Assolti i 4 dirigenti Helios Airways accusati di omicidio colposo


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Four former airline officials were acquitted Wednesday of manslaughter and other charges in the unusual crash of a Cypriot airliner six years ago that killed 121 passengers, while victims' relatives jeered the ruling inside a packed courtroom in the island's capital of Nicosia.

In a majority decision, a panel of three judges ruled there was no evidence presented during the two-year trial that the defendants were linked to what caused the crash. The prosecution had argued that the defendants failed to prevent the aircraft from being flown by "unsuitable and inadequate" pilots.

The judges also ruled that the prosecution failed to prove that German pilot Hans-Juergen Merten and his Cypriot co-pilot Charalambos Charalambous didn't meet the minimum standards required to do their job.

"Regardless...how the charges are viewed, they remain groundless and without supporting evidence," the judges said in their 170-page decision. "It's judged that this reason is sufficient to dismiss all charges and acquit all defendants."

The Aug. 14, 2005, crash of the Helios Airways Boeing 737-300 aircraft on a hillside north of Athens killed everyone on board and sent shockwaves through this small east Mediterranean island of 800,000 people.

The plane had been on a flight from Cyprus' main airport of Larnaca to Prague, Czech Republic via Athens.

Greek investigators have said human error was to blame for the crash, which piqued international curiosity about the peculiar circumstances under which it unfolded. Investigators established that cabin pressure failure knocked out the pilots soon after takeoff from Larnaca airport.

The aircraft reached Athens on autopilot, but crashed after running out of fuel. A Greek fighter pilot scrambled to intercept the unresponsive jet reported seeing a man who managed to stay conscious enter the flight deck and try to pilot the plane, but to no avail.

The judges referred to testimony suggesting that despite a sound alarm, the pilots had apparently failed to notice and adjust — either before or after takeoff — a switch that would have automatically pressurized the cabin during the flight.

An autopsy showed that all the passengers were alive at the time of impact, but were in a deep comatose state because of the prolonged lack of oxygen, the court said.

The defendants included former managing director of Helios Airways Demetris Pantazis, the airline's former chief executive Andreas Drakos, chief pilot Ianko Stoimenov, operations director George Kikides and the defunct airline as a legal entity.

The manslaughter charge carried a maximum life sentence. The defendants also had faced a lesser charge of causing death by recklessness.

The ruling angered victims' relatives inside the stuffy courtroom. Some shouted "killers," and "is this justice?" as bailiffs spirited the defendants outside after the dissenting judge finished reading his opinion.

Outside the courthouse, relatives dressed in black clutched photographs of victims and wept, while others heaped abuse on lawyers exiting the building whom they thought had represented the defendants.

"Where should I go now, should I go to the cemetery again?" asked Maro Makridou, whose daughter, son-in-law and three children perished in the crash. Makridou said relatives are looking into appealing the decision.
 
The judges referred to testimony suggesting that despite a sound alarm, the pilots had apparently failed to notice and adjust — either before or after takeoff — a switch that would have automatically pressurized the cabin during the flight.

Uno dei casi RE da aula CRM.
Pieno rispetto per le vittime e per chi in maniera brusca e orribile ha perso la vita. Da brividi studiare questo caso in un'aula di CRM, davvero.
Mi consola sapere almeno che grazie a ciò che si è saputo da questo incidente sono cambiate radicalmente le procedure di comunicazione cockpit/cabina e l'approccio a quella patologia subdola chiamata ipossia, in grado di tramortire in pochi minuti due professionisti dell'aria.
Purtroppo per quanto sia brutto da dire, la sicurezza di oggi è frutto della vita e del sangue lasciato dagli altri.
A volte mi chiedo quanto il fattore umano possa essere materiale di discussione e riflessione non solo nel mondo dell'aviazione, ma anche nell'istruzione elementare degli studenti e per la sicurezza su qualsiasi luogo di lavoro. Le forze armate sotto questo aspetto già si stanno muovendo.
Un momento di riflessione per tutti coloro che devono garantire la sicurezza dei passeggeri, ai loro tempi, e con le loro procedure di quel tempo TUTTI noi avremmo potuto fare esattamente gli stessi errori e causare lo stesso disastro. Anche qui, una telefonata, poteva veramente allungare la vita.
 
Riporto dal rapporto di inchiesta:

Causes

Direct Causes

Non-recognition that the cabin pressurization mode selector was in the MAN (manual) position during the performance of the:
a) Preflight procedure;
b) Before Start checklist; and
c) After Takeoff checklist.
Non-identification of the warnings and the reasons for the activation of the warnings (cabin altitude warning horn, passenger oxygen masks deployment indication, Master Caution), and continuation of the climb.
Incapacitation of the flight crew due to hypoxia, resulting in continuation of the flight via the flight management computer and the autopilot, depletion of the fuel and engine flameout, and impact of the aircraft with the ground.

Latent causes

The Operator’s deficiencies in organization, quality management and safety culture, documented diachronically as findings in numerous audits.
The Regulatory Authority’s diachronic inadequate execution of its oversight responsibilities to ensure the safety of operations of the airlines under its supervision and its inadequate responses to findings of deficiencies documented in numerous audits.
Inadequate application of Crew Resource Management (CRM) principles by the flight crew.
Ineffectiveness and inadequacy of measures taken by the manufacturer in response to previous pressurization incidents in the particular type of aircraft, both with regard to modifications to aircraft systems as well as to guidance to the crews.

Contributing Factors to the Accident

Omission of returning the pressurization mode selector to AUTO after un- scheduled maintenance on the aircraft.
Lack of specific procedures (on an international basis) for cabin crew procedures to address the situation of loss of pressurization, passenger oxygen masks deployment, and continuation of the aircraft ascent (climb).
Ineffectiveness of international aviation authorities to enforce implementation of corrective action plans after relevant audits.

Per chi volesse approfondire

http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/F15FBD7320037284C2257204002B6243/$file/FINAL%20REPORT%205B-DBY.pdf