Aeroflot compra Transaero


Russia’s largest airline, Aeroflot, will acquire Transaero Airlines, according to a Transaero statement.
A government commission backed the acquisition in a meeting led by First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Transaero said.
“In the interests of the development of the commercial aviation and creating one of the largest in the world group of airlines, the commission has approved the acquisition of JSC Transaero Airlines by Aeroflot Group,” the statement said. “The shareholders of Transaero Airlines believe this measure will serve the interests of passengers, personnel and partners of the airline.”
No other details of the transaction were released.
In May, Transaero reported a 2014 net loss of RUB14.5 billion ($255 million). Aeroflot Group reported 1H 2015 net loss of RUB3.541 billion ($60 million) up 85.9% year-over-year.

atwonline
 
Ultima modifica:
La russa Aeroflot vola in aiuto dei connazionali di Transaero. La compagnia aerea, detenuta al 51% dal governo di Mosca, acquisterà il 75% del vettore concorrente per la cifra simbolica di 1 rublo.
Secondo i termini dell’accordo, benedetto dal vice premier Igor Shuvalov, Aeroflot si accollerà il debito netto di quasi un miliardo e mezzo di euro di Transaero, che oggi attraversa delle forti turbolenze a causa della crisi economica russa.
Il braccio di ferro geopolitico tra Mosca e l’Occidente ha portato ad una riduzione della domanda di voli a lungo raggio, riducendo drasticamente le entrate del settore.

euronews
 
E fu cosí che SU si trovò con quasi 40 aerei di lungo raggio in più (747, 767 e 777). Inoltre, dal prossimo anno dovrebbero entrare in flotta i 380 come sostituzione dei 747-400.

Quasi tutti gli aerei di lungo sono configurati a 4 classi (first inclusa) mentre i nuovi B737 hanno la business sostanzialmente molto simile a quella di SU.
 
E fu cosí che SU si trovò con quasi 40 aerei di lungo raggio in più (747, 767 e 777). Inoltre, dal prossimo anno dovrebbero entrare in flotta i 380 come sostituzione dei 747-400.

Quasi tutti gli aerei di lungo sono configurati a 4 classi (first inclusa) mentre i nuovi B737 hanno la business sostanzialmente molto simile a quella di SU.

inoltre con questa mossa credo si sia aggiudicata praticamente la totalità del traffico interno.
 
E fu cosí che SU si trovò con quasi 40 aerei di lungo raggio in più (747, 767 e 777). Inoltre, dal prossimo anno dovrebbero entrare in flotta i 380 come sostituzione dei 747-400.

Quasi tutti gli aerei di lungo sono configurati a 4 classi (first inclusa) mentre i nuovi B737 hanno la business sostanzialmente molto simile a quella di SU.

Secondo voi A380 e 747-8 in ordine da Transaero verranno comunque presi in consegna? Pare che ultimamente anche Aeroflot non navighi in acque calmissime, anzi ha cancellato qualche mese fa un ordine per una ventina di 787, mi sembra di ricordare...
 
Transaero viene ricordata per la sua flotta eterogenea. Di tutto un po'.
 
Secondo voi A380 e 747-8 in ordine da Transaero verranno comunque presi in consegna? Pare che ultimamente anche Aeroflot non navighi in acque calmissime, anzi ha cancellato qualche mese fa un ordine per una ventina di 787, mi sembra di ricordare...
Visto che l'aereo più grande nella flotta di SU è il 77W, ho grossi dubbi sull'arrivo di 380 e 748.
 
inoltre con questa mossa credo si sia aggiudicata praticamente la totalità del traffico interno.

Sul lungo raggio assolutamente si! Non mi viene in mente nessuna altra compagnia che attualmente abbia voli da Mosca verso destinazioni piu' orientali di Novosibirsk (che comunque sono un 5 ore di volo)
Sul corto, in pratica tutta la Russia europea, diciamo che va' a dar fastidio sia ad S7 a DME che a UN a VKO. E specialmente S7 ha da DME ancora molte più frequenze e può contare sui transiti che gli alleati di OneWorld gli forniscono. Stavo facendo due calcoli velocissimi ed in alcuni momenti sulla MOW - LED ci sarà un volo ogni 15 minuti...
Interessantissime, secondo me, sono per SU le rotte verso le destinazioni petrolifere in Kazakhstan attualmente non presenti nel network SU.


Dovrebero mantenere i due marchi, altrimenti cosa succede delle rotte in cui Transaero e' la seconda designata (per esempio Londra Mosca), subentrera' S7?
La soluzione potrebbe essere quella utilizzata con Rossija: Stessa società e stesso programma Frequent Flyer ma 2 livree e 2 AOC differenti.
 
Esiste un antitrust russo? Conquistando una fetta enorme del mercato interno, SU di fatto ottiene un monopolio esteso. Chissà se dovranno cedere un tot di slot a destra e a manca per far passare l'accordo, così come hanno già fatto US e AA in scali come DCA...

Inviato dal mio SM-G920F utilizzando Tapatalk
 
Esiste un antitrust russo? Conquistando una fetta enorme del mercato interno, SU di fatto ottiene un monopolio esteso. Chissà se dovranno cedere un tot di slot a destra e a manca per far passare l'accordo, così come hanno già fatto US e AA in scali come DCA...

Inviato dal mio SM-G920F utilizzando Tapatalk

L'errore che spesso commettiamo è ragionare con la nostra mentalità e le nostre regole, ma in gran parte del mondo vigono regole e logiche diverse....
 
In pratica succederà verosimilmente quello che è già successo nel recente passato con la Rossiya di San Pietroburgo, Aeroflot ha acquisito il 75% del capitale........adesso FV vola con unico codice quello di "SU" dal 30 marzo 2014, sebbene esista formalmente ancora il vettore ma non ha più identità e autonomia.

A titolo d'esempio

AEROFLOT - SU 6276
Planned Flight Information
Airport Arriving Day Departing Day Meal Elapsed Flying Time
Fiumicino (FCO), Rome, Italy - - 13:05 Tuesday Yes 3:40
Pulkovo (LED), St Petersburg, Russia 18:45 Tuesday - - - -

AIRCRAFT OWNER ROSSIYA AIRLINES
OPERATED BY ROSSIYA AIRLINES
 
Esiste un antitrust russo? Conquistando una fetta enorme del mercato interno, SU di fatto ottiene un monopolio esteso. Chissà se dovranno cedere un tot di slot a destra e a manca per far passare l'accordo, così come hanno già fatto US e AA in scali come DCA...

Inviato dal mio SM-G920F utilizzando Tapatalk

Il concetto di "posizione dominante" viene valutato in modo differente. Ad esempio si può non applicare se la società dimostra che il consumatore finale ha gli stessi (o maggiori) benefici che avrebbe in caso di concorrenza oppure se i vantaggi del consumatore sono gli stessi della società presunta monopolista

Comunque mi mancherà la sua livrea (foto fatta questa mattina dalla lounge di S7 subito dopo l'evacuazione d'emergenza di DME)

dbcb221f9f2eb3cf870ab9b6bd8d9051.jpg



Inviato dal mio iPhone utilizzando Tapatalk
 
As Russia braces itself for a brutal winter, with economic conditions to match, Transaero and its prospective new owner Aeroflot must prepare for a similarly arduous journey toward integration and ultimate business transformation.


The initial obstacles to be surmounted – approval by shareholders and the competition authorities – pale into insignificance compared with those lying further down the road. One that looms large is the mismatch between the carriers’ fleets.


Transaero’s 98 in-service aircraft – 91 of which are Boeings – have an average age of 16 years, versus a mere five years for Aeroflot’s 163 aircraft, which comprise 118 Airbus jets, 25 Boeings and 20 Sukhoi Superjets. Swingeing fleet cuts must surely lie ahead, and Transaero’s 13 737-500s seem the prime candidates for phase-out. Those narrowbodies have an average age of 19 years, and likely don’t retain much residual value. Transaero and Aeroflot both operate fleets of much newer 737-800s, and both fly A321s too, though Aeroflot has many more of these than Transaero.


Decisions on how to streamline the long-haul fleet are for the longer term. Transaero’s in-service widebody fleet of 45 aircraft – 14 747s ,18 767s and 13 777s – is bigger than Aeroflot’s, which consists of 13 777s and 22 A330s, though the flag carrier also has A350s on order. A big question mark overhangs the fate of Transaero’s four on-order A380s. In any negotiations with Airbus on these, Aeroflot can be at least emboldened with the knowledge that the European airframer will be keen on retaining a Russian customer in the interests of a diversified customer base for the double-deck type.


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More broadly, Aeroflot-Transaero will need to rationalise various dollar-denominated lease deals, given the impact on revenue of the sharply depreciated rouble.


Before any long-haul fleet plan can be finalised, however, there are huge cultural challenges to address. Even aside from its focus on leisure-market charter flying, Transaero is a very different animal from state-owned Aeroflot. Under the leadership of Olga Pleshakova – who has featured in Fortune’s list of the 50 most powerful women in business – Transaero has had the air of a confident, modernising private-sector independent, and a philosophical clash seems inevitable as the airline joins the powerful host of regional carriers that have been subsumed by Aeroflot since the early 1990s.


At middle-management levels, perhaps, a coming-together of like minds is possible, but there has already been a strong hint that big changes will happen higher up the managerial chain. Almost immediately after news of the putative Aeroflot deal broke, it emerged that Pleshakova had been succeeded as Transaero chief executive by Dmitry Yerzakovich. She will now chair the airline.


The Russian government’s motivation in moving to secure the future of Transaero is multifaceted. Beyond the potential integration benefits which could be brought by the creation of an integrated carrier, there lies the significant weight of the Transaero debt mountain owed to state-banking institutions such as Vnesheconombank and Sberbank.


With the nation’s carriers queuing up for assistance from government, it makes sense for the authorities to simplify negotiations – and perhaps reduce the level of payouts – by effecting market consolidation, albeit that UTair’s situation had seemed more dire than Transaero’s. Likewise, the move dovetails with a narrative of state-directed integration and streamlining within Russia’s aerospace industry generally.


However, it is equally a blow to market competition. With UTair deep in the red, Russia may soon be a country of two-and-a-half airlines, with only S7 as a sizeable independent and the shadow of the state extending ever further.


But if Aeroflot-Transaero can be seen as a victory for pragmatism in the face of adverse market conditions, it is very far from a quick fix. Industry watchers and passengers should prepare for a tedious, long-drawn-out process, knotted with complexity. The only cold comfort for the Russian government may lie in the knowledge that it may be easier to embark on this journey now, rather than be forced to take action later in 2016, after that inevitable bad winter.

flightglobal
 
[h=1]Aeroflot back in operating profit in 1H. Transaero acquisition to take its market share close to 50%[/h]

aeroflot_logo-200x.png

The Aeroflot Group turned around an operating loss in 1H2014 into a profit in 1H2015. The depreciation of the RUB served to boost both revenue and operating costs, with a net negative impact, but Aeroflot managed to grow its RASK more rapidly than its CASK.
The Ukraine crisis and tense international relations continue to weigh on demand for travel to/fromRussia. But demand for domestic flights is growing strongly.
Moreover, Aeroflot is taking advantage of capacity reductions by cautious international rivals and struggling domestic competitors to increase its leading share of the Russian air transport market. The group's market share now looks set to jump to embrace almost a half of all passengers to/from/within Russia once it completes the acquisition of second ranked Transaero.

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[h=2]Operating result returns to profit in 1H2015[/h]In 1H2015, the Aeroflot Group made a net loss of RUB3.451 billion (EUR54 million), which was 86% wider than its loss in the same period a year earlier. However, this year's result was adversely affected by an unrealised RUB8.848 billion (EUR137 million) loss onhedging derivatives.
The operating result, which more closely reflects the underlying performance of the business, was a profit of RUB5.886 billion (EUR91 million) in 1H2015, turning around from an operating loss of RUB1.384 billion (EUR29 million) in 1H2014. Revenue increased by 25.8% to RUB 176.467 billion (EUR2.736 billion) and the operating margin improved by 4.3ppts to 3.3%.
Adjusting for non-recurring expenses (which include RUB1.639 billion for the early return of aircraft at Orenair and Rossiya Airlines and RUB567 million for a fixed asset write off at Vladavia), the operating result was RUB8.072 billion (EUR125 million) in 1H2015, compared with a small profit of RUB713 million (EUR48 million) a year earlier.
See related report: Aeroflot Group suffers first 1H net loss in many years as geopolitical backdrop starts to show
Aeroflot Group financial highlights: 1H2015 vs 1H2014
SU1.JPG

1 EBITDAR = EBITDA + operating lease expenses;
2 Non-recurring expenses in 2015 include pre-term return of aircraft at Orenair and Rossiya airlines, fixed assets write off at Vladavia, derivatives and FX effects
Source: Aeroflot

Aeroflot Group development of operating income (RUB million): 1H2014 to 1H2015
SU2.JPG

* Pricing and other factors
** Excluding currency impact
*** Custom Duties
**** Non-recurring expenses include pre-term return of aircraft at Orenair and Rossiya Airlines, fixed assets write off at Vladavia
Source: Aeroflot

[h=2]Group ASKs up 8.7%; strong domestic growth but international contraction[/h]The Aeroflot Group increased its capacity in ASKs by 8.7% in 1H2015 and this was matched by growth in RPKs, so that load factor remained flat at 75.7%. Domestic ASKs grew by 32.2%, but the group's international ASKs were cut by 4.5% as demand continued to soften as a result of the geopolitical environment.
The group outpaced growth in the total Russian market
Passenger numbers increased at the faster rate of 14.0%, concentrated in the domestic market (+33.4%), while traffic fell in international markets (-4.9%). The group outpaced growth in the total Russian market, where passenger numbers fell by 3.9% in 1H2015 (domestic passengers up 13.4% and international passengers down 15.6%).
The parent Aeroflot airline's passenger numbers grew by 9.3%, with increases recorded in both the international market (+7.4%) and the domestic market (+11.5%). The parent airline's load factor was 76.9% (+0.4 ppts), compared with the combined load factor of its subsidiary airlines of 71.8% (-1.5 ppts).
Aeroflot Group and JSC Aeroflot passenger traffic statistics: 1H2015 vs 1H2014
SU3.JPG

Source: Aeroflot

[h=2]Double digit capacity growth to Asia[/h]By region, the Aeroflot Group's strongest growth outside the domestic market was in Asia, with an ASK increase of 14.7%. In spite of this strong capacity growth, the group's load factor in Asia gained 4.1 ppts.
On European routes, ASKs were up by 3.4% and load factor was roughly flat (+0.1 ppts). There was also capacity growth in the Middle East (ASKs +8.6%), although here load factor dipped by 2.2 ppts as demand weakened on flights to Turkey.
Aeroflot's strategy of growing international transfer traffic through its hub at Moscow Sheremetyevo also stimulated growth on routes to Asia and Europe
Traffic growth to Asia and Europe was helped by higher capacity on some routes and by what Aeroflot called a "softening competitive landscape" as many foreign airlines cut capacity to/from Russia. Aeroflot's strategy of growing international transfer traffic through its hub atMoscow Sheremetyevo also stimulated growth on routes to Asia and Europe.
The group cut its ASKs to the Americas by 10.0%, reflecting its withdrawal from "commercially inefficient" routes to Toronto, Cancun and Punta Cana. The capacity cut helped to drive a 2.9 ppt load factor gain on flights to the region.
The group also cut ASKs on CIS routes, albeit at the lesser rate of 1.3%, but managed a 2.5 ppt gain in load factor in the region.
Aeroflot Group growth in passengers, ASK and RPK by region 1H2015
SU4.JPG

Source: Aeroflot

[h=2]Aeroflot revenue increased by 26% in 1H2015[/h]Aeroflot group revenue increased by 25.8% year on year, faster than the 8.7% increase in ASKs. The weakening of the RUB against USD and other international currencies boosted revenue by RUB30.904 billion (EUR479 million), accounting for 85% of the incremental revenue versus last year.
Scheduled passenger revenue was up 30%, while charter revenue plummeted by 71%. Cargo revenue grew by 16.3% and other revenue increased by 39.9%.
Scheduled passenger revenue grew fastest in Asia, where it grew by 58.5%, much faster than the 14.7% ASK growth in the region. There was also strong revenue growth on routes in Russia (+33.6%, a little faster than ASK growth), CIS (+23.3%), Middle East(+22.1%) and Europe (+19.2%). Domestic routes accounted for 40% of traffic revenue, followed by Europe (26%) and Asia (17%).
Aeroflot Group revenues: 1H2015 vs 1H2014
SU5.JPG

Source: Aeroflot

Aeroflot Group passenger traffic revenue by region 1H2015 vs 1H2014
SU6.JPG

Source: Aeroflot (based on management accounting)

[h=2]Passenger RASK up 12.4%[/h]The Aeroflot group's passenger revenue per ASK grew by 12.4%, or by 13.8% excluding its LCC subsidiary Pobeda, driven by yieldgrowth (particularly on international markets). The domestic market experienced a 3.7% increase in yield, but this was offset by a dip in load factor so that domestic scheduled passenger revenue per ASK grew by only 0.7%.
On international markets, yield was up 18.7% and passenger RASK was up 21.6%. Currency movements had a significant positive impact on international yields.
Aeroflot attributed its yield improvement to "active revenue management", in addition to the positive impact of RUB devaluation on yield on inbound and transit routes. Moreover, the negative impact of reductions in EUR denominated outbound fares is being reduced. The group said that the "aggressive pricing" of domestic competitors was affecting yields within Russia.
Aeroflot Group yield (passenger revenue per RPK) and passenger RASK 1H2015 versus 1H2014
SU7.JPG

Source: Aeroflot

[h=2]Costs up 20%; CASK up 11%[/h]Operating costs were up by 20.4%, faster than the growth in ASKs, but slower than the increase in revenue. Fuel costs grew by 11.1%, faster than capacity growth in spite of lower market prices for jet fuel, due to the weaker RUB versus USD.
Ex fuel costs increased by 24.1%, also inflated by RUB depreciation. In addition to the impact on fuel costs as reported in RUB, currency movements also had a significant impact on other USD-denominated costs such as operating leases, maintenance and aircraft, traffic and passenger servicing.
The Aeroflot group's cost per ASK (CASK) increased by 10.8%, but the company says that without the impact of foreign exchange and non-recurring expenses, it was down by 11.1%. Currency movements increased costs by RUB31.448 billion (EUR488 million), so that the net impact on operating profit was negative by RUB544 million (EUR8 million).
Aeroflot Group operating costs 1H2015 versus 1H2014
SU8.JPG

1 Includes sales and marketing expenses and administration and general expenses.
2 Other expenses include VAT under code-sharing agreement with Rossiya Airlines and fuel excise reimbursement during 6M 2015
Source: Aeroflot

[h=2]LCC subsidiary Pobeda carries more than one million passengers in its first six months[/h]Aeroflot's low cost airline, Pobeda, commenced operations just before 1H2015 (in Dec-2014) with a service to Volgograd. Launched as a replacement for its predecessor Dobrolet (forced to close as a result of European Union sanctions), it is the only Russian LCC and deploys a fleet of 12 Boeing 737-800 aircraft.
Pobeda carried 1.1 million passengers, at a load factor of 81.0%, in the half year, when it accounted for 6.2% of the group's total. With its principal hub at Moscow Vnukovo, it has 15 regular destinations and operated 37 routes in the 2015 summer schedule (including seasonal routes).
Pobeda aims to have 40 aircraft on 47 routes (including international destinations), carrying ten million passengers in 2018.
Pobeda monthly passenger numbers ('000) and load factor % Dec-2014 to Jun-2015
SU9.JPG

Source: Aeroflot

Pobeda network
SU10.JPG

Source: Aeroflot

See related reports:

[h=2]Aeroflot Group's leading Russian market share to receive further boost from Transaero acqusition[/h]The Aeroflot Group, still majority owned by the Russian government, has benefited in market share terms in the past from being the state's designated leader of the consolidation of the airline market in Russia. The group now has more than three times the passenger numbers of its nearest competitor in the Russian market and more than the combined numbers of its nearest four competitors.
Aeroflot Group's market share among all airlines operating in Russia has grown from 31% of passengers in 1H2014 to 37% in 1H2015
As others cut capacity (in particular UTair and foreign airlines), the Aeroflot Group's market share among all airlines operating in Russia has grown from 31% of passengers in 1H2014 to 37% in 1H2015.
It now looks set to increase this share further through the acquisition of a 75% stake Russia's number two ranked airline Transaero, whose passenger share was 12% in 1H2015. Aeroflot has been prompted into this course of action by the Russian government, essentially in order to save the heavily indebted Transaero from bankruptcy.
Russia: share of airline passenger numbers 1H2014 and 1H2015
SU11.JPG

Source: Aeroflot 1H2015 presentation, quoting TCH, Rosaviatsia

The near 50% combined market share of the two groups has attracted the attention of Russia's Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), but it seems likely to be approved. In a statement on 2-Sep-2015, FAS Head Igor Artemyev stated: "I have said that I prefer the alternative of bankruptcy ... we will ask Aeroflot to sell a part of their routes, where it gains a monopoly as a result with a consolidation with Transaero Airlines."
the deal will further accelerate the consolidation of the Russian airline industry, cementing Aeroflot's undisputed market leadership
Although this transaction will present significant operational challenges as it executes the acquisition, Aeroflot has significant experience of integrating subsidiary airlines into the group. Moreover, the deal will further accelerate the consolidation of the Russian airline industry, cementing Aeroflot's undisputed market leadership.
The group's 1H2015 results show a welcome return to operating profit growth, after a 43% reduction in FY2014, in spite of the difficult geopolitical backdrop affecting demand for international traffic to/from Russia. Its business appears to be robust despite the challenges that it faces.



capa
 
Prez, mi ricollego al tuo messaggio con l'analisi CAPA (che non quoto per motivo di spazio) per respondere alla domanda di Mobius sull'antitrust.
Sotto al 50% non ci sono problemi di antitrust (esclusi alcuni casi ben specifico tra il 35 ed il 49%)