ATR72.
Quando riesco a trovare un po` di tempo faccio un mini TR del viaggio che ho fatto.
Incidente aereo a Taiwan per ATR72 TransAsia
- Autore Discussione MindOnAir
- Data d'inizio
ATR72.
Quando riesco a trovare un po` di tempo faccio un mini TR del viaggio che ho fatto.
Grazie.
Quindi questa cosa che avrebbero cancellato tutti i voli GE operati con ATR non e' (per il momento) accaduta.
a me pare di aver capito che è stata la CAA (ente pari a ENAC) ha ordinare il retraining e non la compagnia. Percui direi che è l'ente di controllo che ha dei dubbi sulle capacità degli equipaggi della TransAsia.
ciauz sky3boy
ciauz sky3boy
TransAsia Airways has canceled 90 scheduled flights and is sending all its active ATR pilots for retraining under the scrutiny of Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), following the fatal crash of an ATR 72-600 last week.
The turboprop aircraft, carrying 53 passengers and five crew, crashed into a river in Taipei on Feb. 4 just over three minutes after taking off. The death toll stands at 40 people, including the two pilots. Fifteen passengers survived the crash, leaving three people still unaccounted for.
Investigators said Feb. 6 that both Pratt & Whitney Canada PW127M engines stopped producing thrust during the brief flight.
“All [our] 71 ATR pilots will take part in proficiency tests carried out by the [Taiwan] CAA and third-party professionals for an estimated four days,” the airline said in a statement.
A spokesperson for Taiwan’s Aviation Safety Council, Thomas Wang, confirmed that information from the flight data recorder (FDR) showed an alarm went off on flight GE235’s right engine only 37 seconds after takeoff from Taiwan, but that immediately afterward, the left engine was shut down. “The pilots had not followed normal procedure,” he added.
The pilot retraining recall follows an order from the CAA late last week that both TransAsia and its subsidiary Uni Air carry out engine and fuel system inspections on all the PW127M power plants on their ATR 72 fleet.
Flight GE235 was a relatively new aircraft, delivered to TransAsia by the manufacturers in April last year. It had last seen maintenance Jan. 26, according to a statement by TransAsia CEO Peter Chen.
This is the third fatal crash the airline has suffered in three years and the second in the last 12 months, following the crash of flight GE222 at Magong Airport, Penghu last July that killed 48 passengers.
That followed the fatal crash of a cargo ATR 72-200F in 2012 flying from Taipei to Macau, in which both crew members died.
atw
The turboprop aircraft, carrying 53 passengers and five crew, crashed into a river in Taipei on Feb. 4 just over three minutes after taking off. The death toll stands at 40 people, including the two pilots. Fifteen passengers survived the crash, leaving three people still unaccounted for.
Investigators said Feb. 6 that both Pratt & Whitney Canada PW127M engines stopped producing thrust during the brief flight.
“All [our] 71 ATR pilots will take part in proficiency tests carried out by the [Taiwan] CAA and third-party professionals for an estimated four days,” the airline said in a statement.
A spokesperson for Taiwan’s Aviation Safety Council, Thomas Wang, confirmed that information from the flight data recorder (FDR) showed an alarm went off on flight GE235’s right engine only 37 seconds after takeoff from Taiwan, but that immediately afterward, the left engine was shut down. “The pilots had not followed normal procedure,” he added.
The pilot retraining recall follows an order from the CAA late last week that both TransAsia and its subsidiary Uni Air carry out engine and fuel system inspections on all the PW127M power plants on their ATR 72 fleet.
Flight GE235 was a relatively new aircraft, delivered to TransAsia by the manufacturers in April last year. It had last seen maintenance Jan. 26, according to a statement by TransAsia CEO Peter Chen.
This is the third fatal crash the airline has suffered in three years and the second in the last 12 months, following the crash of flight GE222 at Magong Airport, Penghu last July that killed 48 passengers.
That followed the fatal crash of a cargo ATR 72-200F in 2012 flying from Taipei to Macau, in which both crew members died.
atw
beh....per quanto io sia un fatalista, un minimo di dubbio sull'affidabilita' di questo vettore me lo farei venire sinceramene...
10 TransAsia pilots grounded after failing proficiency tests
Ten TransAsia pilots have been grounded after failing basic oral tests on the correct handling procedure for an engine flameout after Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and the carrier suspended flights to send all active ATR pilots for retraining following the fatal crash of an ATR 72-600 earlier this month.
The turboprop aircraft, carrying 53 passengers and five crew, crashed into a river in Taipei on Feb. 4 just over three minutes after taking off. The death toll stands at 42 people, including the two pilots. Fifteen passengers survived the crash.
A spokesperson for Taiwan’s Aviation Safety Council, Thomas Wang, previously confirmed that information from the flight data recorder (FDR) showed an alarm went off on flight GE235’s right engine only 37 seconds after takeoff from Taiwan, but that immediately afterward, the left engine was shut down. “The pilots had not followed normal procedure,” he added.
The pilot retraining recall follows an order from the CAA that both TransAsia and EVA Air subsidiary Uni Air carry out engine and fuel system inspections on all the PW127M power plants on their ATR 72 fleet.
The CAA said that another 19 pilots who were licensed to fly the airline’s ATR 72-600s have not yet been tested as they were either off duty, sick, or out of the country. All 29 pilots have been suspended, the CAA said.
“This result is not acceptable for us,” TransAsia CEO Peter Chen said. “We will definitely strengthen their training.” Atwonline
Ten TransAsia pilots have been grounded after failing basic oral tests on the correct handling procedure for an engine flameout after Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and the carrier suspended flights to send all active ATR pilots for retraining following the fatal crash of an ATR 72-600 earlier this month.
The turboprop aircraft, carrying 53 passengers and five crew, crashed into a river in Taipei on Feb. 4 just over three minutes after taking off. The death toll stands at 42 people, including the two pilots. Fifteen passengers survived the crash.
A spokesperson for Taiwan’s Aviation Safety Council, Thomas Wang, previously confirmed that information from the flight data recorder (FDR) showed an alarm went off on flight GE235’s right engine only 37 seconds after takeoff from Taiwan, but that immediately afterward, the left engine was shut down. “The pilots had not followed normal procedure,” he added.
The pilot retraining recall follows an order from the CAA that both TransAsia and EVA Air subsidiary Uni Air carry out engine and fuel system inspections on all the PW127M power plants on their ATR 72 fleet.
The CAA said that another 19 pilots who were licensed to fly the airline’s ATR 72-600s have not yet been tested as they were either off duty, sick, or out of the country. All 29 pilots have been suspended, the CAA said.
“This result is not acceptable for us,” TransAsia CEO Peter Chen said. “We will definitely strengthen their training.” Atwonline
dopo ci si accorge che i piloti non sapevano pilotare.
magari i controlli si fanno prima non dopo le tragedie
Taiwan operators under further scrutiny following TransAsia crash
Authorities investigating the fatal crash of a TransAsia ATR 72-600 in Taiwan earlier in February have reported several local airlines have contravened local labor operating regulations for both ground and aircrew.
Taiwan’s Labor Ministry said the following airlines were found to have contravened “certain working standards”: National carrier China Airlines, TransAsia subsidiary V Air, Sunrise Airlines, Roc Aviation, Emerald Pacific Airlines, Dapeng Airlines, Great Wing Airline and Tigerair Taiwan.
The Ministry said the listed airlines had either failed to keep proper records of employee work hours, or to have required workers to exceed the 12-hour maximum working day. It said China Airlines and TransAsia had instructed cabin crews to work more than 12 hours consecutively on Taipei-Hong Kong and Taipei-Tianjin routes, and to potentially go over the mandated 46 hours overtime limit each month.
Both airlines have been given notice they could be fined up to NTD300,000 ($9,530) for the overworking violations, with the contraventions recorded as being “in violation of the law,” the Ministry said.
The rigorous inspection of working methods was ordered following the TransAsia crash of flight GE235, which killed 40 of the 57 passengers on board Feb. 4, shortly after it took off from Taipei.
On Feb. 12, 10 TransAsia pilots were grounded after failing basic oral tests on the correct handling procedure for an engine flameout after Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and the carrier suspended flights to send all active ATR pilots forretraining following the fatal crash.
The new scrutiny adds to the potential disruption from a protracted dispute between China Airlines and its staff that resulted in a mass blockade of the airline headquarters in Taipei last January.
The blockade highlighted an associated overtime dispute and staff complaints about reduced year-end bonuses. Several workers were suspended by the company as a result.
China Airlines’ staff has demanded the airline reinstate the workers and also hold transparent union elections.
The Ministry said the inspections of working conditions and regulatory conformance would be extended to international carriers in the coming weeks.
atwonline
Authorities investigating the fatal crash of a TransAsia ATR 72-600 in Taiwan earlier in February have reported several local airlines have contravened local labor operating regulations for both ground and aircrew.
Taiwan’s Labor Ministry said the following airlines were found to have contravened “certain working standards”: National carrier China Airlines, TransAsia subsidiary V Air, Sunrise Airlines, Roc Aviation, Emerald Pacific Airlines, Dapeng Airlines, Great Wing Airline and Tigerair Taiwan.
The Ministry said the listed airlines had either failed to keep proper records of employee work hours, or to have required workers to exceed the 12-hour maximum working day. It said China Airlines and TransAsia had instructed cabin crews to work more than 12 hours consecutively on Taipei-Hong Kong and Taipei-Tianjin routes, and to potentially go over the mandated 46 hours overtime limit each month.
Both airlines have been given notice they could be fined up to NTD300,000 ($9,530) for the overworking violations, with the contraventions recorded as being “in violation of the law,” the Ministry said.
The rigorous inspection of working methods was ordered following the TransAsia crash of flight GE235, which killed 40 of the 57 passengers on board Feb. 4, shortly after it took off from Taipei.
On Feb. 12, 10 TransAsia pilots were grounded after failing basic oral tests on the correct handling procedure for an engine flameout after Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and the carrier suspended flights to send all active ATR pilots forretraining following the fatal crash.
The new scrutiny adds to the potential disruption from a protracted dispute between China Airlines and its staff that resulted in a mass blockade of the airline headquarters in Taipei last January.
The blockade highlighted an associated overtime dispute and staff complaints about reduced year-end bonuses. Several workers were suspended by the company as a result.
China Airlines’ staff has demanded the airline reinstate the workers and also hold transparent union elections.
The Ministry said the inspections of working conditions and regulatory conformance would be extended to international carriers in the coming weeks.
atwonline
Dovrebbe essere reso pubblico domani un rapporto preliminare sull'incidente. Pare che, in seguito al guasto di uno dei motori, i piloti abbiano spento il motore funzionante.
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...working-engine-source/ar-AAcoWp5?ocid=UP97DHP
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...working-engine-source/ar-AAcoWp5?ocid=UP97DHP
According to the Aviation Safety Council, a transcript of the cockpit voice recording of TransAsia Flight GE235 on February 4 features one of the two pilots shouting “Wow, pulled back the wrong side throttle”, apparently realizing that the wrong engine had been shut down after the other had failed shortly after take off.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/transasia-pilot-shut-down-working-engine-before-taiwan-crash-1435815552
http://www.wsj.com/articles/transasia-pilot-shut-down-working-engine-before-taiwan-crash-1435815552
By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Jun 30th 2016 15:58Z, last updated Thursday, Jun 30th 2016 16:01Z
Taiwan's ASC have released their final report in Chinese and executive summary in English concluding the probable causes of the crash were:
Findings Related to Probable Causes
Powerplant
- An intermittent signal discontinuity between the auto feather unit (AFU) number 2 and the torque sensor may have caused the automatic take off power control system (ATPCS):
+ Not being armed steadily during takeoff roll;
+ Being activated during initial climb which resulted in a complete ATPCS sequence including the engine number 2 autofeathering.
- The available evidence indicated the intermittent discontinuity between torque sensor and auto feather unit (AFU) number 2 was probably caused by the compromised soldering joints inside the AFU number 2.
Flight Operations
- The flight crew did not reject the take off when the automatic take off power control system ARM pushbutton did not light during the initial stages of the takeoff roll.
- TransAsia Airways did not have a clear documented company policy with associated instructions, procedures, and notices to crew for ATR72-600 operations communicating the requirement to reject the take off if the automatic take off power control system did not arm.
- Following the uncommanded autofeather of engine number 2, the flight crew failed to perform the documented failure identification procedure before executing any actions. That resulted in pilot flying’s confusion regarding the identification and nature of the actual propulsion system malfunction and he reduced power on the operative engine number 1.
- The flight crew’s non-compliance with TransAsia Airways ATR72-600 standard operating procedures - Abnormal and Emergency Procedures for an engine flame out at take off resulted in the pilot flying reducing power on and then shutting down the wrong engine.
- The loss of engine power during the initial climb and inappropriate flight control inputs by the pilot flying generated a series of stall warnings, including activation of the stick pusher. The crew did not respond to the stall warnings in a timely and effective manner.
- The loss of power from both engines was not detected and corrected by the crew in time to restart an engine. The aircraft stalled during the attempted restart at an altitude from which the aircraft could not recover from loss of control.
- Flight crew coordination, communication, and threat and error management (TEM) were less than effective, and compromised the safety of the flight. Both operating crew members failed to obtain relevant data from each other regarding the status of both engines at different points in the occurrence sequence. The pilot flying did not appropriately respond to or integrate input from the pilot monitoring.
Findings Related to Risk
Powerplant
- The engine manufacturer attempted to control intermittent continuity failures of the auto feather unit (AFU) by introducing a recommended inspection service bulletin at 12,000 flight hours to address aging issues. The two AFU failures at 1,624 flight hours and 1,206 flight hours show that causes of intermittent continuity failures of the AFU were not only related to aging but also to other previously undiscovered issues and that the inspection service bulletin implemented by the engine manufacturer to address this issue before the occurrence was not sufficiently effective. The engine manufacturer has issued a modification addressing the specific finding of this investigation. This new modification is currently implemented in all new production engines, and another service bulletin is available for retrofit.
Flight Operations
- Pilot flying’s decision to disconnect the autopilot shortly after the first master warning increased the pilot flying’s subsequent workload and reduced his capacity to assess and cope with the emergency situation.
- The omission of the required pre-take off briefing meant that the crew were not as mentally prepared as they could have been for the propulsion system malfunction they encountered after takeoff.
Airline Safety Management
- TransAsia Airways (TNA) did not follow its own procedures when selecting and training pilot flying for upgrade. The TNA’s quality assurance processes had not detected that the command selection upgrade process had been compromised.
- TransAsia Airways (TNA) did not use widely available crew resource management (CRM) guidelines to develop, implement, reinforce, and assess the effectiveness of their flight crew CRM training program.
- While the TransAsia Airways (TNA) ATR72-600 differences training program was consistent with the European Aviation Safety Agency ATR72 operational evaluation board report and compliant from a Civil Aeronautics Administration regulatory perspective, it may not have been sufficient to ensure that TNA flight crews were competent to operate the ATR72-600 under all normal procedures and a set of abnormal conditions.
- The ATR72-600 differences training records for the GE 235 flight crew showed that Captain A probably needed more training on the single engine flame out at take off procedure. That meant if the differences training records were stored, adequately maintained and evaluated by appropriate TransAsia Airways (TNA) flight operations and/or quality assurance personnel, the TNA would have had yet another opportunity to review Captain A’s ability to handle engine out emergencies.
- Captain A’s performance during the occurrence was consistent with his performance weaknesses noted during his training, including his continued difficulties in handling emergency and/or abnormal situations, including engine flame out at take off and single engine operations. However, TransAsia Airways did not effectively address the evident and imminent flight safety risk that Captain A presented.
Regulatory Oversight
- The Civil Aeronautics Administration’s (CAA) oversight of flight crew training, including crew resource management (CRM) training, is in need of improvement.
- The systemic TransAsia Airways (TNA) flight crew non-compliances with standard operating procedures identified in previous investigations, including GE 222, remained unaddressed at the time of the GE235 occurrence. Although the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) had conducted a special audit after the GE 222 accident which identified the standard operating procedures compliance issue, the CAA did not ensured that TNA responded to previously identified systemic safety issues in a timely manner to minimize the potential risk.
Other Findings
- The flight crew were certificated and qualified in accordance with Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) regulations and company requirements. There was no evidence to indicate that the flight crew’s performance might have been adversely affected by pre-existing medical conditions, fatigue, medication, other drugs or alcohol during the occurrence flight.
- Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the aircraft’s departure. No adverse weather conditions were present for the flight.
- The aircraft’s certificate of airworthiness and registration were current at the time of the occurrence. The occurrence aircraft was dispatched at Songshan Airport with no known defects and was in compliance with all applicable airworthiness directives and service bulletins. A review of the aircraft’s maintenance records before the occurrence flight revealed that there were no defects reported that related to engine number 2 automatic feathering system.
- Flight crew transferred from conventional flight instruments to a more advanced avionic suite with primary flight display, the visual pattern and information picked up by the crew in an emergency situation may not be retrieved at the same location with the same display.
- Although the influence of the flight director indication was not demonstrated in the occurrence flight and the logics of ATR flight director bars are consistent with other aircraft types within the industry, the simulator flight illustrated the flight director bars indication during stall warning were in contradiction with the automatic stall protection inputs and thus may disturb the crew.
- The ATR72 formal document has no general statement of rejecting take off policy and procedure of rejecting take off with both engines operative.
Five safety recommendations were released to the airline, four to Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration, two to the engine manufacturer, two to the aircraft manufacturer and three to the European Aviation Safety Agency.
The ASC summarized the analysis in their executive summary:
Had the crew prioritized their actions to stabilize the aircraft flight path, correctly identify the propulsion system malfunction which was the engine number 2 loss of thrust and then take actions in accordance with procedure of engine number 2 flame out at take off, the occurrence could have been prevented. The investigation report identified a range of contributing and other safety factors relating to the engine’s auto feather unit, crew of the aircraft, TransAsia’s flight operations and management processes, and the regulatory oversight of TransAsia by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).
http://avherald.com/h?article=48145bb3/0036&opt=0
Taiwan's ASC have released their final report in Chinese and executive summary in English concluding the probable causes of the crash were:
Findings Related to Probable Causes
Powerplant
- An intermittent signal discontinuity between the auto feather unit (AFU) number 2 and the torque sensor may have caused the automatic take off power control system (ATPCS):
+ Not being armed steadily during takeoff roll;
+ Being activated during initial climb which resulted in a complete ATPCS sequence including the engine number 2 autofeathering.
- The available evidence indicated the intermittent discontinuity between torque sensor and auto feather unit (AFU) number 2 was probably caused by the compromised soldering joints inside the AFU number 2.
Flight Operations
- The flight crew did not reject the take off when the automatic take off power control system ARM pushbutton did not light during the initial stages of the takeoff roll.
- TransAsia Airways did not have a clear documented company policy with associated instructions, procedures, and notices to crew for ATR72-600 operations communicating the requirement to reject the take off if the automatic take off power control system did not arm.
- Following the uncommanded autofeather of engine number 2, the flight crew failed to perform the documented failure identification procedure before executing any actions. That resulted in pilot flying’s confusion regarding the identification and nature of the actual propulsion system malfunction and he reduced power on the operative engine number 1.
- The flight crew’s non-compliance with TransAsia Airways ATR72-600 standard operating procedures - Abnormal and Emergency Procedures for an engine flame out at take off resulted in the pilot flying reducing power on and then shutting down the wrong engine.
- The loss of engine power during the initial climb and inappropriate flight control inputs by the pilot flying generated a series of stall warnings, including activation of the stick pusher. The crew did not respond to the stall warnings in a timely and effective manner.
- The loss of power from both engines was not detected and corrected by the crew in time to restart an engine. The aircraft stalled during the attempted restart at an altitude from which the aircraft could not recover from loss of control.
- Flight crew coordination, communication, and threat and error management (TEM) were less than effective, and compromised the safety of the flight. Both operating crew members failed to obtain relevant data from each other regarding the status of both engines at different points in the occurrence sequence. The pilot flying did not appropriately respond to or integrate input from the pilot monitoring.
Findings Related to Risk
Powerplant
- The engine manufacturer attempted to control intermittent continuity failures of the auto feather unit (AFU) by introducing a recommended inspection service bulletin at 12,000 flight hours to address aging issues. The two AFU failures at 1,624 flight hours and 1,206 flight hours show that causes of intermittent continuity failures of the AFU were not only related to aging but also to other previously undiscovered issues and that the inspection service bulletin implemented by the engine manufacturer to address this issue before the occurrence was not sufficiently effective. The engine manufacturer has issued a modification addressing the specific finding of this investigation. This new modification is currently implemented in all new production engines, and another service bulletin is available for retrofit.
Flight Operations
- Pilot flying’s decision to disconnect the autopilot shortly after the first master warning increased the pilot flying’s subsequent workload and reduced his capacity to assess and cope with the emergency situation.
- The omission of the required pre-take off briefing meant that the crew were not as mentally prepared as they could have been for the propulsion system malfunction they encountered after takeoff.
Airline Safety Management
- TransAsia Airways (TNA) did not follow its own procedures when selecting and training pilot flying for upgrade. The TNA’s quality assurance processes had not detected that the command selection upgrade process had been compromised.
- TransAsia Airways (TNA) did not use widely available crew resource management (CRM) guidelines to develop, implement, reinforce, and assess the effectiveness of their flight crew CRM training program.
- While the TransAsia Airways (TNA) ATR72-600 differences training program was consistent with the European Aviation Safety Agency ATR72 operational evaluation board report and compliant from a Civil Aeronautics Administration regulatory perspective, it may not have been sufficient to ensure that TNA flight crews were competent to operate the ATR72-600 under all normal procedures and a set of abnormal conditions.
- The ATR72-600 differences training records for the GE 235 flight crew showed that Captain A probably needed more training on the single engine flame out at take off procedure. That meant if the differences training records were stored, adequately maintained and evaluated by appropriate TransAsia Airways (TNA) flight operations and/or quality assurance personnel, the TNA would have had yet another opportunity to review Captain A’s ability to handle engine out emergencies.
- Captain A’s performance during the occurrence was consistent with his performance weaknesses noted during his training, including his continued difficulties in handling emergency and/or abnormal situations, including engine flame out at take off and single engine operations. However, TransAsia Airways did not effectively address the evident and imminent flight safety risk that Captain A presented.
Regulatory Oversight
- The Civil Aeronautics Administration’s (CAA) oversight of flight crew training, including crew resource management (CRM) training, is in need of improvement.
- The systemic TransAsia Airways (TNA) flight crew non-compliances with standard operating procedures identified in previous investigations, including GE 222, remained unaddressed at the time of the GE235 occurrence. Although the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) had conducted a special audit after the GE 222 accident which identified the standard operating procedures compliance issue, the CAA did not ensured that TNA responded to previously identified systemic safety issues in a timely manner to minimize the potential risk.
Other Findings
- The flight crew were certificated and qualified in accordance with Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) regulations and company requirements. There was no evidence to indicate that the flight crew’s performance might have been adversely affected by pre-existing medical conditions, fatigue, medication, other drugs or alcohol during the occurrence flight.
- Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the aircraft’s departure. No adverse weather conditions were present for the flight.
- The aircraft’s certificate of airworthiness and registration were current at the time of the occurrence. The occurrence aircraft was dispatched at Songshan Airport with no known defects and was in compliance with all applicable airworthiness directives and service bulletins. A review of the aircraft’s maintenance records before the occurrence flight revealed that there were no defects reported that related to engine number 2 automatic feathering system.
- Flight crew transferred from conventional flight instruments to a more advanced avionic suite with primary flight display, the visual pattern and information picked up by the crew in an emergency situation may not be retrieved at the same location with the same display.
- Although the influence of the flight director indication was not demonstrated in the occurrence flight and the logics of ATR flight director bars are consistent with other aircraft types within the industry, the simulator flight illustrated the flight director bars indication during stall warning were in contradiction with the automatic stall protection inputs and thus may disturb the crew.
- The ATR72 formal document has no general statement of rejecting take off policy and procedure of rejecting take off with both engines operative.
Five safety recommendations were released to the airline, four to Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration, two to the engine manufacturer, two to the aircraft manufacturer and three to the European Aviation Safety Agency.
The ASC summarized the analysis in their executive summary:
Had the crew prioritized their actions to stabilize the aircraft flight path, correctly identify the propulsion system malfunction which was the engine number 2 loss of thrust and then take actions in accordance with procedure of engine number 2 flame out at take off, the occurrence could have been prevented. The investigation report identified a range of contributing and other safety factors relating to the engine’s auto feather unit, crew of the aircraft, TransAsia’s flight operations and management processes, and the regulatory oversight of TransAsia by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).
http://avherald.com/h?article=48145bb3/0036&opt=0
Sarà banale ma mi sembra di poter dire che una risposta semplice non la si può dare, c'è appunto da leggersi tutto per bene. Sarà banale ma anche in questo caso è una catena di eventi e responsabilità che ha portato all'incidente.
E' umana la reazione oggettivamente sbagliata nello spegnere il motore buono
Questo deriva da un briefing pre decollo non fatto, ma anche da procedure che evidentemente consentono di saltarlo a piè pari, ma anche da addestramento male eseguito e male recepito (il pilota sottoperformava anche al simulatore).
Il tutto con un problema tecnico che ha reso inoperativo un motore. E un mix di altre cosette.
Non si fosse rotto il motore non saremmo qui a parlarne, se si fosse rotto e avessimo avuto un top gun ai comandi lo stesso, il fatto che il pilota non fosse particolarmente abile si poteva evitare con formazione adeguata, le procedure potevano essere migliori, il check sul collegamento del poteva essere istruito prima...
Se comunque una quota di errore umano c'è stata, e io lo penso, non è tutta attribuibile agli umani nel cockpit.
Come sempre, una catena.
