Eppure e' successo nella "remota Etiopia" come nella "remota Indonesia"; un caso dici?
Downfall - Il caso Boeing
- Autore Discussione Seaking
- Data d'inizio
Come ho già scritto, non voglio in alcun modo ridurre le responsabilità di Boeing, che per quanto mi riguarda ha fatto scelte criminali.
Avevo risposto alla domanda se il MAX era stato messo a terra senza motivo.
Ora abbiamo due CAA che pur ribadendo le responsabilità del MCAS, hanno elencato una serie rilevanti di inadempienze da parte dei piloti.
Rispetto abbastanza la categoria per aspettarmi che l'addestramento sia tale da poter gestire la rottura di una sonda in fase di decollo.
Ci sono situazioni basiche dove se non altro per mancanza di tempo, devi sapere cosa fare. Perchè ti deve essere stato insegnato.
Se non è così, si gettano comunque le fondamenta per avere problemi ogni volta che si presenta qualcosa di anomalo.
Il fatto che la CAA etiope abbia emesso un rapporto senza allegare i pareri di FAA e BEA come avrebbe dovuto, andrebbe sanzionato pesantemente. Come pure l'omissione delle trascrizioni più compromettenti per i piloti.
E per rispondere a EEA, credo che le CAA siano specchio fedele dei paesi che rappresentano.
Se nel caso del Lion Air l'inconsapevolezza dell'esistenza del MCAS da parte dei piloti può giustificarne l'operato, nel caso di Ethiopian è palese la volontà di quel sistema paese di parare il cuxo alla propria compagnia di bandiera omettendo le responsabilità dei propri piloti e scaricando tutto il peso dell'incidente sull'aereo.
Come sostengo da sempre, le analisi sugli incidenti non devono incontrare santuari inviolabili in compagnia, in fabbrica e in cockpit. Perchè è l'unico modo per aumentare realmente la sicurezza del sistema aviazione.
Anche Berberi ha scritto un articolo sulla vicenda.
Boeing 737 Max caduto, Europa e Usa attaccano l’Etiopia: «L’incidente è stato causato anche dai piloti»
di Leonard Berberi
La dura posizione degli investigatori di Bea e Ntsb coinvolti nell’inchiesta: «Comandante e primo ufficiale non hanno eseguito le procedure previste dai manuali»
Il Boeing 737 Max di Ethiopian Airlines è precipitato il 10 marzo 2019 non solo per colpa del difetto al sensore esterno, ma anche perché «i piloti non hanno eseguito le procedure previste» per evitare di schiantarsi. È questo il giudizio degli esperti occidentali — coinvolti nelle indagini sull’incidente che ha provocato la morte di 157 persone — che in due documenti criticano pure gli investigatori etiopi sulla valutazione del disastro e perché non hanno tenuto conto delle osservazioni degli omologhi europei ed americani.
Il rapporto finale
Pochi giorni fa, alla vigilia di Natale, le autorità di Addis Abeba hanno pubblicato il rapporto finale sull’incidente dell’aereo diretto a Nairobi, Kenya, e che ha portato poco dopo al fermo globale di tutti i Boeing 737 Max. Ma il documento di 331 pagine non contiene alcun giudizio né del Bea, l’autorità francese di investigazione aerea, né dei colleghi statunitensi dell’Ntsb, cosa che in realtà sarebbe previsto dall’annesso 13 dell’Icao, quello relativo alle «Inchieste sugli incidenti aeronautici».
«Procedure non eseguite»
Bea, si legge nel documento dell’autorità francese, «ritiene che gli aspetti relativi alle prestazioni dell’equipaggio non siano sufficientemente affrontati nella relazione finale, in particolare per quanto riguarda la sequenza di eventi che si sono verificati prima dell’attivazione del Mcas (il sistema anti-stallo, ndr)». Per gli esperti di Bea, infatti, subito dopo il decollo — e quando sono partiti i primi allarmi — comandante e primo ufficiale non hanno eseguito tutte le procedure richieste in questi casi.
Errori nelle manovre
Non solo. Secondo i francesi — che hanno anche estratto i dati dalle due scatole nere, quella che registra le voci dei piloti e quella che memorizza i parametri di volo — quando il Boeing 737 Max si trovava a 107 metri «il comandante ha provato a inserire il pilota automatico nonostante le regole aziendali richiedano che questo avvenga una volta raggiunti i 152 metri». Una decisione «prematura» che «potrebbe essere sintomatico di uno stato di stress» in cabina «dopo l’attivazione dello stick shaker», il dispositivo che fa vibrare rumorosamente la barra di comando per avvisare i piloti che c’è il rischio stallo.
«Poca esperienza»
E ancora: «La mancanza di riduzione della spinta dei motori ha aggravato le difficoltà incontrate dall’equipaggio per controllare l’aereo», commenta ancora Bea. In tutto questo, «il coordinamento e la comunicazione tra il comandante e il primo ufficiale sono stati molto limitati e insufficienti». I due piloti, insomma, non si parlavano. «Non ci sono state discussioni tra loro — si legge ancora —, né una diagnosi su quello che stava succedendo a bordo». Cosa che ha «profondamente influenzato» il processo decisionale. Secondo i francesi potrebbe aver influito anche la «poca esperienza di volo» del primo ufficiale (300 ore in totale).
«Trascrizioni omesse»
Gli investigatori transalpini, poi, puntano il dito contro i colleghi etiopi anche sulla trascrizione dei dialoghi tra i piloti. «Hanno tolto dal rapporto finale la parte che mostrerebbe le difficoltà del primo ufficiale». Per tutte queste ragioni Bea «ritiene che la risposta inadeguata del personale di volo e la gestione insufficiente della situazione hanno giocato un ruolo nella catena di eventi che ha portato all’incidente, in particolare nella prima fase».
Il sensore rotto da un uccello
Un giudizio, quello degli europei, che viene condiviso anche dagli investigatori dell’Ntsb (coinvolti perché il Boeing è di fabbricazione statunitense). Secondo gli americani il sensore esterno che misura l’angolo di incidenza — e i cui dati sbagliati hanno poi fatto scattare il Mcas, il sistema anti-stallo — si è staccato subito dopo il decollo dopo aver impattato a 315 chilometri orari contro un volatile di circa 230 grammi di peso. L’impatto con gli uccelli (piccioni, nibbio bruno) all’aeroporto internazionale di Addis Abeba-Bole non è raro. Nel 2016 i vertici dello scalo avevano denunciato le macellazioni illegali che, secondo loro, attirava eserciti di volatili.
«I piloti avrebbero potuto salvarsi»
«Concordiamo sul fatto che l’attivazione del Mcas è parte delle cause dell’incidente», scrivono gli esperti dell’Ntsb. Ma, precisano, «riteniamo che le procedure esistenti in quel momento avrebbero consentito ai piloti di riprendere il controllo dell’aereo». Comandante e primo ufficiale — anche secondo gli statunitensi — avrebbero dovuto ridurre la spinta dei motori e la velocità, cosa non fatta, rendendo difficile ogni azione correttiva. Così come non hanno eseguito tutte le procedure previste sia dal manuale sia dal bollettino «correttivo» inviato a tutti gli operatori dopo l’incidente in Indonesia, a fine ottobre 2018, del Boeing 737 Max di Lion Air.
Boeing 737 Max caduto, Europa e Usa attaccano l’Etiopia: «Incidente causato anche dai piloti»
La dura posizione degli investigatori di Bea e Ntsb coinvolti nell’inchiesta: «Comandante e primo ufficiale non hanno eseguito le procedure previste dai manuali»
www.corriere.it
Questa mentalità è quanto di più pericoloso esista in aviazione: l'immunità per aria non esiste.
Non scopriamo certo oggi che Indonesia e in misura forse minore l'Etiopia non possono essere paragonate ad Europa e States quanto ad addestramento, però non possiamo nemmeno cavarcela ogni volta con la storiella sui paesi del terzo mondo: spesso è vero, ma di falle ne abbiamo tante pure nel mondo occidentale. Una delle più eclatanti degli ultimi tempi è quella del 77 Emirates a Dubai, e l'addestramento in Emirates non è gestito dal "terzo mondo" etiope-indonesiano.
guarda, non piloto 737 max , ma mi piacerebbe ti rispondesse un professionista , per spiegarti la complessita' della macchina e la professionalita' media dei piloti, siano etiopi o del suriname. c e' chi scrive di rispettare troppo la categoria , per aspettarsi che non siano in grado di gestire una sonda guasta, poi succede su Air France e non in Liberia e sappiamo tutti come e' andata a finire.
Attenzione a non fare confusione: generalizzare per sommi capi ci può anche stare, salvo poi entrare nel merito di ogni singola situazione. E' abbastanza scontato che una CAA tenda a ricalcare usi e costumi del paese di appartenenza, come qualunque altro ente pubblico. Nulla vieta poi che ci siano realtà migliori o peggiori di quanto si potrebbe supporre abbinando una CAA ad un dato stato. Perchè alla fine spesso sono i singoli a fare la differenza.
Detto questo le critiche alla FAA etiope arrivano da due entità analoghe e sono dettagliatamente circostanziate.
Ed una di queste due CAA appartiene ad uno stato che ha cercato per mesi un aereo precipitato in fondo all'Atlantico per scoprirne le cause, quando non trovare il relitto sarebbe stato comodo per (quasi) tutti. Nessun colpevole. Invece hanno avuto le paxxe per andare fino in fondo per scoprire cosa era successo. Onore al merito in quel caso. Poi magari in altre circostanze avranno fatto le loro caxxate anche loro...
Ad Addis Abeba invece hanno fatto l'esatto opposto: pur essendo in possesso di tutti i dati, hanno scelto volutamente di redigere un rapporto che ometteva tutto quello che era scomodo e chiamava in causa i piloti e di riflesso la compagnia e la stessa CAA del paese africano. Poi magari in altri incidenti avranno redatto rapporti cristallini, è senz'altro possibile.
Quanto alla posizione dei piloti del volo Ethiopian, non ho la competenza per approfondire e ringrazio B77W come altri piloti che volessero offrire un punto di vista interno.
Nondimeno se NTSB e BEA certificano congiuntamente una serie di errori, senza i quali a loro giudizio l'aereo non sarebbe precipitato, non posso che prendere atto anche di fonti così qualificate.
D'altra parte sappiamo per esperienza che di solito un incidente è dato da una somma di fattori. Un errore da evitare, è sceglierne alcuni distogliendo lo sguardo da altri. Le responsabilità vanno ripartite con competenza tecnica ed onestà intellettuale verso i corretti destinatari.
Queste sono le considerazioni del BEA.
Accident to the Boeing 737 registered ET-AVJ and operated by Ethiopian Airlines on 10/03/2019 near Bishoftu [Investigation led by EAIB / Ethiopia]
Introduction
The BEA wishes to thank the EAIB for being consulted on the draft final report concerning the aforementioned accident.
From the very start of the investigation, the BEA has, under the authority of the Ethiopian AIB and in cooperation with the NTSB and their technical advisers, actively participated in the understanding and the analysis of the aircraft systems, the operational aspects of the occurrence and the crew performance issues.
The BEA considers that the operational and crew performance aspects are insufficiently addressed in the EAIB final report, in particular with regard to the sequence of events that occurred before the activation of the 1st MCAS. Consequently this prevents the reader from having a precise and complete understanding of the event.
Shortcomings relating to the crew’s actions, particularly in the first phase of the flight, is not accompanied by a thorough analysis of the reasons for the behaviours observed, in relation with their training, their experience and the company organization with regard to the training and knowledge acquisition principles.
The following comments represent important points that the BEA considers necessary to take into account in order to have a comprehensive and balanced report.
In accordance with paragraph 6.3 of ICAO Annex 13, the BEA requests that this document be appended to the Final Report.
Sequence of events
1. From take-off to the 1st MCAS
Shortly after take-off, as a result of the erroneous left AOA value, the left stick shaker was activated.
On the activation of the stick shaker, the flight crew must apply the Approach to Stall or Stall recovery procedure, which is a memory item. As described in the FCOM/QRH, the first steps in the Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery procedure are to hold the control column firmly, disengage the autopilot and authrottle and then smoothly apply a nose down input.
Only the nose down input was performed by the flight crew. The autothrottle remained engaged and the pilot later insisted on engaging the A/P.
Wind tunnel testing, modelling and AOA rupture mode analysis performed by the AOA sensor manufacturer concluded that the only possible scenario for the AOA sensor erroneous data was a foreign object impact, most likely a bird, causing separation of the vane at the hub and breaking of the vane heater wires.These results were presented to the EAIB in Addis Ababa in September 2019.
Five seconds after the activation of the stick shaker, an IAS DISAGREE message appeared on both PFDs. It was followed two seconds later by an ALT DISAGREE message. Although these messages were not recorded on the FDR, it has been established, by computations and later confirmed at the Boeing engineering simulator (eCAB), that they appeared on both PFDs.
In the case of the IAS DISAGREE, the flight crew has to apply the Airspeed Unreliable Non-Normal Checklist. This checklist states to first disengage the AP, then the Autothrottle and to put the F/D switches on OFF, before setting 10° pitch attitude and 80% N1 (when flaps are extended).
The captain tried, in vain, to engage the AP. He did not disconnect the autothrottle. There were no crew exchanges on the CVR regarding the IAS DISAGREE or ALT DISAGREE messages, which supports the conclusion that the IAS DISAGREE and ALT DISAGREE messages were most probably not seen by the crew throughout the flight.
At a height of approximately 350 ft, the captain again tried to engage the A/P although the airline policy requests pilots to wait until they reach 500 ft AGL to engage the autopilot. This premature action, although not appropriate in stick shaker conditions, may be symptomatic of a state of stress that had been rapidly developping following the activation of the stick shaker and Master Caution immediately after take-off.
A second attempt was made six seconds later, above 500 ft. The captain’s reaction after this second engagement attempt ("What's going on ?") was probably related to the inability to engage the A/P. The Captain’s question remained unanswered and did not trigger any process of information acquisition, cross-check or crew decision making.
Passing 1000 ft/radio altitude, at the third attempt, the A/P was successfully engaged. MCP speed was set to 238 kt. However, the A/P airspeed target was not the MCP speed but that of the erroneous LH minimum operational speed, which was above VMO (340 kt). The A/P therefore commanded a nose down to accelerate towards the erroneous minimum operational speed. The stabilizer trim value decreased from 5.6 to 4.6 units of trim. The aircraft descended at -1,400 ft/min.
Thirty-three seconds after being engaged, the A/P disconnected.
The increase of speed beyond the target speed was not mentioned by the crew. Moreover, the autothrottle remained engaged and, due to the AOA foreign object impact resulting in partial vane separation, failed to change to N1 mode. It remained in ARM mode with take-off thrust. The ARM mode was never verbalized. It is highly probable that it was not identified by the crew.
The lack of thrust reduction aggravated the difficulties encountered by the crew to control the aircraft throughout the reminder of the flight.
During this phase, besides the destabilizing cockpit environment linked to the activation of the stick shaker and a Master Caution immediately after take-off, the coordination and the communication between the captain and the F/O were very limited and insufficient. There was no discussion nor diagnosis with respect to the nature of the events on board. The situational awareness, problem solving and decision making were therefore deeply impacted. The F/O’s lack of proactivity, which comes out from the CVR transcripts, seems to show that he was overwhelmed by the events on board from the moment the stick shaker triggered. His low flight experience (300 hours total) may have accounted for this situation.
The BEA regrets that the parts of the CVR transcript which allow to show the difficulties encountered by the F/O have been removed from the extracts of the CVR transcript published in the report.
It is regrettable that the report does not include a thorough analysis of the reasons for the behaviours observed, in relation with their training, their experience and the company organization with regard to the training and knowledge acquisition principles.
2. From the 1st MCAS until the end of the flight
As the flaps reached the retracted position, the MCAS was activated and the stabilizer trim position decreased from 4.6 to 2.1 units . Although the Captain was applying an increasing nose up force (between 100 and 125 Lbs), only a brief electric trim up input of 2 seconds was recorded, which was insufficient to trim out the MCAS inputs and to relieve the aerodynamic loads. The stabilizer remained at 2.1 units of trim.
The force applied by the Captain on the control column during this phase only kept the airplane almost level. During the ECAB simulator sessions, the simulator crews felt it was instinctual to use as much electric trim as needed to reduce the column forces in response to MCAS inputs while recognizing that it was not very common in a normal flight.
During the second MCAS activation, the Captain applied a 9-second electric trim-up input. This interrupted the MCAS two seconds before its expected end. The effect of this second trim input fully countered the 2nd MCAS. However the aircraft was not returned to a fully trimmed condition as the first MCAS input had never been trimmed out.
During the 9 seconds of electric trimming, the stab trim cut-out switches were put in the cut-out position. At that moment, the stabilizer was at 2.3 units of trim and the Captain was pulling on the control column with a force of 80 Lbs. The altitude was 9,100ft, IAS 332 kt, pitch 2.5°, and vertical speed + 350 ft/min.
When the speed exceeded VMO 340 kt (varying between 360 and 375 kt), the overspeed warning triggered. The crew expressed their surprise. This may indicate that after retracting the flaps, the crew lost track of the IAS values. No thrust reduction was however performed.
During this phase, the physical efforts applied by the crew on the column probably impacted their situational awareness and their cognitive resources and did not allow them to undertake the proper actions.
Probable cause of the accident (paragraph 3.2 of the report)
The BEA notes that the only probable cause retained in the EAIB report is related to the activation of the MCAS system.
The BEA believes that the crew’s inadequate actions and the insufficient Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) played a role in the chain of events that led to the accident, in particular during the first phase of the flight, before the first MCAS activation.
Contributing factors (paragraph 3.3 of the report)
The BEA notes that the contributing factors identified by the EAIB are only related to the MCAS system. The following contributing factors, that come out of the analysis of the event, should also be stated in the report:
Accident to the Boeing 737 registered ET-AVJ and operated by Ethiopian Airlines on 10/03/2019 near Bishoftu [Investigation led by EAIB / Ethiopia]
Introduction
The BEA wishes to thank the EAIB for being consulted on the draft final report concerning the aforementioned accident.
From the very start of the investigation, the BEA has, under the authority of the Ethiopian AIB and in cooperation with the NTSB and their technical advisers, actively participated in the understanding and the analysis of the aircraft systems, the operational aspects of the occurrence and the crew performance issues.
The BEA considers that the operational and crew performance aspects are insufficiently addressed in the EAIB final report, in particular with regard to the sequence of events that occurred before the activation of the 1st MCAS. Consequently this prevents the reader from having a precise and complete understanding of the event.
Shortcomings relating to the crew’s actions, particularly in the first phase of the flight, is not accompanied by a thorough analysis of the reasons for the behaviours observed, in relation with their training, their experience and the company organization with regard to the training and knowledge acquisition principles.
The following comments represent important points that the BEA considers necessary to take into account in order to have a comprehensive and balanced report.
In accordance with paragraph 6.3 of ICAO Annex 13, the BEA requests that this document be appended to the Final Report.
Sequence of events
1. From take-off to the 1st MCAS
Shortly after take-off, as a result of the erroneous left AOA value, the left stick shaker was activated.
On the activation of the stick shaker, the flight crew must apply the Approach to Stall or Stall recovery procedure, which is a memory item. As described in the FCOM/QRH, the first steps in the Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery procedure are to hold the control column firmly, disengage the autopilot and authrottle and then smoothly apply a nose down input.
Only the nose down input was performed by the flight crew. The autothrottle remained engaged and the pilot later insisted on engaging the A/P.
Wind tunnel testing, modelling and AOA rupture mode analysis performed by the AOA sensor manufacturer concluded that the only possible scenario for the AOA sensor erroneous data was a foreign object impact, most likely a bird, causing separation of the vane at the hub and breaking of the vane heater wires.These results were presented to the EAIB in Addis Ababa in September 2019.
Five seconds after the activation of the stick shaker, an IAS DISAGREE message appeared on both PFDs. It was followed two seconds later by an ALT DISAGREE message. Although these messages were not recorded on the FDR, it has been established, by computations and later confirmed at the Boeing engineering simulator (eCAB), that they appeared on both PFDs.
In the case of the IAS DISAGREE, the flight crew has to apply the Airspeed Unreliable Non-Normal Checklist. This checklist states to first disengage the AP, then the Autothrottle and to put the F/D switches on OFF, before setting 10° pitch attitude and 80% N1 (when flaps are extended).
The captain tried, in vain, to engage the AP. He did not disconnect the autothrottle. There were no crew exchanges on the CVR regarding the IAS DISAGREE or ALT DISAGREE messages, which supports the conclusion that the IAS DISAGREE and ALT DISAGREE messages were most probably not seen by the crew throughout the flight.
At a height of approximately 350 ft, the captain again tried to engage the A/P although the airline policy requests pilots to wait until they reach 500 ft AGL to engage the autopilot. This premature action, although not appropriate in stick shaker conditions, may be symptomatic of a state of stress that had been rapidly developping following the activation of the stick shaker and Master Caution immediately after take-off.
A second attempt was made six seconds later, above 500 ft. The captain’s reaction after this second engagement attempt ("What's going on ?") was probably related to the inability to engage the A/P. The Captain’s question remained unanswered and did not trigger any process of information acquisition, cross-check or crew decision making.
Passing 1000 ft/radio altitude, at the third attempt, the A/P was successfully engaged. MCP speed was set to 238 kt. However, the A/P airspeed target was not the MCP speed but that of the erroneous LH minimum operational speed, which was above VMO (340 kt). The A/P therefore commanded a nose down to accelerate towards the erroneous minimum operational speed. The stabilizer trim value decreased from 5.6 to 4.6 units of trim. The aircraft descended at -1,400 ft/min.
Thirty-three seconds after being engaged, the A/P disconnected.
The increase of speed beyond the target speed was not mentioned by the crew. Moreover, the autothrottle remained engaged and, due to the AOA foreign object impact resulting in partial vane separation, failed to change to N1 mode. It remained in ARM mode with take-off thrust. The ARM mode was never verbalized. It is highly probable that it was not identified by the crew.
The lack of thrust reduction aggravated the difficulties encountered by the crew to control the aircraft throughout the reminder of the flight.
During this phase, besides the destabilizing cockpit environment linked to the activation of the stick shaker and a Master Caution immediately after take-off, the coordination and the communication between the captain and the F/O were very limited and insufficient. There was no discussion nor diagnosis with respect to the nature of the events on board. The situational awareness, problem solving and decision making were therefore deeply impacted. The F/O’s lack of proactivity, which comes out from the CVR transcripts, seems to show that he was overwhelmed by the events on board from the moment the stick shaker triggered. His low flight experience (300 hours total) may have accounted for this situation.
The BEA regrets that the parts of the CVR transcript which allow to show the difficulties encountered by the F/O have been removed from the extracts of the CVR transcript published in the report.
It is regrettable that the report does not include a thorough analysis of the reasons for the behaviours observed, in relation with their training, their experience and the company organization with regard to the training and knowledge acquisition principles.
2. From the 1st MCAS until the end of the flight
As the flaps reached the retracted position, the MCAS was activated and the stabilizer trim position decreased from 4.6 to 2.1 units . Although the Captain was applying an increasing nose up force (between 100 and 125 Lbs), only a brief electric trim up input of 2 seconds was recorded, which was insufficient to trim out the MCAS inputs and to relieve the aerodynamic loads. The stabilizer remained at 2.1 units of trim.
The force applied by the Captain on the control column during this phase only kept the airplane almost level. During the ECAB simulator sessions, the simulator crews felt it was instinctual to use as much electric trim as needed to reduce the column forces in response to MCAS inputs while recognizing that it was not very common in a normal flight.
During the second MCAS activation, the Captain applied a 9-second electric trim-up input. This interrupted the MCAS two seconds before its expected end. The effect of this second trim input fully countered the 2nd MCAS. However the aircraft was not returned to a fully trimmed condition as the first MCAS input had never been trimmed out.
During the 9 seconds of electric trimming, the stab trim cut-out switches were put in the cut-out position. At that moment, the stabilizer was at 2.3 units of trim and the Captain was pulling on the control column with a force of 80 Lbs. The altitude was 9,100ft, IAS 332 kt, pitch 2.5°, and vertical speed + 350 ft/min.
When the speed exceeded VMO 340 kt (varying between 360 and 375 kt), the overspeed warning triggered. The crew expressed their surprise. This may indicate that after retracting the flaps, the crew lost track of the IAS values. No thrust reduction was however performed.
During this phase, the physical efforts applied by the crew on the column probably impacted their situational awareness and their cognitive resources and did not allow them to undertake the proper actions.
Probable cause of the accident (paragraph 3.2 of the report)
The BEA notes that the only probable cause retained in the EAIB report is related to the activation of the MCAS system.
The BEA believes that the crew’s inadequate actions and the insufficient Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) played a role in the chain of events that led to the accident, in particular during the first phase of the flight, before the first MCAS activation.
Contributing factors (paragraph 3.3 of the report)
The BEA notes that the contributing factors identified by the EAIB are only related to the MCAS system. The following contributing factors, that come out of the analysis of the event, should also be stated in the report:
- Flight crew’s failure to apply, immediately after take-off and before the first MCAS activation, the Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery Maneuver and the Airspeed Unreliable Non-Normal Check-list;
- Captain’s insistence on engaging the A/P, contrary to the Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery maneuver procedure;
- Insufficient use of the electric trim to relieve the high control column forces after the MCAS nose down orders;
- Captain’s lack of thrust reduction when the speed became excessive, which in combination with insufficient trim, caused an increase of the forces which became unmanageable on both the control column and the manual trim wheel.
- The use of the Logipad system by the airline as the sole means to disseminate information on new systems and/or procedures, which doesn’t allow the evaluation the crews’ understanding and knowledge acquisition on new systems and procedures. This system was used to disseminate the information related to the MCAS system issued following the previous 737 Max accident and did not allow the airline to ensure that the crews had read and correctly understood this information.
Il capitano del volo Lion Air aveva conseguito il suo brevetto in California... giusto per dire.
Cio' detto, io trovo la diatriba sui piloti se non inutile almeno di cattivo gusto. Chiaro, in ogni disastro c'e' sempre una serie di concause e, se al posto degli etiopi ci fossero stati Neil Armstrong e Chuck Norris magari finiva diversamente, ma:
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso di infilare motori del 21mo secolo su un aereo progettato nei tardi anni '50.
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso di piazzare i motori in modo tale da non dover cambiare il carrello (e quindi il training dei suddetti piloti).
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso che bastavano due indicatori AoA invece che tre come la competizion.
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso di introdurre l'MCAS.
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso di esternalizzare il coding dell'MCAS a parti terze in base a un contratto al ribasso.
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso di tacere sull'MCAS e ha fatto di tutto affinche' il passaggio sul MAX si limitasse a una presentazione su un iPad.
E infine la FAA, non i piloti, ha lasciato che Boeing si correggesse i compiti da sola. E questo e' un punto su cui non riesco a capacitarmi. Ho lavorato per un anno e mezzo per un integratore che lavorava a contratto di ESA, su una missione spaziale 'di prova', in altre parole una di quelle in cui "se il payload funziona, bene, se si spacca ca**i dell'experiment provider". Malgrado cio', ESA ha controllato tutto della nostra piattaforma. Intendo dire tutto. E, nota bene, la nostra piattaforma e' la copia precisa di un altro satellite: se non avevamo gli stessi bulloni, componenti, computer, software etc... dovevamo fare test di tutto. E, una volta integrata l'astronave, avremmo comunque dovuto fare test enormi e lunghissimi. E dopo ESA veniva il launcher a controllare. Tutto questo per una missione spaziale 'rideshare', dove non eravamo nemmeno il primary payload. Non sto scherzando: abbiamo dovuto promettere di fare una test campaign extra (vibrazioni, termica, e si parlava anche di radiazioni) per il meccanismo di rilascio dei pannelli solari perche' il produttore dei dampers (ammortizzatori?) aveva cambiato il lubricante con un altro. Eravamo a quei livelli.
Quando comparo questa mia esperienza col fatto che all'FAA abbiano delegato Boeing a controllare se stessi per un macchinario su cui andava gente... non mi capacito che ci sia gente che a) da ancora colpa ai piloti e b) nessuno sia finito in galera da parte di FAA e Boeing.
Cio' detto, io trovo la diatriba sui piloti se non inutile almeno di cattivo gusto. Chiaro, in ogni disastro c'e' sempre una serie di concause e, se al posto degli etiopi ci fossero stati Neil Armstrong e Chuck Norris magari finiva diversamente, ma:
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso di infilare motori del 21mo secolo su un aereo progettato nei tardi anni '50.
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso di piazzare i motori in modo tale da non dover cambiare il carrello (e quindi il training dei suddetti piloti).
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso che bastavano due indicatori AoA invece che tre come la competizion.
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso di introdurre l'MCAS.
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso di esternalizzare il coding dell'MCAS a parti terze in base a un contratto al ribasso.
Boeing, non i piloti, ha deciso di tacere sull'MCAS e ha fatto di tutto affinche' il passaggio sul MAX si limitasse a una presentazione su un iPad.
E infine la FAA, non i piloti, ha lasciato che Boeing si correggesse i compiti da sola. E questo e' un punto su cui non riesco a capacitarmi. Ho lavorato per un anno e mezzo per un integratore che lavorava a contratto di ESA, su una missione spaziale 'di prova', in altre parole una di quelle in cui "se il payload funziona, bene, se si spacca ca**i dell'experiment provider". Malgrado cio', ESA ha controllato tutto della nostra piattaforma. Intendo dire tutto. E, nota bene, la nostra piattaforma e' la copia precisa di un altro satellite: se non avevamo gli stessi bulloni, componenti, computer, software etc... dovevamo fare test di tutto. E, una volta integrata l'astronave, avremmo comunque dovuto fare test enormi e lunghissimi. E dopo ESA veniva il launcher a controllare. Tutto questo per una missione spaziale 'rideshare', dove non eravamo nemmeno il primary payload. Non sto scherzando: abbiamo dovuto promettere di fare una test campaign extra (vibrazioni, termica, e si parlava anche di radiazioni) per il meccanismo di rilascio dei pannelli solari perche' il produttore dei dampers (ammortizzatori?) aveva cambiato il lubricante con un altro. Eravamo a quei livelli.
Quando comparo questa mia esperienza col fatto che all'FAA abbiano delegato Boeing a controllare se stessi per un macchinario su cui andava gente... non mi capacito che ci sia gente che a) da ancora colpa ai piloti e b) nessuno sia finito in galera da parte di FAA e Boeing.
Ultima modifica:
Aggiungo che mentre Boeing alla fine ha avuto un enorme danno economico e di immagine, in FAA ne sono usciti relativamente puliti, e questa cosa non la digerisco proprio!
Caro 13900/Seaking, siete enormemente piu' esperti di me (a confronto sono una pippa) e forse anche di altri qui sopra; sono comunque palesi anche alle mezze tacche come me le gravi carenze di product-check da parte di Boeing in primissima istanza e di FAA a seguire, hai ragione.
Pure vero, tuttavia, che anche qui in Italia fioccano auto-certificazioni, dalla HAACCP all'ottemperanza della 81/08, dove parimenti sono conseguentemente coinvolti milioni di esseri umani; e infatti, parimenti, si susseguono intossicazioni alimentari e "morti bianche", queste ultime ben 685 nel 2021, con oltre 564mila infortuni sul lavoro.
Delle oltre 12mila ispezioni INAIL ben l'83% (ottantatrepercento) sono risultate in violazione della normativa...
Capisco che qui parliamo di aerei ma questa storia delle auto-certificazioni vedi che lascia impronte pesanti e gravissimi danni sociali anche in altri comparti, quindi tutta questa sfiducia nelle stesse nasce a mio avviso non dal concederle, quanto dalla malafede applicativa da parte del beneficiante.
Il principio del delegare non e' dunque cosi' sbagliato, quanto assai grave invece e' l'omissione del delegato. E per questo si piangono le vittime.
In Boeing nessuno al gabbio, vero, ma multa di $2,5B; direi sia comunque una concreta evidenza di responsabilita'.
Sulla diatriba "remota Etiopia", personalmente non posso che fidarmi dei reports conclusivi, o andrei dietro a terrapiattisti e no-vax.
La sanzione assolutamente incoerente (multa salata ma che viene "alleviata" attraverso il sostegno con le commesse militari perché Boeing non può fallire) rappresenta l'ammissione delle mancanze della FAA nel processo di certificazione e che ha portato alla morte di centinaia di persone.
Potremmo dirci se era opportuno mettere al gabbio a vita qualche capro espiatorio in FAA e in Boeing ma rimarrebbe purtroppo filosofia.
Il gabbio vale fino ad un certo punto, conterebbe anche e soprattutto avere dei cambi legislativi tali da rendere un nuovo caso MAX impossibile. Purtroppo non vedo molto del genere: il budget della FAA non mi sembra che sia stato incrementato e la saga della certificazione del MAX10 sta riproponendo alcuni dei leitmotiv del MAX 7-8-9.
La colpa di Boeing e' evidente, ammetto tuttavia di non essere cosi' approfonditamente documentato da poter asserire se appunto si tratti di azione colposa o dolosa; nel primo caso varrebbe la sanzione, nel secondo no.
Mi sembra difficile si sia accertato un dolo di natura penale (dunque con responsabilita' individuale) e sia stata multata l'azienda (sanzione civile)...ma attendo vostri lumi.
Interessante articolo di Symple Flying sul 2023 di Boeing; non proprio un anno stellare, anzi...con tante, troppe pendenze approvative e scarse idee sul futuro. L'unica chiara e' il non-progetto di un NMA fino al 2035, il che vedra' Airbus trarne un discreto vantaggio con l'A321Neo, trend gia' ampiamente in atto d'altronde. Per contro gli ampi ordini in essere per 777 e 787 contengono il danno.
What Can We Expect From Boeing In 2023?
BYCHRIS LOH
PUBLISHED 4 DAYS AGO
2022 was a year of recovery for Boeing, with one particularly substantial order struck with United, So what can we expect in the year to come?
2019 through 2021 was a fairly challenging time for Boeing. The US manufacturer suffered immense reputational damage due to the 737 MAX crisis. Indeed, in many ways, the firm is still dealing with the consequences of this narrowbody program in the form of added regulator scrutiny. However, 2022 seemed to be a turning point for the company. Not only did it see numerous large aircraft orders, but it also managed to get the green light to resume 787 Dreamliner production. With these major achievements still somewhat fresh, can Boeing keep the momentum going? And what major bridges will it need to cross this coming year?
What did we get right and wrong about 2022?
First, it's worth taking a quick look back at our predictions for 2022. The article from last year suggested that 2022 would be Boeing's comeback year. This was more or less accurate, particularly with the resumption of 787 deliveries and the amassing of several large aircraft orders. Additionally, deliveries of the 737 MAX comprised much of Boeing's output, and were a major part of its revenue from commercial customers. With millions of safe flight hours now accumulated, the type has regained its reputation as being a safe aircraft upon which commercial airlines (and their passengers) can rely on.
With Airbus launching an A350 freighter program, we also knew that Boeing was likely to officially challenge its European rival on this front, with rumors and discussions building throughout late 2021. This indeed turned out to be the case, with Boeing announcing the launch of its 777X freighter program at the end of January 2022.
We did, however, get some things wrong. Firstly, the 737 MAX was not re-certified in China, despite test aircraft flying across the Pacific to be scrutinized by Chinese regulators. There even seemed to be a small glimmer of hope when China Southern scheduled the type for commercial service at the end of October. Unfortunately, these flights were scrapped, and the type remains ineligible for commercial service in Chinese airspace. We were also wrong about 737 MAX 7 certification, which Boeing was aiming to complete before the end of 2022.
It's also worth noting that our hopes for a new aircraft program announcement for an "NMA/new midsized aircraft" or "797" never materialized. This was always a long shot, given the more pressing matters that the company needed to resolve. The company has indeed gone a step further on this topic, ruling out any new midsized aircraft program until 2035.
So with this in mind, we already have a good idea of what to expect in 2023. Nonetheless, let's look at everything in a little more detail.
737 MAX 7 certification
First on the list will need to be certification of the Boeing 737 MAX 7, the smallest variant in the 737 MAX family. This milestone was supposed to have taken place in 2022 but never happened. In fact, not only was the MAX 7 supposed to be certified in 2022, but Boeing was also planning the first delivery of the variant as well.
While Boeing's aircraft order data doesn't break down quantities for the three different 737 MAX variants, we do know that Southwest Airlines continues to be the largest customer for this shorter model. ch-aviation.com data indicates that the airline has 239 -7s on order. The only other significant customer for the -7 is US low-cost airline Allegiant, which is expecting 30.
So, if all goes well, MAX 7 certification will take place sometime in the first half of 2023, with an entry into service taking place shortly after (hopefully within the same year).
The recent granting of waivers to allow Boeing to certify the MAX 7 and MAX 10 with identical cockpits as their MAX 8 and 9 counterparts gives the company a great deal more certainty in certification timelines. While this will ensure cockpit commonality in the short term, Boeing is still required to eventually upgrade the 737 MAX 7 aircraft and retrofit the existing fleet of 737 MAX 8 and MAX 9. However, the recent government waiver means that Boeing has more time to implement the change. In fact, it is only after successfully certifying the 737 MAX 10, that Boeing will have three years to retrofit all jets with the required upgrades. The regulatory authorities in Europe (EASA) and Canada (Transport Canada) intend to implement the same certification mandate as the FAA.
737 MAX 10 and 777X certification work will continue
Unfortunately, 2023 isn't likely to be a headline year for the 737 MAX 10 - and most certainly not for the 777X. The news of 2022 indicates that both of these programs have faced setbacks resulting in later certification dates.
Things do seem to have a natural order to them, with MAX 7 certification taking place first and MAX 10 certification following. But, according to American Machinist, Boeing Commercial Airplanes CEO Stan Deal estimates that the 737 MAX 10 will not be certified until late 2023 or early 2024. Given the tendency for planemakers to deliver on the later end of their estimates, we don't have high hopes for MAX 10 certification in 2023 - even if it's later in the year. We'd love to be proven wrong, however!
As for the 777X, the most recent news from April 2022 pegged the first 777X deliveries to take place in 2025. In the coming year, the best news that we can hope for is perhaps no news at all. Indeed, if we hear nothing, then it's a good sign that timelines haven't slipped further for the firm's flagship widebody.
More aircraft orders?
2023 might be a difficult year for Boeing to top in terms of aircraft orders. After all, the US planemaker secured a number of major deals, including Delta Air Lines ordering 100 MAX 10s and United signing on for a firm 100 787 Dreamliners.
When you stop to think about the state of the industry and the recent orders placed around the world, it might actually be difficult to think of any major airlines poised to place a major order for a significant future fleet renewal. It's worth noting that in 2022, and likely for years to come, Russian airlines can be firmly ruled out as potential customers. However, there is one big outstanding customer that comes to mind: Air India. In fact, there is an expectation that the airline will order nearly 200 737 MAX aircraft for its budget subsidiary, Air India Express.
With the 737 MAX continuing to rebuild its reputation and the 787 being delivered to customers once again, airlines will undoubtedly be feeling more confident in Boeing's ability to deliver on its two main commercial passenger products.
Deliveries will depend on a healthy supply chain
On the deliveries side, CNBC reporting in November indicated that Boeing was aiming to produce between 400 and 450 737 MAX aircraft in 2023 up from about 375 planes in 2022. With the company's growing backlog of aircraft orders, it will certainly need to ensure a well-paced rate of output to keep customers happy.
Reaching out to Boeing, a company spokesperson pointed me to comments made during a November conference for investors. One goal mentioned for the coming year was a "continued effort towards supply chain and production stability to ensure predictability for customers." Unsurprisingly, this is an extremely important point of focus - not only for Boeing but for many manufacturers around the world. Indeed, while pandemic-related travel restrictions are mostly a thing of the past, supply chain issues continue to persist - and these issues may just hamper the company's plans to deliver more aircraft on a consistent and predictable timeline.
A key part of the world to keep an eye on in this respect is China, with COVID currently taking a heavy toll across the country and its hospitals. Yes, Boeing assembles its 737s in Renton, and its 787s in North Charleston, in the United States. But, in case you were unaware, Boeing aircraft are also comprised of various components manufactured in China, and could thus be impacted by any factory shutdowns or large-scale lockdowns. When it comes to the 737 specifically, 737.org.uk notes that the following components are manufactured in China:
Old aircraft and new aircraft
While the last Boeing 747 to be produced rolled off the assembly line in December 2022, the aircraft is actually yet to be delivered to customer Atlas Air.
In recent weeks, the aircraft has undertaken its first few test flights and is actually slated for delivery in February 2023. No doubt this will be a huge moment for Boeing as it firmly and definitively concludes its 747 chapter and over 50 years of delivering the distinctly humped four-engined behemoth. As Stanley Deal said in November, Boeing clearly sees the 777X as the successor to the 747 as a flagship, high-capacity jet.
"Everybody remembers the Queen of the Skies, the 747. I would submit to you this is the next queen of the skies, the 777, which stands in a category of its own, will replace the four-engined aircraft, the 747 and the A380."
Demonstrating this transition from one "queen" to another, as the 747 program is put to rest, the airline will continue to develop its 777X freighter, which is expected to enter service in 2027. And while there won't be any NMA news in 2023, we are expecting a new 787 variant to be announced. Indeed, at Boeing's November investor's conference, Stan Deal was quoted as saying:
"We will introduce an enhanced gross weight version of the 787 in the near future, adding more capability to an already superior product in the middle of the widebody market."
The name of this exact 787 variant is yet to be announced, but Boeing's historical naming patterns give us a hint to what a heavier 787 could be named - just look at the 767-300ER, 737-900ER, and 777-300ER. If we combine this pattern with the known range limitations of the 787-10, then there's a chance we could see something like a "787-10ER" - a heavier -10 variant capable of carrying more fuel for an increased range.
Slow and steady
To sum things up, we see 2023 being a year that will consist mostly of steady progress for Boeing as it works hard to certify various aircraft variants. The MAX 7 will be the primary achievement for Boeing this year so that entry-into-service can commence, and full-scale production can begin. And while we'd love to also see the MAX 10 get the regulatory stamp of approval, we wouldn't be surprised if this didn't take place until 2024.
On the widebody side, we can only hope that the 777X program isn't further delayed. Based on recent news, the program's progress (or lack of progress) might be further outside its control, as GE and its GE9X engine had reportedly been facing issues near the end of 2022. The announcement of a new 787 variant will also generate some excitement - and will likely be much-welcomed news for airlines like United, as the carrier has plans to significantly expand its Dreamliner fleet.
Perhaps news of a new Dreamliner variant will take place at a major air show like Paris or Dubai. These air shows also hold high expectations for being the sites where significant aircraft orders are announced.
What Can We Expect From Boeing In 2023?
BYCHRIS LOH
PUBLISHED 4 DAYS AGO
2022 was a year of recovery for Boeing, with one particularly substantial order struck with United, So what can we expect in the year to come?
2019 through 2021 was a fairly challenging time for Boeing. The US manufacturer suffered immense reputational damage due to the 737 MAX crisis. Indeed, in many ways, the firm is still dealing with the consequences of this narrowbody program in the form of added regulator scrutiny. However, 2022 seemed to be a turning point for the company. Not only did it see numerous large aircraft orders, but it also managed to get the green light to resume 787 Dreamliner production. With these major achievements still somewhat fresh, can Boeing keep the momentum going? And what major bridges will it need to cross this coming year?
What did we get right and wrong about 2022?
First, it's worth taking a quick look back at our predictions for 2022. The article from last year suggested that 2022 would be Boeing's comeback year. This was more or less accurate, particularly with the resumption of 787 deliveries and the amassing of several large aircraft orders. Additionally, deliveries of the 737 MAX comprised much of Boeing's output, and were a major part of its revenue from commercial customers. With millions of safe flight hours now accumulated, the type has regained its reputation as being a safe aircraft upon which commercial airlines (and their passengers) can rely on.
With Airbus launching an A350 freighter program, we also knew that Boeing was likely to officially challenge its European rival on this front, with rumors and discussions building throughout late 2021. This indeed turned out to be the case, with Boeing announcing the launch of its 777X freighter program at the end of January 2022.
We did, however, get some things wrong. Firstly, the 737 MAX was not re-certified in China, despite test aircraft flying across the Pacific to be scrutinized by Chinese regulators. There even seemed to be a small glimmer of hope when China Southern scheduled the type for commercial service at the end of October. Unfortunately, these flights were scrapped, and the type remains ineligible for commercial service in Chinese airspace. We were also wrong about 737 MAX 7 certification, which Boeing was aiming to complete before the end of 2022.
It's also worth noting that our hopes for a new aircraft program announcement for an "NMA/new midsized aircraft" or "797" never materialized. This was always a long shot, given the more pressing matters that the company needed to resolve. The company has indeed gone a step further on this topic, ruling out any new midsized aircraft program until 2035.
So with this in mind, we already have a good idea of what to expect in 2023. Nonetheless, let's look at everything in a little more detail.
737 MAX 7 certification
First on the list will need to be certification of the Boeing 737 MAX 7, the smallest variant in the 737 MAX family. This milestone was supposed to have taken place in 2022 but never happened. In fact, not only was the MAX 7 supposed to be certified in 2022, but Boeing was also planning the first delivery of the variant as well.
While Boeing's aircraft order data doesn't break down quantities for the three different 737 MAX variants, we do know that Southwest Airlines continues to be the largest customer for this shorter model. ch-aviation.com data indicates that the airline has 239 -7s on order. The only other significant customer for the -7 is US low-cost airline Allegiant, which is expecting 30.
So, if all goes well, MAX 7 certification will take place sometime in the first half of 2023, with an entry into service taking place shortly after (hopefully within the same year).
The recent granting of waivers to allow Boeing to certify the MAX 7 and MAX 10 with identical cockpits as their MAX 8 and 9 counterparts gives the company a great deal more certainty in certification timelines. While this will ensure cockpit commonality in the short term, Boeing is still required to eventually upgrade the 737 MAX 7 aircraft and retrofit the existing fleet of 737 MAX 8 and MAX 9. However, the recent government waiver means that Boeing has more time to implement the change. In fact, it is only after successfully certifying the 737 MAX 10, that Boeing will have three years to retrofit all jets with the required upgrades. The regulatory authorities in Europe (EASA) and Canada (Transport Canada) intend to implement the same certification mandate as the FAA.
737 MAX 10 and 777X certification work will continue
Unfortunately, 2023 isn't likely to be a headline year for the 737 MAX 10 - and most certainly not for the 777X. The news of 2022 indicates that both of these programs have faced setbacks resulting in later certification dates.
Things do seem to have a natural order to them, with MAX 7 certification taking place first and MAX 10 certification following. But, according to American Machinist, Boeing Commercial Airplanes CEO Stan Deal estimates that the 737 MAX 10 will not be certified until late 2023 or early 2024. Given the tendency for planemakers to deliver on the later end of their estimates, we don't have high hopes for MAX 10 certification in 2023 - even if it's later in the year. We'd love to be proven wrong, however!
As for the 777X, the most recent news from April 2022 pegged the first 777X deliveries to take place in 2025. In the coming year, the best news that we can hope for is perhaps no news at all. Indeed, if we hear nothing, then it's a good sign that timelines haven't slipped further for the firm's flagship widebody.
More aircraft orders?
2023 might be a difficult year for Boeing to top in terms of aircraft orders. After all, the US planemaker secured a number of major deals, including Delta Air Lines ordering 100 MAX 10s and United signing on for a firm 100 787 Dreamliners.
When you stop to think about the state of the industry and the recent orders placed around the world, it might actually be difficult to think of any major airlines poised to place a major order for a significant future fleet renewal. It's worth noting that in 2022, and likely for years to come, Russian airlines can be firmly ruled out as potential customers. However, there is one big outstanding customer that comes to mind: Air India. In fact, there is an expectation that the airline will order nearly 200 737 MAX aircraft for its budget subsidiary, Air India Express.
With the 737 MAX continuing to rebuild its reputation and the 787 being delivered to customers once again, airlines will undoubtedly be feeling more confident in Boeing's ability to deliver on its two main commercial passenger products.
Deliveries will depend on a healthy supply chain
On the deliveries side, CNBC reporting in November indicated that Boeing was aiming to produce between 400 and 450 737 MAX aircraft in 2023 up from about 375 planes in 2022. With the company's growing backlog of aircraft orders, it will certainly need to ensure a well-paced rate of output to keep customers happy.
Reaching out to Boeing, a company spokesperson pointed me to comments made during a November conference for investors. One goal mentioned for the coming year was a "continued effort towards supply chain and production stability to ensure predictability for customers." Unsurprisingly, this is an extremely important point of focus - not only for Boeing but for many manufacturers around the world. Indeed, while pandemic-related travel restrictions are mostly a thing of the past, supply chain issues continue to persist - and these issues may just hamper the company's plans to deliver more aircraft on a consistent and predictable timeline.
A key part of the world to keep an eye on in this respect is China, with COVID currently taking a heavy toll across the country and its hospitals. Yes, Boeing assembles its 737s in Renton, and its 787s in North Charleston, in the United States. But, in case you were unaware, Boeing aircraft are also comprised of various components manufactured in China, and could thus be impacted by any factory shutdowns or large-scale lockdowns. When it comes to the 737 specifically, 737.org.uk notes that the following components are manufactured in China:
- Fwd entry door & Overwing exits (Chengdu Aircraft)
- Wing-to-body fairing panels and tail cone - (BHA Aero Composite Parts Co. Ltd.)
- Tail section (aluminum extrusions) (Alcoa / Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing)
Old aircraft and new aircraft
While the last Boeing 747 to be produced rolled off the assembly line in December 2022, the aircraft is actually yet to be delivered to customer Atlas Air.
In recent weeks, the aircraft has undertaken its first few test flights and is actually slated for delivery in February 2023. No doubt this will be a huge moment for Boeing as it firmly and definitively concludes its 747 chapter and over 50 years of delivering the distinctly humped four-engined behemoth. As Stanley Deal said in November, Boeing clearly sees the 777X as the successor to the 747 as a flagship, high-capacity jet.
"Everybody remembers the Queen of the Skies, the 747. I would submit to you this is the next queen of the skies, the 777, which stands in a category of its own, will replace the four-engined aircraft, the 747 and the A380."
Demonstrating this transition from one "queen" to another, as the 747 program is put to rest, the airline will continue to develop its 777X freighter, which is expected to enter service in 2027. And while there won't be any NMA news in 2023, we are expecting a new 787 variant to be announced. Indeed, at Boeing's November investor's conference, Stan Deal was quoted as saying:
"We will introduce an enhanced gross weight version of the 787 in the near future, adding more capability to an already superior product in the middle of the widebody market."
The name of this exact 787 variant is yet to be announced, but Boeing's historical naming patterns give us a hint to what a heavier 787 could be named - just look at the 767-300ER, 737-900ER, and 777-300ER. If we combine this pattern with the known range limitations of the 787-10, then there's a chance we could see something like a "787-10ER" - a heavier -10 variant capable of carrying more fuel for an increased range.
Slow and steady
To sum things up, we see 2023 being a year that will consist mostly of steady progress for Boeing as it works hard to certify various aircraft variants. The MAX 7 will be the primary achievement for Boeing this year so that entry-into-service can commence, and full-scale production can begin. And while we'd love to also see the MAX 10 get the regulatory stamp of approval, we wouldn't be surprised if this didn't take place until 2024.
On the widebody side, we can only hope that the 777X program isn't further delayed. Based on recent news, the program's progress (or lack of progress) might be further outside its control, as GE and its GE9X engine had reportedly been facing issues near the end of 2022. The announcement of a new 787 variant will also generate some excitement - and will likely be much-welcomed news for airlines like United, as the carrier has plans to significantly expand its Dreamliner fleet.
Perhaps news of a new Dreamliner variant will take place at a major air show like Paris or Dubai. These air shows also hold high expectations for being the sites where significant aircraft orders are announced.
Comunque non e' finita...
www.aviation24.be
Boeing to be arraigned next week on criminal charges related to aviation crashes
Major court ruling in Boeing criminal litigation Families will be attending A Texas federal judge this afternoon (Thursday, Jan. 19, 2023) ruled that
www.aviation24.be
Non riesco a trovare il tread sul Middle of the market, quindi posto qui:
theaviationgeekclub.com
Former Boeing Employee explains why the company didn’t develop the 757 instead of the older 737 - The Aviation Geek Club
Former Boeing Employee explains why the company didn’t develop the 757 instead of the older 737
theaviationgeekclub.com