Gira anche un video sulla dinamica dell'incidente, ma non riesco a capire se possa essere attendibile o meno perché non c'è audio e nemmeno scritte.
Volo Lion Air 737 MAX si schianta in Indonesia
- Autore Discussione EY460
- Data d'inizio
From (Reuters.com) - The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Wednesday issued an emergency airworthiness directive on about 250 Boeing 737 Max aircraft after the U.S. aircraft manufacturer sent a bulletin to carriers in the aftermath of a deadly Lion Air flight.
The FAA said the order is effective immediately and covers 45 aircraft in the United States operated by carriers including Southwest Air Co, United Airlines and American Airlines Group Inc and addresses erroneous angle of attack inputs.
The directive orders operators to revise the airplane flight manual to give the flight crew horizontal stabilizer trim procedures to follow under some conditions.
The FAA said the order is effective immediately and covers 45 aircraft in the United States operated by carriers including Southwest Air Co, United Airlines and American Airlines Group Inc and addresses erroneous angle of attack inputs.
The directive orders operators to revise the airplane flight manual to give the flight crew horizontal stabilizer trim procedures to follow under some conditions.
Noto solo ora che il bollettino è specifico per i MAX... quindi è qualcosa che non può succedere sui Next Generation?
NoEmptyElse
Utente Registrato
Quindi l'accento è sulla procedura per gestire il problema. Tale procedura esisteva anche prima. Da capire se quella nuova sia sostanzialmente differente dalla precedente.
Tiennetti
Utente Registrato
Non proprio, la procedura è sempre la stessa (stabilizer runaway)
La differenze è nel riconoscere che un malfunzionamento di questo sistema contro lo stallo, può portare ad uno stabilizer runaway
Praticamente l'AD dice "Occhio che in certe condizioni il sistema xyz fa lo scemo e il risultato è uno stabilizer runaway. Se questo succede applica la procedura di stabilizer runaway, anche se non ti sembra causato per i soliti motivi"
Questo da quanto ho capito, non avendo IO comunque esperienza di 737, prendilo con il beneficio del dubbio
La differenze è nel riconoscere che un malfunzionamento di questo sistema contro lo stallo, può portare ad uno stabilizer runaway
Praticamente l'AD dice "Occhio che in certe condizioni il sistema xyz fa lo scemo e il risultato è uno stabilizer runaway. Se questo succede applica la procedura di stabilizer runaway, anche se non ti sembra causato per i soliti motivi"
Questo da quanto ho capito, non avendo IO comunque esperienza di 737, prendilo con il beneficio del dubbio
tiefpeck
Utente Registrato
Un interessante articolo del NYT: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/world/asia/indonesia-plane-crash-last-moments.html che discute i due temi principali evocati riguardo a questo incidente, ovvero la crescente automazione dei sistemi di volo e il livello tecnico di manutenzione e preparazione dei piloti nei paesi in via di sviluppo (e non solo).
East End Ave
Utente Registrato
Una compagnia ha dato queste indicazioni:
As part of the Lion Air B737 MAX-8 accident investigation, analysis performed by the
manufacturer (Boeing) showing that if a single erroneously high angle of attack (AOA) sensor input is
received by the flight control system, there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands to the
horizontal stabilizer. XXXXX is issuing this Pilot Bulletin to address this potential nose-down
trim issue, which could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to
excessive nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible impact with terrain.
In the event of an erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA) input, the pitch trim system can trim the stabilizer
nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. An erroneous AOA input can cause some or all of
the following indications and effects:
Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.
Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.
Increasing nose down control forces.
IAS DISAGREE alert.
ALT DISAGREE alert.
AOA DISAGREE alert (if the option is installed).
FEEL DIFF PRESS light.
Autopilot may disengage.
Inability to engage autopilot.
Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already
applied. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are
moved to CUTOUT.
Policy/Procedure: In the event of an uncommanded horizontal stabilizer trim movement, combined
with any of the above potential effects or indications resulting from an erroneous Angle of Attack
(AOA) input, the flight crew MUST accomplish the Runaway Stabilizer Non-Normal procedure
ensuring that the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are set to CUTOUT and remain in CUTOUT for the
remainder of the flight.
The B737 FM Stabilizer Runaway is described on FM 2.90.56 and QRH 90.27. It is also an item on the
B737 QRC.
As part of the Lion Air B737 MAX-8 accident investigation, analysis performed by the
manufacturer (Boeing) showing that if a single erroneously high angle of attack (AOA) sensor input is
received by the flight control system, there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands to the
horizontal stabilizer. XXXXX is issuing this Pilot Bulletin to address this potential nose-down
trim issue, which could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to
excessive nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible impact with terrain.
In the event of an erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA) input, the pitch trim system can trim the stabilizer
nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. An erroneous AOA input can cause some or all of
the following indications and effects:
Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only. Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only. Increasing nose down control forces. IAS DISAGREE alert. ALT DISAGREE alert. AOA DISAGREE alert (if the option is installed). FEEL DIFF PRESS light. Autopilot may disengage. Inability to engage autopilot.Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already
applied. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are
moved to CUTOUT.
Policy/Procedure: In the event of an uncommanded horizontal stabilizer trim movement, combined
with any of the above potential effects or indications resulting from an erroneous Angle of Attack
(AOA) input, the flight crew MUST accomplish the Runaway Stabilizer Non-Normal procedure
ensuring that the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are set to CUTOUT and remain in CUTOUT for the
remainder of the flight.
The B737 FM Stabilizer Runaway is described on FM 2.90.56 and QRH 90.27. It is also an item on the
B737 QRC.
NoEmptyElse
Utente Registrato
Per fortuna che ci sono i media che fanno informazione puntuale e corretta
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East End Ave
Utente Registrato
Tiennetti
Utente Registrato
NoEmptyElse
Utente Registrato
Scherzi più o meno a parte è il tono che hanno tutti i media, e questo era la seconda news del mio Google News, quindi immagino che sia arrivato a più di qualche persona.
AlicorporateUK
Utente Registrato
“L’interlocutore ha notato che i piloti saranno avvertiti”... Cioè, tipo “Datecela n’occhiata ogni tanto eh che sennò vi scappa, scusa, scoppia”... Comunque constatato che i piloti saranno avvertiti, possiamo pure chiudere (mah...).
G
G
Mi autoquoto per riportare la stessa perplessità da parte di una fonte che sembrerebbe un po' più competente del sottoscritto: https://www.facebook.com/737handbook/posts/1941769159225680
U.S. Pilots Say Boeing Didn’t Warn of 737 Feature Tied to Crash
By Alan Levin and Mary Schlangenstein
Lion Air plane carrying 189 people crashed Oct. 29 in Java Sea
Unions say aviators need to know of changes affecting safety
Two U.S. pilots’ unions say the potential risks of a safety feature on Boeing Co.’s 737 Max aircraft that has been linked to a deadly crash in Indonesia weren’t sufficiently spelled out in their manuals or training.
Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration issued directives last week telling flight crews about the system, which is designed to provide extra protection against pilots losing control. That prompted aviators, unions and training departments to realize that none of the documentation for the Max aircraft included an explanation of the system, the union leaders said.
“We don’t like that we weren’t notified,” said Jon Weaks, president of the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association. Dennis Tajer, a 737 captain and spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association at American Airlines Group Inc., said his union’s members were also concerned.
The complaints from pilot union leaders at Southwest Airlines Co. and American are significant because of the size of those carriers’ 737 fleets and their Max purchases. Southwest is the largest operator of the 737 Max and has the most on order with 257 of the jets yet to be delivered. American, the world’s largest airline, has outstanding orders for 85 of the planes.
“This is not about silos and layers of bureaucracy, this is about knowing your airplane,” Tajer said. “We will always be eager and aggressive in gaining any knowledge of new aircraft.” A bulletin from APA to American’s pilots said details about the system weren’t included in the documentation about the plane. “This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen,” it said. “The companies and the pilots should have been informed,” Weaks said. “It makes us question, ‘Is that everything, guys?’ I would hope there are no more surprises out there.” Boeing said it is confident in the safety of the 737 Max family of jets.
“We are taking every measure to fully understand all aspects of this incident, working closely with the investigating team and all regulatory authorities involved,” the company said in a statement by email. “Safety remains our top priority and is a core value for everyone at Boeing.”
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-07/boeing-issues-bulletin-for-737-max-after-indonesia-jet-crash
By Alan Levin and Mary Schlangenstein
Lion Air plane carrying 189 people crashed Oct. 29 in Java Sea
Unions say aviators need to know of changes affecting safety
Two U.S. pilots’ unions say the potential risks of a safety feature on Boeing Co.’s 737 Max aircraft that has been linked to a deadly crash in Indonesia weren’t sufficiently spelled out in their manuals or training.
Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration issued directives last week telling flight crews about the system, which is designed to provide extra protection against pilots losing control. That prompted aviators, unions and training departments to realize that none of the documentation for the Max aircraft included an explanation of the system, the union leaders said.
“We don’t like that we weren’t notified,” said Jon Weaks, president of the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association. Dennis Tajer, a 737 captain and spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association at American Airlines Group Inc., said his union’s members were also concerned.
The complaints from pilot union leaders at Southwest Airlines Co. and American are significant because of the size of those carriers’ 737 fleets and their Max purchases. Southwest is the largest operator of the 737 Max and has the most on order with 257 of the jets yet to be delivered. American, the world’s largest airline, has outstanding orders for 85 of the planes.
“This is not about silos and layers of bureaucracy, this is about knowing your airplane,” Tajer said. “We will always be eager and aggressive in gaining any knowledge of new aircraft.” A bulletin from APA to American’s pilots said details about the system weren’t included in the documentation about the plane. “This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen,” it said. “The companies and the pilots should have been informed,” Weaks said. “It makes us question, ‘Is that everything, guys?’ I would hope there are no more surprises out there.” Boeing said it is confident in the safety of the 737 Max family of jets.
“We are taking every measure to fully understand all aspects of this incident, working closely with the investigating team and all regulatory authorities involved,” the company said in a statement by email. “Safety remains our top priority and is a core value for everyone at Boeing.”
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-07/boeing-issues-bulletin-for-737-max-after-indonesia-jet-crash
American Airlines 'unaware' of some Boeing 737 MAX functions until last week: spokesman
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - American Airlines Group Inc (AAL.O) said on Wednesday it was “unaware” of some functions of an anti-stall system on Boeing Co’s (BA.N) 737 MAX until last week.
Boeing and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued guidance on the system last week after a Lion Air jet crashed in Indonesia on Oct. 29, killing all 189 people on board. The FAA warned airlines last week that erroneous inputs from the system’s sensors could lead the jet to automatically pitch its nose down even when autopilot is turned off, making it difficult for pilots to control. The system was designed to prevent the jet from stalling, according to information provided by Boeing to airlines.
“We value our partnership with Boeing, but were unaware of some of the functionality of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) installed on the MAX 8,” an American Airlines spokesman said.
“We must ensure that our pilots are fully trained on procedures and understand key systems on the aircraft they fly.” Indonesian investigators said on Monday the situation the crew of a doomed Lion Air jet was believed to have faced was not contained in the aircraft’s flight manual. U.S. pilot unions were also not aware of potential risks, pilot unions told Reuters. The FAA and Boeing are evaluating the need for software or design changes to 737 MAX jets in the wake of the Lion Air crash, the regulator said on Tuesday. The American Airlines spokesman said his airline was continuing to work with Boeing and the FAA and would keep pilots informed of any updates.
A Boeing spokeswoman said the manufacturer could not discuss specifics of an ongoing investigation but it had provided two updates for operators around the world that re-emphasize existing procedures to deal with situations relating to MCAS.
“We are confident in the safety of the 737 MAX,” she said. “Safety remains our top priority and is a core value for everyone at Boeing.”
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-crash-boeing-american-airli/american-airlines-unaware-of-some-boeing-737-max-functions-until-last-week-spokesman-idUSKCN1NK0EF
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - American Airlines Group Inc (AAL.O) said on Wednesday it was “unaware” of some functions of an anti-stall system on Boeing Co’s (BA.N) 737 MAX until last week.
Boeing and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued guidance on the system last week after a Lion Air jet crashed in Indonesia on Oct. 29, killing all 189 people on board. The FAA warned airlines last week that erroneous inputs from the system’s sensors could lead the jet to automatically pitch its nose down even when autopilot is turned off, making it difficult for pilots to control. The system was designed to prevent the jet from stalling, according to information provided by Boeing to airlines.
“We value our partnership with Boeing, but were unaware of some of the functionality of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) installed on the MAX 8,” an American Airlines spokesman said.
“We must ensure that our pilots are fully trained on procedures and understand key systems on the aircraft they fly.” Indonesian investigators said on Monday the situation the crew of a doomed Lion Air jet was believed to have faced was not contained in the aircraft’s flight manual. U.S. pilot unions were also not aware of potential risks, pilot unions told Reuters. The FAA and Boeing are evaluating the need for software or design changes to 737 MAX jets in the wake of the Lion Air crash, the regulator said on Tuesday. The American Airlines spokesman said his airline was continuing to work with Boeing and the FAA and would keep pilots informed of any updates.
A Boeing spokeswoman said the manufacturer could not discuss specifics of an ongoing investigation but it had provided two updates for operators around the world that re-emphasize existing procedures to deal with situations relating to MCAS.
“We are confident in the safety of the 737 MAX,” she said. “Safety remains our top priority and is a core value for everyone at Boeing.”
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-crash-boeing-american-airli/american-airlines-unaware-of-some-boeing-737-max-functions-until-last-week-spokesman-idUSKCN1NK0EF
Salve, sembra sempre più evidente che alcune nuove procedure del Max non siano state rese note ai clienti, al di là del fatto di stabilire se può essere stata la causa o concausa dell'incidente, non dovrà in ogni caso, la Boeing, essere condannata per questo tipo di omissione?
Saluti Marco
Saluti Marco
Articolo su Repubblica sull’avanzamento dell’indagine
https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/20...eo_indonesia_errore_computer_bordo-212812442/
https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/20...eo_indonesia_errore_computer_bordo-212812442/
tiefpeck
Utente Registrato
‘Spend the Minimum’: After Crash, Lion Air’s Safety Record Is Back in Spotlight
Articolo sul NYT in merito a presunte carenze nella sicurezza Lion Air: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/world/asia/lion-air-crash-safety-failures.html
Direi che i temi principali si stanno delineando e sono riassunti all'inizio dell'articolo.
Articolo sul NYT in merito a presunte carenze nella sicurezza Lion Air: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/world/asia/lion-air-crash-safety-failures.html
Direi che i temi principali si stanno delineando e sono riassunti all'inizio dell'articolo.
È stato rilasciato dalla safety committente indonesiana il rapporto preliminare sull incidente. Purtroppo non ho modo di postarlo o postare il link.
Tra gli aspetti salienti: da subito registrata una differenza di 20 gradi indicati dagli AoA, attivazione continua dalla rotazione dello stick shaker del comandante, comando automatico nose down allo stabilizzatore una volta retratti i flap, con azioni del crew per dare a contrastare aircraft nose up inputs. Il crew richiedeva sempre al atc di dirgli quota e velocità perché i sistemi di bordo erano in contrasto
Tra gli aspetti salienti: da subito registrata una differenza di 20 gradi indicati dagli AoA, attivazione continua dalla rotazione dello stick shaker del comandante, comando automatico nose down allo stabilizzatore una volta retratti i flap, con azioni del crew per dare a contrastare aircraft nose up inputs. Il crew richiedeva sempre al atc di dirgli quota e velocità perché i sistemi di bordo erano in contrasto