather conditions and aircraft weight, and not to abort the approach when the capture of the PAPI glidepath brought the airplane outside the parameters of a stabilized approach. This resulted in a hard landing damaging important parts of the aircraft making it impossible to stop the airplane on the runway.
Contributing factors were:
- the crew did not have regulations and specific procedures for the airport of Quito (the briefing by the operator did not match the real conditions)
- the crew, although experienced in Quito and similiar airports, had no experience in similiar weather conditions, which would have allowed them to develop a strategy for the approach determining: necessary runway length, minimum altitude to change from ILS glideslope to PAPI visual glidepath, detailed briefing of the approach permitting no deviation from the briefed procedure and weather conditions (tail wind, visibility and moderate rain)
The crew had received weather data via ATIS telling them winds coming from 170 degreees at 6 knots, visbility 3000 meters and more than 10000 meters north of the station, moderate rain, fog in the vicinity, clouds 1-2 octas in 150 meters (500 feet), 5-7 octas in 780 meters (2500 feet), 8 octas at 3000 meters (10000 feet), temperature 13 degrees Centigrade, dew point 11 degrees Centigrade, QNH 1024 hPa, estimated moderate thunderstorms with precipitation at around 22:00Z, braking action was reported average.
The airplane was cleared to perform approach procedure 4 (see approach chart below). 2 minutes prior to landing the crew reported established on the localizer and was handed off to the tower frequency. The tower reported braking action medium to poor following two pilot reports who had landed earlier. The crew therefore changed their autobrakes setting from 4 to HIGH.
30 seconds prior to touch down the crew reported the runway in sight, the tower advised winds 170 at 4, runway was wet, braking action was poor and cleared the airplane to land on runway 35.
22 seconds prior to touch down the commander, pilot flying, decided to leave the glideslope indication and establish on the visual glidepath defined by the PAPIs.
The airplane touched down 200 meters from the runway threshold experiencing a vertical accelertion of 3.09G. Upon touch down the spoilers deployed automatically, the tyres 3 and 8 blew, wiring harnesses of both main gear struts broke leaving the engines in approach idle. The flap lever was involuntarily moved from full to position 2. Autobrakes indicated defective (due to loss of wheel tachometer signals), the crew applied full manual braking about 3 seconds after touch down, 20 seconds later the crew disconnected the anti-skid system still applying full manual braking.
The airplane departed the runway end with a ground speed of about 90 knots, impacted the localizer antenna and stopped 232 meters past the runway end in the security zone. The passengers were evacuated using slides about 30 minutes after landing.
The airplane received substantial damage:
- the left main gear strut was broken at the base separating from its wing attachment. The wheel bogie beam was broken, hydraulics lines and electrical harnesses were ruptured, the lower articulation link was broken into three pieces.
- the right main gear strut was bent outwards by about 5-10 degrees and showed the hydraulics lines and electrical harnesses ruptured, the lower articulation link was broken into two parts.
- the body gear remained in its position fully extended and locked.
- apart from the damaged wiring harnesses there was no evidence of damages to the brakes
- all tyres except number 6 deflated
- the left main landing gear damper separated from the aircraft upon impact with the localizer antenna
- the engine pylons 1 and 2 (both left) were deformed by torsion to the right
- the left wing had a crack at the lower surface resulting in a fuel spill. Several rivets detached. The upper surface showed a fissure in the area of the left main landing gear support.
- about 30% of the access doors of the overhead lockers went out of their position. The lavatory door 53L separated from its pivots, the upper panels between seat row 44 and 45 separated. Several vents were loose.
The instrument landing system of the airport was destroyed.
The captain (51) had a total of 14024 hours flying experience, thereof 2375 on type. The flight was his seventh into Quito.
The first officer (40) had a total of 10095 hours flying experience, thereof 1742 on type. The flight was his sixth flight to Quito.
The second officer (38) had a total of 8924 hours total flying experience, thereof 2793 hours on type. The accident flight was his eighth to Quito.
The instrument approach chart warns, that following the ILS glidepath at 3.2 degrees leaves a landing distance of just 2610 meters instead of 3120 meters available using the visual glide path.
The flight data recorder showed, that the airplane was touching down at a calibrated airspeed of 153 knots, an actual ground speed of 188 knots at a vertical speed of more than 1100 feet per minute resulting in a vertical acceleration of 3.09G. The airplane had been doing a 960 feet per minute sinkrate down to about 9700 feet (500 feet AGL) at a calibrated airspeed of 153 knots and 188 knots above ground. Then a pitch down command occured resulting in about 1500 feet per minute sinkrate descending through 400 feet AGL down to 200 feet AGL. At 130 feet AGL the sinkrate had reduced to 992 feet per minute, but increased again.
The airplane came to a standstill 49 seconds after touchdown.
The DGACE analysed, that the airplane remained stabilised until about 7 seconds after the autopilots initially used for approach and ILS intercept were disconnected at an altitude of 9810 feet (600 feet AGL) and became unstabilized when the airplane descended through 9700 feet (500 feet AGL).
Computations of the landing performance showed, that given the airplane's weight, aircraft configuration, weather and runway conditions the landing distance required was 2984 meters leaving a reserve of 136 meters for the full runway length, but did not permit a touchdown following the ILS glideslope indication. Following the PAPI indications the airplane was permitted to land.
Examination of the lower articulation link showed corrosion resulting in weakened material hardness, that could no longer fulfill the JAR requirements, however remained within construction tolerances.
Simulator tests showed, that the airplane can not be stabilized at 500 feet AGL as required in visual conditions, if the transfer from ILS glideslope to PAPI visual path is initiated at 652 feet AGL (the minimums for the ILS Category I approach). The operator did not specify a minimum altitude above which the change from ILS glideslope to the visual PAPI glide path was permitted.
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