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Air France to Disclose Review's Criticisms
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704213404576100302858460220.html
Air France to Disclose Review's Criticisms
By ANDY PASZTOR And DANIEL MICHAELS
(WSJ) Air France-KLM SA, in a bid for greater openness, is slated to release the findings of an independent review broadly critical of some of the airline's past safety practices and internal safeguards.The conclusions, which cap a wide-ranging, yearlong assessment by an international panel of eight aviation experts hand-picked by senior Air France officials, are expected to be unveiled Monday, according to people familiar with the issue. The review is unusual not only because of its frequently critical tone, but also because the airline's management tentatively plans to make portions public.
Among other things, the report is expected to question some of the carrier's pilot-training efforts, highlight lapses in cockpit discipline over the years and stress the importance of making flight crews more proficient in dealing with onboard automation failures.
Overall, people close to the process said, the report has identified various shortcomings in the traditional safety culture of Europe's second-largest airline. As a result, these people said, the report is expected to recommend a wide range of procedural and internal oversight changes, partly intended to ensure that details of incidents and safety threats are quickly analyzed and communicated throughout the carrier.
Air France already has adopted many of the recommendations, which is likely to take some of the sting out of the criticism. Still, safety experts said it was unusual for a large company, especially an airline, to give outsiders such latitude publicly to expose gaps in safety systems.
The project was initiated by Chairman Jean-Cyril Spinetta in late 2009, six months after the crash of an Air France Airbus A330, which killed all 228 people aboard en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. The cause remains unknown-with search teams continuing to look for Flight 447's data recorders-but the crash immediately focused attention on Air France's safety record and pilot training.
Over the weekend, company officials and members of the study team-led by former Boeing Co. safety executive and U.S. human-factors specialist Curt Graeber-declined to comment on specifics before the report's official release. Other members of the team include Nick Sabatini, the former top safety official at the Federal Aviation Administration; John Marshall, former head of safety at Delta Air Lines Inc.; and David Woods, a risk-management specialist and Ohio State University professor.
"I can't think of another example of a major airline bringing in this kind of high-powered group for such a comprehensive review," said Bill Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation, a global air-safety advocacy organization based in Alexandria, Va. "It's extraordinary that they are willing to release the results," said Mr. Voss. The process "gives me confidence there will be follow-through."
In addition to focusing on specific training, technical and flight-safety issues, according to people tracking the report, portions are expected to touch on aspects of the strained pilot-management relations that have roiled Air France in the past. The study team briefed Air France-KLM Chief Executive Pierre-Henri Gourgeon on Friday
The report calls for making pilot-training sessions more realistic, partly by including actual in-flight incidents involving Air France pilots in periodic simulator sessions. Some safety managers inside the company had concluded that simulator training needed to be updated and varied to enhance pilot skills. For years, many large carriers in the U.S. and other regions have routinely incorporated recent, real-life scenarios in simulators.
Reflecting the latest safety priorities of European plane maker Airbus, a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co., the review also encourages steps to help pilots use stand-by instruments if automated systems fail or provide suspect readings. Other safety experts have identified longstanding training shortcomings and management weaknesses at many airlines around the globe to help crews respond to such emergencies.
The panel, known as the Independent Safety Review Team, is slated formally to present its report Monday to an Air France committee that includes representatives of both management and trade unions, according to an airline spokesman.
The carrier had four significant crashes between 1999 and 2009. Mr. Gourgeon previously said the carrier's safety record before the Rio crash was better than the global industry average, but afterward was only average. Following the 2009 accident, Air France and its pilots sparred over safety procedures and training. Many air-safety specialists outside the airline suggested a contributing factor in the crash was improper response by the pilots to faulty speed sensors.
Air France pilot unions spoke critically of the carrier's training, while many outsiders criticized the safety record of Air France pilots.
In the fall of 2009, Air France sent a memo to its cockpit crew members instructing them to follow safety procedures more closely and stop criticizing the carrier. The airline's largest pilot union said the memo was inappropriate.
Since then, Air France safety officials have made presentations at industrywide safety conferences emphasizing the importance of pilots strictly following internal rules and procedures for deciding when to land, or break off airport approaches, in poor visibility and stormy weather. The carrier also has worked extensively with Airbus and Boeing safety experts, among others, to better understand the dangers of tiny ice particles clogging external speed sensors and causing flight-control computers to malfunction.
The independent review marked the second time in six years that Air France initiated a sweeping safety assessment of its operations. In the wake of a 2005 crash of an Air France A340 on landing in Toronto, management commissioned an internal review. The plane caught fire and was destroyed after rolling off the runway, but there were no fatalities.
Finished in 2006, that report was distributed to more than 4,000 company pilots and was widely praised for its frankness about shortcomings within the carrier. Although Air France has said its executive committee made formal decisions to implement the report's recommendations, critics of the airline continue to maintain management didn't aggressively pursue the changes.
Following the 2009 crash of the A330, which took off from Rio and was going through a violent thunderstorm, Air France quickly replaced some onboard air-speed indicators on certain of its Airbus planes before the equipment swaps were mandated by regulators. The airline also issued alerts warning pilots about the proper use of onboard radars to identify the size and intensity of storms.
The latest team of experts had a sweeping mandate to look into everything from general pilot decision making to how effectively Air France collects, assesses and distributes data stemming from safety lapses that could be warning signs of future incidents or accidents.
There have been numerous signs of management's sensitivity about the findings: Air France twice before delayed announcing completion of the outside review, and over the weekend a spokesman indicated it wasn't clear exactly how the findings would become public.
Air France to Disclose Review's Criticisms
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704213404576100302858460220.html
Air France to Disclose Review's Criticisms
By ANDY PASZTOR And DANIEL MICHAELS
(WSJ) Air France-KLM SA, in a bid for greater openness, is slated to release the findings of an independent review broadly critical of some of the airline's past safety practices and internal safeguards.The conclusions, which cap a wide-ranging, yearlong assessment by an international panel of eight aviation experts hand-picked by senior Air France officials, are expected to be unveiled Monday, according to people familiar with the issue. The review is unusual not only because of its frequently critical tone, but also because the airline's management tentatively plans to make portions public.
Among other things, the report is expected to question some of the carrier's pilot-training efforts, highlight lapses in cockpit discipline over the years and stress the importance of making flight crews more proficient in dealing with onboard automation failures.
Overall, people close to the process said, the report has identified various shortcomings in the traditional safety culture of Europe's second-largest airline. As a result, these people said, the report is expected to recommend a wide range of procedural and internal oversight changes, partly intended to ensure that details of incidents and safety threats are quickly analyzed and communicated throughout the carrier.
Air France already has adopted many of the recommendations, which is likely to take some of the sting out of the criticism. Still, safety experts said it was unusual for a large company, especially an airline, to give outsiders such latitude publicly to expose gaps in safety systems.
The project was initiated by Chairman Jean-Cyril Spinetta in late 2009, six months after the crash of an Air France Airbus A330, which killed all 228 people aboard en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. The cause remains unknown-with search teams continuing to look for Flight 447's data recorders-but the crash immediately focused attention on Air France's safety record and pilot training.
Over the weekend, company officials and members of the study team-led by former Boeing Co. safety executive and U.S. human-factors specialist Curt Graeber-declined to comment on specifics before the report's official release. Other members of the team include Nick Sabatini, the former top safety official at the Federal Aviation Administration; John Marshall, former head of safety at Delta Air Lines Inc.; and David Woods, a risk-management specialist and Ohio State University professor.
"I can't think of another example of a major airline bringing in this kind of high-powered group for such a comprehensive review," said Bill Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation, a global air-safety advocacy organization based in Alexandria, Va. "It's extraordinary that they are willing to release the results," said Mr. Voss. The process "gives me confidence there will be follow-through."
In addition to focusing on specific training, technical and flight-safety issues, according to people tracking the report, portions are expected to touch on aspects of the strained pilot-management relations that have roiled Air France in the past. The study team briefed Air France-KLM Chief Executive Pierre-Henri Gourgeon on Friday
The report calls for making pilot-training sessions more realistic, partly by including actual in-flight incidents involving Air France pilots in periodic simulator sessions. Some safety managers inside the company had concluded that simulator training needed to be updated and varied to enhance pilot skills. For years, many large carriers in the U.S. and other regions have routinely incorporated recent, real-life scenarios in simulators.
Reflecting the latest safety priorities of European plane maker Airbus, a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co., the review also encourages steps to help pilots use stand-by instruments if automated systems fail or provide suspect readings. Other safety experts have identified longstanding training shortcomings and management weaknesses at many airlines around the globe to help crews respond to such emergencies.
The panel, known as the Independent Safety Review Team, is slated formally to present its report Monday to an Air France committee that includes representatives of both management and trade unions, according to an airline spokesman.
The carrier had four significant crashes between 1999 and 2009. Mr. Gourgeon previously said the carrier's safety record before the Rio crash was better than the global industry average, but afterward was only average. Following the 2009 accident, Air France and its pilots sparred over safety procedures and training. Many air-safety specialists outside the airline suggested a contributing factor in the crash was improper response by the pilots to faulty speed sensors.
Air France pilot unions spoke critically of the carrier's training, while many outsiders criticized the safety record of Air France pilots.
In the fall of 2009, Air France sent a memo to its cockpit crew members instructing them to follow safety procedures more closely and stop criticizing the carrier. The airline's largest pilot union said the memo was inappropriate.
Since then, Air France safety officials have made presentations at industrywide safety conferences emphasizing the importance of pilots strictly following internal rules and procedures for deciding when to land, or break off airport approaches, in poor visibility and stormy weather. The carrier also has worked extensively with Airbus and Boeing safety experts, among others, to better understand the dangers of tiny ice particles clogging external speed sensors and causing flight-control computers to malfunction.
The independent review marked the second time in six years that Air France initiated a sweeping safety assessment of its operations. In the wake of a 2005 crash of an Air France A340 on landing in Toronto, management commissioned an internal review. The plane caught fire and was destroyed after rolling off the runway, but there were no fatalities.
Finished in 2006, that report was distributed to more than 4,000 company pilots and was widely praised for its frankness about shortcomings within the carrier. Although Air France has said its executive committee made formal decisions to implement the report's recommendations, critics of the airline continue to maintain management didn't aggressively pursue the changes.
Following the 2009 crash of the A330, which took off from Rio and was going through a violent thunderstorm, Air France quickly replaced some onboard air-speed indicators on certain of its Airbus planes before the equipment swaps were mandated by regulators. The airline also issued alerts warning pilots about the proper use of onboard radars to identify the size and intensity of storms.
The latest team of experts had a sweeping mandate to look into everything from general pilot decision making to how effectively Air France collects, assesses and distributes data stemming from safety lapses that could be warning signs of future incidents or accidents.
There have been numerous signs of management's sensitivity about the findings: Air France twice before delayed announcing completion of the outside review, and over the weekend a spokesman indicated it wasn't clear exactly how the findings would become public.