Aviazione Civile
Booking.com
Pagina 38 di 45 primaprima ... 282930313233343536373839404142434445 ultimoultimo
Visualizzazione dei risultati da 926 a 950 su 1103
  1. #926

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da B77W Visualizza il messaggio
    Ni. Sicuramente Airbus ha fatto l’affare per il post A320, ma continua così a restare fuori dal mercato regional, dove invece Embraer la fa da padrone. E pure con la cellula E-Jet al tramonto, Embraer ha tutte le capacità per progettare ex novo una macchina che vada a coprire il gap fra ATR e A220/320.
    Embraer ha venduto 1500 E-jets - 170, 175, 190, 195 - in tutta la sua storia; il numero di 320 CEO e 737 NG e' dieci volte piu' alto e, se consideriamo il trend di upgauging (nessuno sta comprando i 737-7MAX, o i 319NEO) direi che in molti tra quanti hanno 190/195, dove possono, cercheranno di spostarsi verso mezzi da 120-140 posti.
    Are we there yet? Stories from the road.

  2. #927

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da indaco1 Visualizza il messaggio
    Posto qui molto di rado, quindi approfitto per una vaccata.

    L'airframe del 737 e' del 1967. Quella del DC-9 da cui poi sono derivati MD80 ecc. e' del 1965... non tanto diverso.

    Con i motori montati in coda non hai il problema dello spostamento del centro di spinta.

    Non e' che possono recuperare dalle scartoffie dei vecchi design?

    Ve l'avevo detto che era una vaccata.
    Non ci sono più le linee di pruduzione e (credo soprattutto) i motori moderni hanno un diametro totalmente diverso dal JT8, immagino ci sarebbero un mare di problemi aerodinamici da risolvere

  3. #928
    Amministratore L'avatar di enrico
    Registrato dal
    Jan 2008
    residenza
    Rapallo, Liguria.
    Messaggi
    14,653

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da indaco1 Visualizza il messaggio
    Posto qui molto di rado, quindi approfitto per una vaccata.

    L'airframe del 737 e' del 1967. Quella del DC-9 da cui poi sono derivati MD80 ecc. e' del 1965... non tanto diverso.

    Con i motori montati in coda non hai il problema dello spostamento del centro di spinta.

    Non e' che possono recuperare dalle scartoffie dei vecchi design?

    Ve l'avevo detto che era una vaccata.
    Te la concediamo.

  4. #929
    Junior Member
    Registrato dal
    Nov 2011
    Messaggi
    397

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da 13900 Visualizza il messaggio
    Embraer ha venduto 1500 E-jets - 170, 175, 190, 195 - in tutta la sua storia; il numero di 320 CEO e 737 NG e' dieci volte piu' alto e, se consideriamo il trend di upgauging (nessuno sta comprando i 737-7MAX, o i 319NEO) direi che in molti tra quanti hanno 190/195, dove possono, cercheranno di spostarsi verso mezzi da 120-140 posti.
    Mi riesce difficile credere che si passerà dai 70 posti dell’ATR72, con tutte le sue limitazioni, direttamente ai 120 di un A220/319/737, il mercato regional continuerà ad essere vivo e non è l’A220 la risposta a quel segmento. Staremo a vedere.

  5. #930

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da B77W Visualizza il messaggio
    Mi riesce difficile credere che si passerà dai 70 posti dell’ATR72, con tutte le sue limitazioni, direttamente ai 120 di un A220/319/737, il mercato regional continuerà ad essere vivo e non è l’A220 la risposta a quel segmento. Staremo a vedere.
    E' anche il mercato in cui c'è più concorrenza e meno margine...
    Are we there yet? Stories from the road.

  6. #931
    Moderatore L'avatar di londonfog
    Registrato dal
    Jul 2012
    residenza
    Londra
    Messaggi
    7,963

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da indaco1 Visualizza il messaggio
    Posto qui molto di rado, quindi approfitto per una vaccata.

    L'airframe del 737 e' del 1967. Quella del DC-9 da cui poi sono derivati MD80 ecc. e' del 1965... non tanto diverso.

    Con i motori montati in coda non hai il problema dello spostamento del centro di spinta.

    Non e' che possono recuperare dalle scartoffie dei vecchi design?

    Ve l'avevo detto che era una vaccata.
    Mia opinione personale (tentativo di proteggermi dalla contraerea )

    Credo che a prescindere da linee di produzione (con relative attrezzature) oramai chiuse da un pezzo, il problema non e' solo quello dei motori.

    Nella mia (breve) carriera in cabina di pilotaggio io sono stato il primo ufficiale nei B737 di LH. Era un'aereo molto piu' piccolo in tutti i sensi. Le varie versioni del DC.9/MD 80/B717 avevano semplicemente allungato la cabina, cosa favorita dai motori dietro. Il B737 e' stato progressivamente ingrandito, nelle dimensioni, nella potenza dei motori, ecc. Il B737 Max e' piu' vicino a quello che era un B707/720 di quanto non lo sia ad un B737-100.

    Non voglio entrare nel merito del software, o di altri aggiornamenti. Dico solo che forse a partire dal B737-400 ha cominciato ad essere un aereo diverso, e forse questo ha creato una serie di problemi che sono forse stati sottovalutati. E' un po come se l'Airbus A318 fosse stato il progetto originale Airbus (non la versione accorciata del 320) e fosse entrato in servizio quasi quarant'anni prima del 321 LR.

  7. #932
    Member L'avatar di i-ffss
    Registrato dal
    Aug 2010
    residenza
    LIMF
    Messaggi
    1,324

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    non per fare paragoni arditi, ma nel settore automobilistico c'è questa bizzarra mania yankee (e non solo) di prendere auto d'epoca e infilarci sotto meccaniche moderne: ultima la Dodge Charger con KIT motore-sospensioni-freni-aerodinamica-estetica; il motore Mopar fa 1000 CV: ecco, per quanto debitamente rinforzato, il telaio è quello di una Charger anni '70...mi sembra qausi la storia del MAX
    "I wanna fly like a bird in the sky just you and I"

  8. #933

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da B77W Visualizza il messaggio
    Mi riesce difficile credere che si passerà dai 70 posti dell’ATR72, con tutte le sue limitazioni, direttamente ai 120 di un A220/319/737, il mercato regional continuerà ad essere vivo e non è l’A220 la risposta a quel segmento. Staremo a vedere.
    Dipende dall'economicità d'uso dell'A220, in fondo un E195 non è lontano dei 120 posti. Tendenzialmente il mercato negli ultimi anni è andato verso le versioni più capienti penalizzando le versioni più piccole che scontano una struttura sovradimensionata.

  9. #934
    Junior Member
    Registrato dal
    Aug 2014
    residenza
    Torino
    Messaggi
    418

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Interessante articolo del NYT dove si scopre qualcosa di più sull'origine dell'MCAS, che sembra sia nato per tutt'altro contesto (manovre evasive ad alta velocità) e poi rimaneggiato successivamente per le situazioni di high-thrust & high-AoA: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/b...CTPGzEQpfGHsgg


    Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change
    By Jack Nicas, Natalie Kitroeff, David Gelles and James Glanz

    SEATTLE — The fatal flaws with Boeing’s 737 Max can be traced to a breakdown late in the plane’s development, when test pilots, engineers and regulators were left in the dark about a fundamental overhaul to an automated system that would ultimately play a role in two crashes.

    A year before the plane was finished, Boeing made the system more aggressive and riskier. While the original version relied on data from at least two types of sensors, the final version used just one, leaving the system without a critical safeguard. In both doomed flights, pilots struggled as a single damaged sensor sent the planes into irrecoverable nose-dives within minutes, killing 346 people and prompting regulators around the world to ground the Max.

    But many people involved in building, testing and approving the system, known as MCAS, said they hadn’t fully understood the changes. Current and former employees at Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration who spoke with The New York Times said they had assumed the system relied on more sensors and would rarely, if ever, activate. Based on those misguided assumptions, many made critical decisions, affecting design, certification and training.

    “It doesn’t make any sense,” said a former test pilot who worked on the Max. “I wish I had the full story.”

    While prosecutors and lawmakers try to piece together what went wrong, the current and former employees point to the single, fateful decision to change the system, which led to a series of design mistakes and regulatory oversights. As Boeing rushed to get the plane done, many of the employees say, they didn’t recognize the importance of the decision. They described a compartmentalized approach, each of them focusing on a small part of the plane. The process left them without a complete view of a critical and ultimately dangerous system.

    The company also played down the scope of the system to regulators. Boeing never disclosed the revamp of MCAS to Federal Aviation Administration officials involved in determining pilot training needs, according to three agency officials. When Boeing asked to remove the description of the system from the pilot’s manual, the F.A.A. agreed. As a result, most Max pilots did not know about the software until after the first crash, in October.

    “Boeing has no higher priority than the safety of the flying public,” a company spokesman, Gordon Johndroe, said in a statement.

    He added that Boeing and regulators had followed standard procedures. “The F.A.A. considered the final configuration and operating parameters of MCAS during Max certification, and concluded that it met all certification and regulatory requirements,” Mr. Johndroe said.

    At first, MCAS — Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System — wasn’t a very risky piece of software. The system would trigger only in rare conditions, nudging down the nose of the plane to make the Max handle more smoothly during high-speed moves. And it relied on data from multiple sensors measuring the plane’s acceleration and its angle to the wind, helping to ensure that the software didn’t activate erroneously.

    Then Boeing engineers reconceived the system, expanding its role to avoid stalls in all types of situations. They allowed the software to operate throughout much more of the flight. They enabled it to aggressively push down the nose of the plane. And they used only data about the plane’s angle, removing some of the safeguards.

    The disasters might have been avoided, if employees and regulators had a better understanding of MCAS.

    A test pilot who originally advocated for the expansion of the system didn’t understand how the changes affected its safety. Safety analysts said they would have acted differently if they had known it used just one sensor. Regulators didn’t conduct a formal safety assessment of the new version of MCAS.

    The current and former employees, many of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the continuing investigations, said that after the first crash, they were stunned to discover MCAS relied on a single sensor.

    “That’s nuts,” said an engineer who helped design MCAS.

    “I’m shocked,” said a safety analyst who scrutinized it.

    “To me, it seems like somebody didn’t understand what they were doing,” said an engineer who assessed the system’s sensors.

    MCAS Is Born

    In 2012, the chief test pilot for the Max had a problem.

    During the early development of the 737 Max, the pilot, Ray Craig, a silver-haired retired Navy airman, was trying out high-speed situations on a flight simulator, like maneuvers to avoid an obstacle or to escape a powerful vortex from another plane. While such moves might never be necessary for the pilot of a passenger plane, the F.A.A. requires that a jet handle well in those situations.

    But the plane wasn’t flying smoothly, partly because of the Max’s bigger engines. To fix the issue, Boeing decided to use a piece of software. The system was meant to work in the background, so pilots effectively wouldn’t know it was there.

    Mr. Craig, who had been with Boeing since 1988, didn’t like it, according to one person involved in the testing. An old-school pilot, he eschewed systems that take control from pilots and would have preferred an aerodynamic fix such as vortex generators, thin fins on the wings. But engineers who tested the Max design in a wind tunnel weren’t convinced they would work, the person said.

    Mr. Craig relented. Such high-speed situations were so rare that he figured the software would never actually kick in.

    To ensure it didn’t misfire, engineers initially designed MCAS to trigger when the plane exceeded at least two separate thresholds, according to three people who worked on the 737 Max. One involved the plane’s angle to the wind, and the other involved so-called G-force, or the force on the plane that typically comes from accelerating.

    The Max would need to hit an exceedingly high G-force that passenger planes would probably never experience. For the jet’s angle, the system took data from the angle-of-attack sensor. The sensor, several inches long, is essentially a small wind vane affixed to the jet’s fuselage.

    Adding More Power

    On a rainy day in late January 2016, thousands of Boeing employees gathered at a runway next to the 737 factory in Renton, Wash. They cheered as the first Max, nicknamed the Spirit of Renton, lifted off for its maiden test flight.

    “The flight was a success,” Ed Wilson, the new chief test pilot for the Max, said in a news release at the time. Mr. Wilson, who had tested Boeing fighter jets, had replaced Mr. Craig the previous year.

    “The 737 Max just felt right in flight, giving us complete confidence that this airplane will meet our customers’ expectations,” he said.

    But a few weeks later, Mr. Wilson and his co-pilot began noticing that something was off, according to a person with direct knowledge of the flights. The Max wasn’t handling well when nearing stalls at low speeds.

    In a meeting at Boeing Field in Seattle, Mr. Wilson told engineers that the issue would need to be fixed. He and his co-pilot proposed MCAS, the person said.

    The change didn’t elicit much debate in the group, which included just a handful of people. It was considered “a run-of-the-mill adjustment,” according to the person. Instead, the group mostly discussed the logistics of how MCAS would be used in the new scenarios.

    “I don’t recall ever having any real debates over whether it was a good idea or not,” the person said.

    The change proved pivotal. Expanding the use of MCAS to lower-speed situations required removing the G-force threshold. MCAS now needed to work at low speeds so G-force didn’t apply.

    The change meant that a single angle-of-attack sensor was the lone guard against a misfire. Although modern 737 jets have two angle-of-attack sensors, the final version of MCAS took data from just one.

    Using MCAS at lower speeds also required increasing the power of the system. When a plane is flying slowly, flight controls are less sensitive, and far more movement is needed to steer. Think of turning a car’s steering wheel at 20 miles an hour versus 70.

    The original version of MCAS could move the stabilizer — the part of the tail that controls the vertical direction of the jet — a maximum of about 0.6 degrees in about 10 seconds. The new version could move the stabilizer up to 2.5 degrees in 10 seconds.

    Test pilots aren’t responsible for dealing with the ramifications of such changes. Their job is to ensure the plane handles smoothly. Other colleagues are responsible for making the changes, and still others for assessing their impact on safety.

    Boeing declined to say whether the changes had prompted a new internal safety analysis.

    While the F.A.A. officials in charge of training didn’t know about the changes, another arm of the agency involved in certification did. But it did not conduct a safety analysis on the changes.

    The F.A.A. had already approved the previous version of MCAS. And the agency’s rules didn’t require it to take a second look because the changes didn’t affect how the plane operated in extreme situations.

    “The F.A.A. was aware of Boeing’s MCAS design during the certification of the 737 Max,” the agency said in a statement. “Consistent with regulatory requirements, the agency evaluated data and conducted flight tests within the normal flight envelope that included MCAS activation in low-speed stall and other flight conditions.”

    ‘External Events’

    After engineers installed the second version of MCAS, Mr. Wilson and his co-pilot took the 737 Max for a spin.

    The flights were uneventful. They tested two potential failures of MCAS: a high-speed maneuver in which the system doesn’t trigger, and a low-speed stall when it activates but then freezes. In both cases, the pilots were able to easily fly the jet, according to a person with knowledge of the flights.

    In those flights, they did not test what would happen if MCAS activated as a result of a faulty angle-of-attack sensor — a problem in the two crashes.

    Boeing engineers did consider such a possibility in their safety analysis of the original MCAS. They classified the event as “hazardous,” one rung below the most serious designation of catastrophic, according to two people. In regulatory-speak, it meant that MCAS could trigger erroneously less often than once in 10 million flight hours.

    That probability may have underestimated the risk of so-called external events that have damaged sensors in the past, such as collisions with birds, bumps from ramp stairs or mechanics stepping on them. While part of the assessment considers such incidents, they are not included in the probability. Investigators suspect the angle-of-attack sensor was hit on the doomed Ethiopian Airlines flight in March.

    Bird strikes on angle-of-attack sensors are relatively common.

    A Times review of two F.A.A. databases found hundreds of reports of bent, cracked, sheared-off, poorly installed or otherwise malfunctioning angle-of-attack sensors on commercial aircraft over three decades.

    Since 1990, one database has recorded 1,172 instances when birds — meadowlarks, geese, sandpipers, pelicans and turkey vultures, among others — damaged sensors of various kinds, with 122 strikes on angle-of-attack vanes. The other database showed 85 problems with angle-of-attack sensors on Boeing aircraft, including 38 on 737s since 1995.

    And the public databases don’t necessarily capture the extent of incidents involving angle-of-attack sensors, since the F.A.A. has additional information. “I feel confidence in saying that there’s a lot more that were struck,” said Richard Dolbeer, a wildlife specialist who has spent over 20 years studying the issue at the United States Department of Agriculture, which tracks the issue for the F.A.A.

    A Simple Request

    On March 30, 2016, Mark Forkner, the Max’s chief technical pilot, sent an email to senior F.A.A. officials with a seemingly innocuous request: Would it be O.K. to remove MCAS from the pilot’s manual?

    The officials, who helped determine pilot training needs, had been briefed on the original version of MCAS months earlier. Mr. Forkner and Boeing never mentioned to them that MCAS was in the midst of an overhaul, according to the three F.A.A. officials.

    Under the impression that the system was relatively benign and rarely used, the F.A.A. eventually approved Mr. Forkner’s request, the three officials said.

    Boeing wanted to limit changes to the Max, from previous versions of the 737. Anything major could have required airlines to spend millions of dollars on additional training. Boeing, facing competitive pressure from Airbus, tried to avoid that.

    Mr. Forkner, a former F.A.A. employee, was at the front lines of this effort. As the chief technical pilot, he was the primary liaison with the F.A.A. on training and worked on the pilot’s manual.

    “The pressure on us,” said Rick Ludtke, a cockpit designer on the Max, “was huge.”

    “And that all got funneled through Mark,” Mr. Ludtke added. “And the pushback and resistance from the F.A.A. got funneled through Mark.”

    Like others, Mr. Forkner may have had an imperfect understanding of MCAS.

    Technical pilots at Boeing like him previously flew planes regularly, two former employees said. “Then the company made a strategic change where they decided tech pilots would no longer be active pilots,” Mr. Ludtke said.

    Mr. Forkner largely worked on flight simulators, which didn’t fully mimic MCAS.

    It is unclear whether Mr. Forkner, now a pilot for Southwest Airlines, was aware of the changes to the system.

    Mr. Forkner’s attorney, David Gerger, said his client did not mislead the F.A.A. “Mark is an Air Force veteran who put safety first and was transparent in his work,” Mr. Gerger said.

    “In thousands of tests, nothing like this had ever happened,” he said. “Based on what he was told and what he knew, he never dreamed that it could.”

    The F.A.A. group that worked with Mr. Forkner made some decisions based on an incomplete view of the system. It never tested a malfunctioning sensor, according to the three officials. It didn’t require additional training.

    William Schubbe, a senior F.A.A. official who worked with the training group, told pilots and airlines in an April meeting in Washington, D.C., that Boeing had underplayed MCAS, according to a recording reviewed by The Times.

    “The way the system was presented to the F.A.A.,” Mr. Schubbe said, “the Boeing Corporation said this thing is so transparent to the pilot that there’s no need to demonstrate any kind of failing.”

    The F.A.A. officials involved in training weren’t the only ones operating with outdated information.

    An April 2017 maintenance manual that Boeing provided to airlines refers to the original version of MCAS. By that point, Boeing had started delivering the planes. The current manual is updated.

    Boeing continued to defend MCAS and its reliance on a single sensor after the first crash, involving Indonesia’s Lion Air.

    At a tense meeting with the pilots’ union at American Airlines in November, Boeing executives dismissed concerns. “It’s been reported that it’s a single point failure, but it is not considered by design or certification a single point,” said Mike Sinnett, a Boeing vice president, according to a recording of the meeting.

    His reasoning? The pilots were the backup.

    “Because the function and the trained pilot work side by side and are part of the system,” he said.

    Four months later, a second 737 Max crashed in Ethiopia. Within days, the Max was grounded around the world.

    As part of the fix, Boeing has reworked MCAS to more closely resemble the first version. It will be less aggressive, and it will rely on two sensors.
    Carlo/Charlie/Charles/Fewwy/Ehi tu!
    GA Pilot + Passenger + Enthusiast
    TRN-FCO w/AZ finché se po'...

  10. #935
    Junior Member L'avatar di frubagotti
    Registrato dal
    Mar 2012
    residenza
    Berlin
    Messaggi
    293

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Intanto Icelandair licenzia 24 piloti MAX che erano stati assunti in concomitanza con l'ingresso dei 737 nella loro flotta.

    Icelandair has dismissed a number of pilots and postponed the appointment of an additional number of them, due to the ongoing grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX.
    The 24 pilots were hired last autumn and had already begun to fly the company’s eight Boeing 737 MAX when the aircraft received a global flight ban in March.
    In addition, Icelandair has postponed the appointment of another 21 pilots who had already begun training on the MAX aircraft.
    “This decision was made as it is anticipated that the suspension of the 737 MAX aircraft will last longer than previously expected and because we have already made changes to our flight plans until September 15 to reflect this,” a spokesman for Icelandair told Air Transport World.
    However, the airline said it hoped to be able to reinstate the pilots as soon as the company has a better overview of how the MAX controversy will develop.


    https://standbynordic.com/icelandair...24-max-pilots/
    Economy is the new business class

  11. #936

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Boeing Business Update begins with #737MAX briefing with Greg Smith: the tragedy of MAX accidents weigh on all
    Of us. These accidents have intensified our focus to improving what we do for safety. Safe return of MAX is priority 1.
    Smith: We’re supporting a number of independent reviews. We’re supporting our airline customers during this challenging time and working to return fleet back to service while working with supply chain. We’re mindful of restoring customer, passengers, and crews trust.
    CEO #Boeing Commercial Airplanes Kevin McAllister: we are very sorry because of the lost of lives in Ethiopian and Lion Air accidents. Safety is sacred & top priority of what we do. This is the most trying of times in the industry in my 30 years. It’s the most pivotal time.
    Updated MCAS software will have 3 pillars of protection. Over 280 test flights and enhanced training. We are making solid progress to unground MAX. Our regulators will decide and I won’t speculate on a date. We will treat each airplane as an entry into service & get it right.
    McAllister: We are making steady progress on 777X with 2 frames complete. Any lessons learned out of 737MAX will be part of all programs going forward. We are staying close to GE engine situation. The 777X will be a terrific airplane replace twins & grow new markets.

    Airways Magazine

  12. #937
    Amministratore L'avatar di enrico
    Registrato dal
    Jan 2008
    residenza
    Rapallo, Liguria.
    Messaggi
    14,653

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Non so sino a che punto sia commercialmente intelligente mettere nella stessa frase 737MAX e 777X.

  13. #938

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Dalla dichiarazione sopra riportata di Boeing:

    "These accidents have intensified our focus to improving what we do for safety."

    "Safety is sacred & top priority of what we do".

    "Any lessons learned out of 737MAX will be part of all programs going forward".

    ---

    Poi su Reuters...

    Exclusive: Boeing seeking to reduce scope, duration of some physical tests for new aircraft

    PARIS (Reuters) - Boeing Co engineers are reducing the scope and duration of certain costly physical tests used to certify the planemaker’s new aircraft, according to industry sources and regulatory officials.

    But the strategy could be at risk if regulators and U.S. lawmakers probing two deadly Boeing plane crashes require even more rigorous safety tests before certifying new aircraft as passenger-worthy.

    As Boeing kicks off the year-long flight testing process on its new 777X, its engineers will cut hours off airborne testing by using computer models to simulate flight conditions, and then present the results to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as part of the basis for certification, according to two people with direct knowledge of the strategy.

    Prosegue sul sito
    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-f...-idUSKCN1TH0A3

  14. #939
    Senior Member
    Registrato dal
    Nov 2005
    residenza
    .
    Messaggi
    14,564

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    ​PARIS: Boeing should rename 737 Max – Qatar chief

    19 JUNE, 2019 SOURCE: FLIGHT DASHBOARD BY: MAX KINGSLEY-JONES PARIS
    Qatar Airways group chief executive Akbar Al Baker expects that Boeing will need to rename the 737 Max after the damage done to its brand reputation in the wake of the grounding that followed two fatal accidents within five months.

    The Qatari carrier has placed orders for 20 Max 8s, of which five have been delivered to Air Italy, in which it holds a 49% stake. Speaking at the show, Al Baker said Qatar Airways had no requirement for additional 737 Max aircraft and awaited the resolution of the grounding issues.

    "The only thing that we difficulty with will be how to convince people to get into a Max, because of the reputational damage," he says.

    "We have full confidence in Boeing that the issues will be resolved, and regulators will certify the aeroplane."

    When asked what could be done to address the brand-reputation issue, Al Baker said: "I think Boeing will have to come up with something to rename this aircraft."

    Boeing announced its first business for the Max at the Paris air show on 19 June when IAG announced commitments for 200 aircraft. Interestingly, the IAG statement made no reference to the Max name, referring to the aircraft as "737-8" and "737-10".

    https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...-chief-459195/

  15. #940

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da indaco1 Visualizza il messaggio
    Posto qui molto di rado, quindi approfitto per una vaccata.

    L'airframe del 737 e' del 1967. Quella del DC-9 da cui poi sono derivati MD80 ecc. e' del 1965... non tanto diverso.

    Con i motori montati in coda non hai il problema dello spostamento del centro di spinta.

    Non e' che possono recuperare dalle scartoffie dei vecchi design?

    Ve l'avevo detto che era una vaccata.
    Direi che a questo punto fanno molto prima a rimettere in produzione il 737 NG e a suon di sconti tappano il buco sino al completo sviluppo di una macchina completamente nuova

  16. #941

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da Azeta Visualizza il messaggio
    Direi che a questo punto fanno molto prima a rimettere in produzione il 737 NG e a suon di sconti tappano il buco sino al completo sviluppo di una macchina completamente nuova
    Impensabile, dovrebbero indennizzare i proprietari di Max con miliardi di dollari e venderebbero comunque in perdita.
    In qualche maniera il Max deve tornare a volare, probabilmente non basteranno modifiche software, potrebbe essere necessario inserire una ulteriore ridondanza ai sensori e possibilità di disinserire manualmente sistemi di ausilio permettendo il pieno controllo dei piloti, ma ripeto, in qualche modo debbono recuperarlo. Poi sicuramente il 797 già ha avuto una virata per sostituire anche il 737, ma è questione di almeno 5-6 anni.

  17. #942

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da Azeta Visualizza il messaggio
    Direi che a questo punto fanno molto prima a rimettere in produzione il 737 NG e a suon di sconti tappano il buco sino al completo sviluppo di una macchina completamente nuova
    Io a questo punto se fossi Boeing chiuderei tutto e mi metterei a fare lamette da barba
    Di alluminio ne hanno tanto :-)

  18. #943

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Vista dall’alto di Renton in questi giorni:
    https://youtu.be/46InmJexzYg

  19. #944
    Junior Member L'avatar di Senator
    Registrato dal
    May 2010
    residenza
    Carate B.za (MB) Marina di Castagneto Carducci (LI)
    Messaggi
    337

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da freez267 Visualizza il messaggio
    Io a questo punto se fossi Boeing chiuderei tutto e mi metterei a fare lamette da barba
    Di alluminio ne hanno tanto :-)
    Lamette da barba in alluminio ? ��

  20. #945

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da Farfallina Visualizza il messaggio
    Impensabile, dovrebbero indennizzare i proprietari di Max con miliardi di dollari e venderebbero comunque in perdita.
    In qualche maniera il Max deve tornare a volare, probabilmente non basteranno modifiche software, potrebbe essere necessario inserire una ulteriore ridondanza ai sensori e possibilità di disinserire manualmente sistemi di ausilio permettendo il pieno controllo dei piloti, ma ripeto, in qualche modo debbono recuperarlo. Poi sicuramente il 797 già ha avuto una virata per sostituire anche il 737, ma è questione di almeno 5-6 anni.
    Si la ma era una risposta al discorso dell’Md-80
    Per quanto riguarda il Max anch’io sono convinto che tornerà presto a volare, a costo di imbottirlo di sensori

  21. #946
    Member L'avatar di Viking
    Registrato dal
    Aug 2009
    residenza
    Milano
    Messaggi
    1,851

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da crazyale Visualizza il messaggio
    Vista dall’alto di Renton in questi giorni:
    https://youtu.be/46InmJexzYg
    https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=iJ7pwTYG4Hk

  22. #947

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Airlines and regulators meet to discuss Boeing 737 MAX un-grounding efforts
    Allison Lampert
    MONTREAL (Reuters) - Airlines and regulators are gathering at a closed-door summit in Montreal on Wednesday to exchange views on steps needed for a safe and coordinated return of Boeing Co’s grounded 737 MAX jets to the skies following two deadly crashes.
    The meeting, organized by industry trade group the International Air Transport Association (IATA), comes as airlines grapple with the financial impact of a global grounding of nearly 400 737 MAX jets that has lasted three months.
    Boeing, the world’s largest planemaker, has yet to formally submit proposed 737 MAX software and training updates to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which will kick-start a re-certification process that could take weeks.
    IATA Director General Alexandre de Juniac has said “shoring up trust among regulators and improving coordination” within an industry that grounded the MAX planes on different dates in March would be priorities at Wednesday’s summit.
    It is the second such meeting organized by IATA.
    China was first to ground the MAX after a March 10 crash in Ethiopia within five months of a similar crash off Indonesia, killing a combined 346 people, while the United States and Canada were the last.
    Regulators including Transport Canada, the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore and the FAA will join airlines at the meeting, representatives from the authorities told Reuters.
    Once regulators approve the MAX for flight, airlines must remove the jets from storage and implement new pilot training, a process that will differ for each airline but that U.S. carriers have said will take at least one month.
    Some airlines and regulators have argued that pilots should be trained in a MAX simulator before flying, though Boeing’s minimum training requirements do not call for flight simulators, according to draft proposals.
    “Training is up to each regulator. When the MAX returns to the skies, with the updated software and required training, it will be one of the safest airplanes ever to fly,” Boeing spokesman Paul Bergman said.
    Boeing’s software fix is meant to make a system known as MCAS, which played a role in both crashes, less powerful. Still, Air Canada has said its 400 MAX pilots, about 10 percent of its pilot force, will train in the simulator. Air Canada is the only North American carrier that currently owns the MAX simulator. U.S. carriers have discussed putting pilots in scenarios similar to the 737 MAX crashes as part of recurring training.

    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-e...-idUSKCN1TR1FG

  23. #948

    Question Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Quote Originariamente inviato da Max737 Visualizza il messaggio
    ... though Boeing’s minimum training requirements do not call for flight simulators...
    Ma che tipo di training vorrebbero proporre ?

    Mi sembrano perseverare nella linea del "vi cambia poco o niente" che li ha portati all'inizio a non dichiarare neppure la presenza del MCAS.
    Sarò più cinico del solito ma leggo un tentativo di scaricare i costi sui vettori; "basta che i piloti leggano qualcosa" ossia il classico compitino "on top", a tempo perso avrebbe detto mia nonna (ed a costo zero aggiungerei io) e se poi un vettore vuole far fare il training nel simulatore a tutti i piloti, faccia pure ma venga a chiedere compensazioni monetarie, non serviva.

  24. #949

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    Forse dovrebbero trovare la decenza e la dignità di abortire il progetto e dedicarsi ad un modello completamente nuovo.

    https://edition-m.cnn.com/2019/06/26...law/index.html

  25. #950
    Member L'avatar di OneShot
    Registrato dal
    Dec 2015
    residenza
    Paris
    Messaggi
    1,541

    Predefinito Re: 737 MAX 8 Ethiopian si schianta subito dopo il decollo da Addis Abeba

    . When testing the potential failure of the microprocessor in the simulators, "it was difficult for the test pilots to recover in a matter of seconds," one of the sources said. "And if you can't recover in a matter of seconds, that's an unreasonable risk."
    E su questo siamo d'accordo!

Informazione discussione

Utenti che visualizzano questa discussione

Ci sono attualmente 2 utenti che visualizzano di questa discussione. (0 utenti 2 ospiti)

Discussioni simili

  1. DXB, Incidente a 777 in atterraggio (volo EK521)
    Da Cekky nel forum Aviazione Civile
    Risposte: 181
    Ultimo messaggio: 18th April 2017, 12: 30
  2. Volo di consegna "umanitario" per l'ultimo 787 Ethiopian
    Da james84 nel forum Aviazione Civile
    Risposte: 0
    Ultimo messaggio: 1st November 2012, 14: 29
  3. Risposte: 0
    Ultimo messaggio: 29th March 2011, 09: 39
  4. Risposte: 11
    Ultimo messaggio: 11th January 2009, 23: 31
  5. Incidente aereo (con Babbo Natale) in volo.
    Da Doctor K nel forum Spot IT - L'angolo dello spotter
    Risposte: 7
    Ultimo messaggio: 11th March 2008, 16: 11

Segnalibri

Segnalibri

Permessi di invio

Permessi di invio

  • Non puoi inserire discussioni
  • Non puoi inserire repliche
  • Non puoi inserire allegati
  • Non puoi modificare i tuoi messaggi
  •