AIR INDIA A320 vola con carrelli abbassati


DusCgn

Utente Registrato
9 Novembre 2005
14,680
20
.
Wheels down, Air India flies into mid-air fuel crisis[

Manju V | TNN | Updated: Jul 25, 2017, 07:40 AM IST
MUMBAI: Pilots of an Air India flight forgot to retract the aircraft wheel assembly after taking off from Kolkata on Saturday and realised it only half way through the journey to Mumbai when they were forced to land in Nagpur. With the landing gear down, the A320 aircraft guzzled fuel faster and a low fuel situation forced the pilots to divert. Both pilots have been de-rostered by the carrier.

Climbing to 4,000ft after AI 676 took off from Kolkata around 9.30am, the pilots would have gone through a "take off/climb checklist". Among the actions taken is retracting the landing gear. "For some reason, the pilots forgot to do it. With the wheels down, the drag force increases and the aircraft speeds rather noisily through the air,'' said a source. Among the consequences would be a poor rate of climb and high fuel consumption.
"The pilots are supposed to check fuel at intervals through the trip, which they might not have done. Also, the A320 couldn't climb beyond 24,000 feet,'' the source added.
The fast rate at which the A320 guzzled fuel left the pilots with no option but to divert to Nagpur airport to refuel. Before takeoff, the aircraft is loaded with enough fuel not just to last the journey, but also to circle, taxi and fly to an alternative airport if it's not possible to land at the destination. But halfway through the almost two hour, 45 minute flight, they were left with not enough fuel to complete the journey safely. "The pilots began to prepare the aircraft for landing and it was only when they decided to put down the landing gear that they realised that it was down all along,'' the source added.
Air India spokesperson Dhananjay Kumar confirmed the incident. He said both the pilots have been derostered and an investigation is on.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...-mid-air-fuel-crisis/articleshow/59747213.cms
 
Velocità, consumi, quota, rateo di salita tutto viene alterato. E probabilmente anche rumore aerodinamico differente dal normale.
Nessuno dei due che si fosse fatto venire un dubbio?
 
...forse erano gli stessi due piloti del Canadair che si era succhiato un sub... mi sa tanto di fake news!
 
...forse erano gli stessi due piloti del Canadair che si era succhiato un sub... mi sa tanto di fake news!

Sembrerebbe tutto vero...

20374805_1481888691850549_5562489609522367219_n.jpg
 
Mi ricorda il 310 di Hapag Lloyd che negli anni novanta fece una planata su Vienna, a corto di carburante, dopo che in decollo da un'isola greca non riuscì a retrarre il carrello e decise di continuare fino in germania in quella configurazione. Solo che sopra alla Capitale austriaca rimase a secco e fece uno spettacolare avvicinamento in chiave alta si LOWW, atterrando in testata pista,mfracassando il carrello, ma tutti sani e salvi!
 
Ma i carrelli possono volare a qualsiasi velocità? A parte il discorso dell'attrito e maggior consumo di carburante (su a.net si dice +180% non so se sia vero), parlo proprio a livello strutturale.
 
Ma i carrelli possono volare a qualsiasi velocità? A parte il discorso dell'attrito e maggior consumo di carburante (su a.net si dice +180% non so se sia vero), parlo proprio a livello strutturale.

Se fosse fisicamente possibile, allora darei per buona la ricostruzione del carrello dimenticato. AI è quella dei piloti che vanno a dormire in First e lasciano un cabin crew da solo in cabina...
 
Ma i carrelli possono volare a qualsiasi velocità? A parte il discorso dell'attrito e maggior consumo di carburante (su a.net si dice +180% non so se sia vero), parlo proprio a livello strutturale.

La velocità massima con carrello esteso è di 280 Kias: mediamente un A320 che vola con un cost index basso (facciamo dal 10 in giù) effettua la salita e la discesa attorno a quella velocità, dai 30mila piedi in su -FL 300- si passa a Mach Number e la ias diminuisce. Supponendo che "se lo siano dimenticato", sono velocità conservative, non è che a 281 kias si strappa il carrello. Il 180% di consumo extra include anche l'attrito dei portelloni del carrello (si presume la configurazione peggiore, ovvero quella col carrello abbassato ed i relativi portelli aperti).
Da wikipedia:
Hapag-Lloyd Flight 3378 (HF-3378) was a passenger service operated by Hapag-Lloyd Flug from Chania, on the island of Crete, Greece, to Hannover, Germany. On 12 July 2000, the aircraft flying the route, an Airbus A310-304, registration D-AHLB, with 143 passengers and 8 crew on board, set off for Hannover leaving the landing gear fully extended, as a precaution, since a malfunction had prevented its proper retraction after take-off. The plane eventually ran out of fuel while attempting a diversion to Vienna, crash-landing just short of the runway. No fatalities resulted, although the aircraft was written off.[1]
Captain Wolfgang Arminger (56) was the pilot-in-command. The flight departed at 10:59 CEDT, shortly after which it was found to be impossible to fully retract the landing gear, as indicated by both the red "gear unsafe" lamp and the yellow "gear door open" lamp. After a total of four retraction attempts, the gear was left in the fully extended condition where all lights indicated a valid condition with the doors trimmed for cruise airspeed. The flight continued towards Germany, as fuel must be burned before landing in any case. The crew had to cope with a heavier cockpit workload that was aggravated by the unavailability of the airline HF radio station for technical consultation, forcing the first officer to spend almost an hour establishing alternative communications with the airline through ACARS and Stockholm Radio. Using the Flight Management System (FMS), the crew estimated the aircraft's fuel consumption, and the captain in consultation with dispatch decided to shorten the flight and divert to Munich, where another A310 would be ready to take the passengers to their final destination. However, the crew was unaware that the FMS was not designed to take into account the extra drag produced by the extended landing gear. In fact, Munich was not within range, as eventually became clear from the unexpectedly rapid fall in fuel reserves. At about 12:00 CEDT, this led the captain to decide to divert to Vienna-Schwechat Airport.[2]

Shortly thereafter, the first officer noted and reported to the captain that they had already consumed half of their initial fuel load, although they had progressed to only their last waypoint "YNN" still inside Greece (about a third of the total distance to Vienna).[3] At 12:34, the FMS prediction for fuel remaining upon arrival at Vienna fell to 1.9 t. Under such conditions, the airline rules require immediate diversion to the nearest suitable airport, which would have been Zagreb, 10 minutes away. The investigation report states "there was no evidence of immediate crew response to this situation." While contact with Zagreb ATC was made 9 minutes later, the crew pressed on towards Vienna, requesting the most direct access to a runway. At 12:53, the crew notified Vienna ATC that if direct runway access were not available, they would prefer to divert to closer Graz. This prompted Vienna ATC to inquire and finally learn that the flight was short of fuel, but the pilots declared no emergency, still anticipating a normal landing. When the fuel gauges fell through 1.9 t remaining, the first officer twice urged the captain to declare an emergency, but the captain postponed such action. At 13:01, the "LT-Fuel low level" warning indicated remaining fuel of 1340 kg, which automatically generates an ACARS message. At this time, the aircraft was 42 nautical miles (78 km) northeast of Zagreb, 85 nautical miles (157 km) south-east from Graz, and 131 nautical miles (243 km) from the destination Vienna. At 11:07 UTC, the crew finally declared an emergency due to lack of fuel, while still stating that they expected to reach Vienna.[2]

At this point, the crew was still debating a possible diversion to Graz, but discovered that the approach chart for that airport was missing from the aircraft map collection. At 11:12 UTC, the crew still debated the contribution of the FMS to their plight; the first officer (correctly) distrusted its performance with gear down, while the captain still defended it. The captain instructed the first officer to request no emergency services for post-landing, and to defer deployment of the flaps, especially if the engines flamed out. At 11:26 UTC, the pressure dropped at the inlet of the right external fuel pump, but the pump was left running. Both engines flamed out 12 nautical miles (22 km) from the runway, although the first officer was able to restart them for a few more minutes of thrust. As there was no time for the final checklist, the "Land Recovery" switch was neglected, resulting in limited operation of inboard ailerons needed for stability control at low speeds. The left wing tip hit the grassy surface about 660 m short of the runway, followed by the left landing gear, which collapsed after 22 m. The aircraft skidded on the left engine and the right main landing gear, over arrays of approach lights and antennas, turning left 90°, and coming to rest off the runway near the end taxiway. About 26 passengers received minor injuries while using the escape slides.[2] Although the photographs suggest that the aircraft remained structurally intact, it was written off due to the severe damage to the underside of the fuselage.[4]

Investigation Edit

The final Report on the investigation of the incident was published (only in German) on 21 March 2006 by the Air Accident Investigation Board (Flugunfalluntersuchungsstelle) of the Austrian Federal Office for Transport (Bundesanstalt für Verkehr, BAV).[2] The Report identified the cause of the failure of landing gear retraction as a minor oversight during maintenance; an inadequately secured lock nut allowed a screw to gradually turn, eventually leading to a 10 mm adjustment error that prevented complete retraction.

The Report identified several key reasons why the cockpit crew failed to adequately cope with this relatively minor technical malfunction of the landing gear, continuing the flight to engine failure due to fuel exhaustion.

The crew failed to comply with company regulations regarding fuel reserves, caused by several human factors, most importantly extreme work load and stress, leading to loss of situational awareness.
Fuel reserves were determined exclusively using the FMS, due to lack of awareness of its inapplicability with gear down.
The captain failed to divert to nearby Zagreb airport upon receiving the low-fuel level warning, apparently becoming excessively single-goal oriented.
Airbus documentation failed to adequately and clearly inform flight crew of the limitations that apply to fuel management using the FMS.
The airline provided insufficient documentation in the checklist for "abnormal landing gear up indication", and Operations Division provided inadequate review of fuel requirements.
The Report makes 14 recommendations for improvements in systems, documents and procedures to avoid such problems in future.
 
Ultima modifica:
La velocità massima con carrello esteso è di 280 Kias: mediamente un A320 che vola con un cost index basso (facciamo dal 10 in giù) effettua la salita e la discesa attorno a quella velocità, dai 30mila piedi in su -FL 300- si passa a Mach Number e la ias diminuisce. Supponendo che "se lo siano dimenticato", sono velocità conservative, non è che a 281 kias si strappa il carrello. Il 180% di consumo extra include anche l'attrito dei portelloni del carrello (si presume la configurazione peggiore, ovvero quella col carrello abbassato ed i relativi portelli aperti).
Da wikipedia:
Hapag-Lloyd Flight 3378 (HF-3378) was a passenger service operated by Hapag-Lloyd Flug from Chania, on the island of Crete, Greece, to Hannover, Germany. On 12 July 2000, the aircraft flying the route, an Airbus A310-304, registration D-AHLB, with 143 passengers and 8 crew on board, set off for Hannover leaving the landing gear fully extended, as a precaution, since a malfunction had prevented its proper retraction after take-off. The plane eventually ran out of fuel while attempting a diversion to Vienna, crash-landing just short of the runway. No fatalities resulted, although the aircraft was written off.[1]
Captain Wolfgang Arminger (56) was the pilot-in-command. The flight departed at 10:59 CEDT, shortly after which it was found to be impossible to fully retract the landing gear, as indicated by both the red "gear unsafe" lamp and the yellow "gear door open" lamp. After a total of four retraction attempts, the gear was left in the fully extended condition where all lights indicated a valid condition with the doors trimmed for cruise airspeed. The flight continued towards Germany, as fuel must be burned before landing in any case. The crew had to cope with a heavier cockpit workload that was aggravated by the unavailability of the airline HF radio station for technical consultation, forcing the first officer to spend almost an hour establishing alternative communications with the airline through ACARS and Stockholm Radio. Using the Flight Management System (FMS), the crew estimated the aircraft's fuel consumption, and the captain in consultation with dispatch decided to shorten the flight and divert to Munich, where another A310 would be ready to take the passengers to their final destination. However, the crew was unaware that the FMS was not designed to take into account the extra drag produced by the extended landing gear. In fact, Munich was not within range, as eventually became clear from the unexpectedly rapid fall in fuel reserves. At about 12:00 CEDT, this led the captain to decide to divert to Vienna-Schwechat Airport.[2]

Shortly thereafter, the first officer noted and reported to the captain that they had already consumed half of their initial fuel load, although they had progressed to only their last waypoint "YNN" still inside Greece (about a third of the total distance to Vienna).[3] At 12:34, the FMS prediction for fuel remaining upon arrival at Vienna fell to 1.9 t. Under such conditions, the airline rules require immediate diversion to the nearest suitable airport, which would have been Zagreb, 10 minutes away. The investigation report states "there was no evidence of immediate crew response to this situation." While contact with Zagreb ATC was made 9 minutes later, the crew pressed on towards Vienna, requesting the most direct access to a runway. At 12:53, the crew notified Vienna ATC that if direct runway access were not available, they would prefer to divert to closer Graz. This prompted Vienna ATC to inquire and finally learn that the flight was short of fuel, but the pilots declared no emergency, still anticipating a normal landing. When the fuel gauges fell through 1.9 t remaining, the first officer twice urged the captain to declare an emergency, but the captain postponed such action. At 13:01, the "LT-Fuel low level" warning indicated remaining fuel of 1340 kg, which automatically generates an ACARS message. At this time, the aircraft was 42 nautical miles (78 km) northeast of Zagreb, 85 nautical miles (157 km) south-east from Graz, and 131 nautical miles (243 km) from the destination Vienna. At 11:07 UTC, the crew finally declared an emergency due to lack of fuel, while still stating that they expected to reach Vienna.[2]

At this point, the crew was still debating a possible diversion to Graz, but discovered that the approach chart for that airport was missing from the aircraft map collection. At 11:12 UTC, the crew still debated the contribution of the FMS to their plight; the first officer (correctly) distrusted its performance with gear down, while the captain still defended it. The captain instructed the first officer to request no emergency services for post-landing, and to defer deployment of the flaps, especially if the engines flamed out. At 11:26 UTC, the pressure dropped at the inlet of the right external fuel pump, but the pump was left running. Both engines flamed out 12 nautical miles (22 km) from the runway, although the first officer was able to restart them for a few more minutes of thrust. As there was no time for the final checklist, the "Land Recovery" switch was neglected, resulting in limited operation of inboard ailerons needed for stability control at low speeds. The left wing tip hit the grassy surface about 660 m short of the runway, followed by the left landing gear, which collapsed after 22 m. The aircraft skidded on the left engine and the right main landing gear, over arrays of approach lights and antennas, turning left 90°, and coming to rest off the runway near the end taxiway. About 26 passengers received minor injuries while using the escape slides.[2] Although the photographs suggest that the aircraft remained structurally intact, it was written off due to the severe damage to the underside of the fuselage.[4]

Investigation Edit

The final Report on the investigation of the incident was published (only in German) on 21 March 2006 by the Air Accident Investigation Board (Flugunfalluntersuchungsstelle) of the Austrian Federal Office for Transport (Bundesanstalt für Verkehr, BAV).[2] The Report identified the cause of the failure of landing gear retraction as a minor oversight during maintenance; an inadequately secured lock nut allowed a screw to gradually turn, eventually leading to a 10 mm adjustment error that prevented complete retraction.

The Report identified several key reasons why the cockpit crew failed to adequately cope with this relatively minor technical malfunction of the landing gear, continuing the flight to engine failure due to fuel exhaustion.

The crew failed to comply with company regulations regarding fuel reserves, caused by several human factors, most importantly extreme work load and stress, leading to loss of situational awareness.
Fuel reserves were determined exclusively using the FMS, due to lack of awareness of its inapplicability with gear down.
The captain failed to divert to nearby Zagreb airport upon receiving the low-fuel level warning, apparently becoming excessively single-goal oriented.
Airbus documentation failed to adequately and clearly inform flight crew of the limitations that apply to fuel management using the FMS.
The airline provided insufficient documentation in the checklist for "abnormal landing gear up indication", and Operations Division provided inadequate review of fuel requirements.
The Report makes 14 recommendations for improvements in systems, documents and procedures to avoid such problems in future.

È chiaro che c'è un abisso tra il "si sono dimenticati" e , piuttosto, il "hanno avuto un problema tecnico". Anche per AI potrebbe dunque trattarsi di una presa di coscienza del problema e dell averlo affrontato scegliendo di proseguire per poi accorciare il volo di quanto necessario per un safe landing.
Detto questo, ringrazio il sempre eccellente OneShot al quale chiedo per il caso Hapag: il rateo di consumo non era dunque visibile sul 310, giusto? In parole semplici e da profano, non è che ci sia la classica lancetta che scende mentre consumi, puoi solo aspettare il Short of Fuel signal dopo aver stimato il consumo extra. Ho capito bene?
Penso le cose ora siano decisamente cambiate, ma allo stesso tempo mi sorprenderebbe avere la conferma che non vi fosse sul 310 un indicatore consumo in tempo reale!
 
Scusate ma non scattano degli allarmi in cabina se dopo il decollo non si ritraggono i carrelli?
No. Suonano solo se si prova a ritrarre ma per qualche motivo il sistema non ci riesce

È chiaro che c'è un abisso tra il "si sono dimenticati" e , piuttosto, il "hanno avuto un problema tecnico". Anche per AI potrebbe dunque trattarsi di una presa di coscienza del problema e dell averlo affrontato scegliendo di proseguire per poi accorciare il volo di quanto necessario per un safe landing.
Detto questo, ringrazio il sempre eccellente OneShot al quale chiedo per il caso Hapag: il rateo di consumo non era dunque visibile sul 310, giusto? In parole semplici e da profano, non è che ci sia la classica lancetta che scende mentre consumi, puoi solo aspettare il Short of Fuel signal dopo aver stimato il consumo extra. Ho capito bene?
Penso le cose ora siano decisamente cambiate, ma allo stesso tempo mi sorprenderebbe avere la conferma che non vi fosse sul 310 un indicatore consumo in tempo reale!
Il problema fu che in quel caso il comandante aveva dato per scontato che i calcoli dell'FMGS tenessero in conto il consumo extra, cosa che ovviamente non era vera
Il consumo istantaneo c'era, ma non è stato usato per fare i calcoli
 
Nel caso di HL da Chania a mio avviso, dato che si erano accorti subito del problema, avrebbero fatto bene ad atterrare non dico a Creta stessq ma in un aeroporto non lontanissimo ma più attrezzato , tipo Atene.

Il volo AI se la dinamica è quella effettivamente descritta, mi sembra più grave in quanto manca la consapevolezza di volare con i carrelli scesi.
 
Il consumo istantaneo c'era, ma non è stato usato per fare i calcoli

La mia vecchia moto aveva la levetta della riserva; a corto di benzina il motore dava segni di caduta, metteva la mano sinistra sulla levetta a fianco della sella, la giravi e ti garantivi altri 30km per arrivare a fare rifornimento. Quella nuova no, ha l'indicatore del consumo istantaneo che, se non lo guardo, la moto si ferma a secco e resto in mezzo alla strada.
Ecco , appunto , per strada. Non per aria. Non stimo quindi, guardo quella benedetta lancetta ed evito guai.
Come abbia potuto il comandante Hapag non utilizzare il dato consumo istantaneo per fare le opportune valutazioni mi sembra assurdo. Incredibile davvero!
 
Ultima modifica:
Nel caso di HL da Chania a mio avviso, dato che si erano accorti subito del problema, avrebbero fatto bene ad atterrare non dico a Creta stessq ma in un aeroporto non lontanissimo ma più attrezzato , tipo Atene.

Il volo AI se la dinamica è quella effettivamente descritta, mi sembra più grave in quanto manca la consapevolezza di volare con i carrelli scesi.

mah, oddio; la consapevolezza c'era, che si fossero invece "dimenticati" o meno e' tutto ancora da dimostrare.
 
Come abbia potuto il comandante Hapag a non utilizzare il dato consumo istantaneo per fare le opportune valutazioni mi sembra assurdo. Incredibile davvero!

Ci ha provato il FO a dirgli a un terzo della tratta che avevano fatto fuori metà del carburante contenuto nelle ali. Come dice Tienneti, il flussometro (fuel flow kg/min) è presente su tutti gli aerei: sebbene sia difficile basarsi sull'FF durante le fasi di salita/discesa, in volo livellato essi danno un indicazione più che onesta del consumo. Sono calcoletti da brevetto commerciale, non bisogna essere ingegneri aerospaziali.
Sul caso AI ci sono ancora pocge informazioni per capire che dimenticanza sia. La più classica potrebbe essere stata quella di decollare con i gear pins inseriti che tengono il carrello bloccato in apertura. Questa "ci può stare..."
 
mah, oddio; la consapevolezza c'era, che si fossero invece "dimenticati" o meno e' tutto ancora da dimostrare.

"The pilots began to prepare the aircraft for landing and it was only when they decided to put down the landing gear that they realised that it was down all along,'' the source added.

Qui tutto mi sembra tranne che fossero consci del fatto che il carrello non fosse mai stato retratto in posizione di volo.

Avevo premesso comunque, se effettivamente le cose sono andate come descritte nellarticolo...
 
Commento fuori tema: ma come cavolo si erano gonfiati gli scivoli sul A310 di Hapag Lloyd? Ho visto alcune foto, mah! Uno a spirale su se stesso... uno verso l'alto (contro ogni legge di gravità)....